The Larger the Better?
Schneider, Maik T.
- Working Paper
Rights / licenseIn Copyright - Non-Commercial Use Permitted
We develop a model of legislative lobbying where policy proposals are endogenous. We show that a policy proposer with preferences tilted towards one lobby may be induced by an increase in that interest group’s size to propose policies geared towards the opposing lobby. Hence, a larger lobby size can have adverse effects on policy outcomes for this same lobby. This provides another rationale as to why some interests do not organize. Moreover, we find that a second-mover advantage in Groseclose and Snyder (1996)-type lobbying models with exogenous policy proposals can turn into a second-mover disadvantage when the proposal is endogenous Show more
External linksFull text via SFX
Journal / seriesEconomics working paper series
PublisherETH, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich
SubjectELECTION BEHAVIOUR + VOTING BEHAVIOUR (INTERNAL POLITICS); WAHLVERHALTEN + STIMMVERHALTEN (INNENPOLITIK); LEGISLATION + LEGAL CODIFICATION (LAW); MODELS + MODEL ANALYSIS; MODELLE + MODELLUNTERSUCHUNG; Interest groups; Legislative lobbying; POLITICAL ECONOMY; Political economy; POLITISCHE ÖKONOMIE; Legislatures; OPERATIONS RESEARCH; GESETZGEBUNG + RECHTSKODIFIKATION (RECHT); Vote buying
Organisational unit02045 - Departement Geistes-, Sozial- und Staatswissenschaften / Department of Humanities, Social and Political Sciences
03729 - Gersbach, Hans
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