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Date
2019Type
- Conference Paper
ETH Bibliography
yes
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Abstract
This paper explores conditions under which players cooperate in a dynamic network game. Historically, folk theorems have provided a speckled perspective by showing that there exists equilibria where players cooperate, do not cooperate, as well as a myriad of equilibria between these extremes. Our main contribution is identifying a necessary and sufficient equilibrium refinement such that, for all equilibria, all players cooperate in order to reach a strictly Pareto dominant graph. We base our results on a class of games that subsume forward-looking extensions of exchange economies with indivisible goods. Show more
Publication status
publishedExternal links
Book title
Proceedings of the 14th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation, NetEcon '19Pages / Article No.
Publisher
Association for Computing MachineryEvent
Subject
Dynamic games; Exchange economies; Equilibrium refinement; Networks; Stability; Collusiveness; Pareto dominanceOrganisational unit
02045 - Dep. Geistes-, Sozial- u. Staatswiss. / Dep. of Humanities, Social and Pol.Sc.03784 - Helbing, Dirk / Helbing, Dirk
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ETH Bibliography
yes
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