Leaders Social Preference in Common Property Management
We investigate social preference of actual leaders in the enforcement of organizational norms in a third party punishment game and the effect this has on naturally occurring outcomes on forest commons management in Ethiopia. We find that most leaders did not punish (non-punisher), but those who did target violations in the conditional cooperation norm (norm-driven). A minority, however, also punished cooperators (anti-social). The results show a positive effect of non-punisher and norm driven leaders on the outcome, but the effect of anti-social leaders is strongly negative. This suggests that what matters is that leaders should not punish anti-socially. Further analysis shows a positive effect of norm-driven leaders on the outcome in groups with lower share of conditional cooperators, but in groups with higher shares, the effect is inconsequential. These findings suggest that gains from leadership, inter alia, need to be assessed in the light of leader social preference and have implications for organizational and development policy outcomes Show more
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PublisherUniversity of Lausanne
Organisational unit03728 - Engel, Stefanie (ehemalig)
NotesLecture at University of Lausanne on 24 March 2010.
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