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dc.contributor.author
Gersbach, Hans
dc.contributor.author
Schneider, Maik T.
dc.date.accessioned
2021-03-10T10:21:44Z
dc.date.available
2017-06-09T08:41:42Z
dc.date.available
2019-05-21T12:37:41Z
dc.date.available
2021-03-10T07:35:38Z
dc.date.available
2021-03-10T10:21:44Z
dc.date.issued
2008-12
dc.identifier.issn
0265-8003
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/28184
dc.description.abstract
We examine how tax contracts affect government formation and welfare of voters in a parliamentary democracy. A tax contract specifies a range of tax rates a party is committed to if in government. We develop a new model of party competition and show that the introduction of tax contracts has two effects: a perks-reduction effect and a policy-shift effect. The former is dominant in soci- eties with a low degree of political polarization. If a society is highly polarized, tax contracts can yield more moderate political outcomes. However, there are also circumstances for which tax contracts induce more extreme policies.
en_US
dc.language.iso
en
en_US
dc.publisher
Centre for Economic Policy Research
en_US
dc.subject
Contract theory
en_US
dc.subject
Government formation
en_US
dc.subject
Voting
en_US
dc.title
Tax contracts and government formation
en_US
dc.type
Working Paper
ethz.journal.title
CEPR Discussion Papers
ethz.pages.start
DP7084
en_US
ethz.size
59 p.
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::D - Microeconomics::D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making::D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::D - Microeconomics::D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty::D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::H - Public Economics::H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies::H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions
en_US
ethz.publication.place
London
en_US
ethz.publication.status
published
en_US
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.::03729 - Gersbach, Hans / Gersbach, Hans
en_US
ethz.leitzahl.certified
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.::03729 - Gersbach, Hans / Gersbach, Hans
ethz.identifier.url
https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=7084
ethz.date.deposited
2017-06-09T08:41:58Z
ethz.source
ECIT
ethz.identifier.importid
imp59364d856137a98099
ethz.ecitpid
pub:47229
ethz.eth
yes
en_US
ethz.availability
Metadata only
en_US
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2017-07-17T08:41:29Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2022-03-29T05:41:28Z
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
ethz.COinS
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