The larger the better? The role of interest-group size in legislative lobbying
Schneider, Maik T.
- Working Paper
Rights / licenseIn Copyright - Non-Commercial Use Permitted
We develop a model of legislative lobbying where policy proposals are endogenous. We show that a policy proposer with preferences tilted towards one lobby may be induced by an increase in that interest group’s size to propose policies geared towards the opposing lobby. Hence, a larger lobby size can have adverse effects on policy outcomes for this same lobby. This provides another rationale as to why some interests do not organize. Moreover, we find that a second-mover advantage in Groseclose and Snyder (1996)-type lobbying models with exogenous policy proposals can turn into a second-mover disadvantage when the proposal is endogenous. Show more
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Journal / seriesEconomics Working Paper Series
PublisherETH Zurich, Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH)
SubjectLegislative lobbying; Vote buying; Legislatures; Interest groups; Political economy
Organisational unit02045 - Dep. Geistes-, Sozial- u. Staatswiss. / Dep. of Humanities, Social and Pol.Sc.
03729 - Gersbach, Hans / Gersbach, Hans
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