Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author
Britz, Volker
dc.contributor.author
Ebrahimi, Afsoon
dc.contributor.author
Gersbach, Hans
dc.date.accessioned
2019-05-22T11:43:06Z
dc.date.available
2019-01-16T11:14:05Z
dc.date.available
2019-01-16T11:30:34Z
dc.date.available
2019-05-22T11:43:06Z
dc.date.issued
2018-12
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/316287
dc.identifier.doi
10.3929/ethz-b-000316287
dc.description.abstract
We study how to efficiently motivate policy-makers to solve political multitask problems. Political multi-task problems typically have outcomes that are difficult to measure. Moreover, there are conflicts among citizens about optimal policies and the agents have the power to tax the citizens to invest in better outcomes of some tasks. We develop a political agency model with two tasks and only one measurable outcome. In such an environment, policy-makers choose socially inefficient public good levels and expropriate minorities. A judicious combination of constitutional limits on taxation and incentive pay for policy-makers is second-best. Incentive pay is conditional on the public good level.
en_US
dc.format
application/pdf
en_US
dc.language.iso
en
en_US
dc.publisher
ETH Zurich, Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH)
en_US
dc.rights.uri
http://rightsstatements.org/page/InC-NC/1.0/
dc.subject
Incentive contracts
en_US
dc.subject
Politicians
en_US
dc.subject
Multi-task problems
en_US
dc.title
Incentive pay for policy-makers
en_US
dc.type
Working Paper
dc.rights.license
In Copyright - Non-Commercial Use Permitted
dc.date.published
2019-01-16
ethz.journal.title
Economics Working Paper Series
ethz.journal.volume
18/307
en_US
ethz.size
60 p.
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::D - Microeconomics::D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making::D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::D - Microeconomics::D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty::D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
en_US
ethz.publication.place
Zurich
en_US
ethz.publication.status
published
en_US
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.
en_US
ethz.date.deposited
2019-01-16T11:14:19Z
ethz.source
FORM
ethz.eth
yes
en_US
ethz.availability
Open access
en_US
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2019-01-16T11:31:00Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2019-05-22T11:43:17Z
ethz.rosetta.exportRequired
true
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
ethz.COinS
ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.atitle=Incentive%20pay%20for%20policy-makers&rft.jtitle=Economics%20Working%20Paper%20Series&rft.date=2018-12&rft.volume=18/307&rft.au=Britz,%20Volker&Ebrahimi,%20Afsoon&Gersbach,%20Hans&rft.genre=preprint&
 Search via SFX

Files in this item

Thumbnail

Publication type

Show simple item record