Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author
Kleineberg, Kaj-Kolja
dc.contributor.author
Helbing, Dirk
dc.date.accessioned
2018-06-13T11:25:49Z
dc.date.available
2018-06-12T07:31:53Z
dc.date.available
2018-06-13T11:25:49Z
dc.date.issued
2018-05-11
dc.identifier.issn
1367-2630
dc.identifier.other
10.1088/1367-2630/aac155
en_US
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/269192
dc.identifier.doi
10.3929/ethz-b-000269192
dc.description.abstract
Governments and enterprises strongly rely on incentives to generate favorable outcomes from social and strategic interactions between individuals. The incentives are usually modeled by payoffs in evolutionary games, such as the prisoners dilemma or the harmony game, with imitation dynamics. Adjusting the incentives by changing the payoff parameters can favor cooperation, as found in the harmony game, over defection, which prevails in the prisoner's dilemma. Here, we show that this is not always the case if individuals engage in strategic interactions in multiple domains. In particular, we investigate evolutionary games on multiplex networks where individuals obtain an aggregate payoff. We explicitly control the strength of degree correlations between nodes in the different layers of the multiplex. We find that if the multiplex is composed of many layers and degree correlations are strong, the topology of the system enslaves the dynamics and the final outcome, cooperation or defection, becomes independent of the payoff parameters. The fate of the system is then determined by the initial conditions.
en_US
dc.format
application/pdf
en_US
dc.language.iso
en
en_US
dc.publisher
Institute of Physics
en_US
dc.rights.uri
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
dc.subject
complex networks
en_US
dc.subject
Multiplex networks
en_US
dc.subject
Evolutionary game theory
en_US
dc.title
Topological enslavement in evolutionary games on correlated multiplex networks
en_US
dc.type
Journal Article
dc.rights.license
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported
ethz.journal.title
New Journal of Physics
ethz.journal.volume
20
en_US
ethz.journal.issue
5
en_US
ethz.journal.abbreviated
New j. phys.
ethz.pages.start
053030
en_US
ethz.size
7 p.
en_US
ethz.version.deposit
publishedVersion
en_US
ethz.grant
Modeling the Emergence of Social Complexity and Order: How Individual and Societal Complexity Co-Evolve
en_US
ethz.identifier.wos
ethz.identifier.scopus
ethz.publication.place
Bristol
en_US
ethz.publication.status
published
en_US
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02045 - Dep. Geistes-, Sozial- u. Staatswiss. / Dep. of Humanities, Social and Pol.Sc.::03784 - Helbing, Dirk / Helbing, Dirk
ethz.leitzahl.certified
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02045 - Dep. Geistes-, Sozial- u. Staatswiss. / Dep. of Humanities, Social and Pol.Sc.::03784 - Helbing, Dirk / Helbing, Dirk
ethz.grant.agreementno
324247
ethz.grant.fundername
EC
ethz.grant.funderDoi
10.13039/501100000780
ethz.grant.program
FP7
ethz.date.deposited
2018-06-12T07:32:03Z
ethz.source
SCOPUS
ethz.eth
yes
en_US
ethz.availability
Open access
en_US
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2018-06-13T11:26:03Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2019-02-03T02:12:59Z
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
ethz.COinS
ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.atitle=Topological%20enslavement%20in%20evolutionary%20games%20on%20correlated%20multiplex%20networks&rft.jtitle=New%20Journal%20of%20Physics&rft.date=2018-05-11&rft.volume=20&rft.issue=5&rft.spage=053030&rft.issn=1367-2630&rft.au=Kleineberg,%20Kaj-Kolja&Helbing,%20Dirk&rft.genre=article&
 Search via SFX

Files in this item

Thumbnail

Publication type

Show simple item record