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Date
2008-12Type
- Working Paper
ETH Bibliography
yes
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Abstract
We examine how tax contracts affect government formation and welfare of voters in a parliamentary democracy. A tax contract specifies a range of tax rates a party is committed to if in government. We develop a new model of party competition and show that the introduction of tax contracts has two effects: a perks-reduction effect and a policy-shift effect. The former is dominant in soci- eties with a low degree of political polarization. If a society is highly polarized, tax contracts can yield more moderate political outcomes. However, there are also circumstances for which tax contracts induce more extreme policies. Show more
Publication status
publishedJournal / series
CEPR Discussion PapersPages / Article No.
Publisher
Centre for Economic Policy ResearchSubject
Contract theory; Government formation; VotingOrganisational unit
03729 - Gersbach, Hans / Gersbach, Hans
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ETH Bibliography
yes
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