
Open access
Date
2017Type
- Conference Paper
Abstract
We consider two prominent mechanisms for the electricity market; the pay-as-bid mechanism, currently applied in certain control reserve markets, and the proposed Vickrey- Clarke-Groves mechanism, an established auction mechanism used in advertising and spectrum auctions, for example. Bringing in tools from game theory and auction theory, we compare the Nash equilibria of these two mechanisms in terms of social efficiency and strategic behavior of the players. Furthermore, by formulating a coalitional game corresponding to the electricity market, we propose alternative mechanisms that incentivize truthful bidding while ensuring shill bidding is not profitable. Finally, we analyze the proposed mechanisms in a case study based on electricity market data. Show more
Permanent link
https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000245226Publication status
publishedExternal links
Book title
2017 IEEE 56th Annual Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)Pages / Article No.
Publisher
IEEEEvent
Organisational unit
09578 - Kamgarpour, Maryam (ehemalig) / Kamgarpour, Maryam (former)
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