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dc.contributor.author
Duca, Stefano
dc.contributor.supervisor
Helbing, Dirk
dc.contributor.supervisor
Perc, Matjaž
dc.contributor.supervisor
Hegselmann, Rainer
dc.date.accessioned
2019-09-16T06:44:20Z
dc.date.available
2019-09-15T19:03:41Z
dc.date.available
2019-09-16T06:44:20Z
dc.date.issued
2019
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/364127
dc.identifier.doi
10.3929/ethz-b-000364127
dc.description.abstract
What makes people cooperate? How can one design mechanisms in order to incentivize players to contribute to public goods? These are the kinds of fundamental questions that are exemplified by analysis of the free-rider problem: The problem arises from the fact that, while an entire population benefits from the presence of a public good produced at some cost by cooperative individuals, free-riders (defectors) can benefit from the public good even when not producing any of it. Using the tools of Game Theory, Mechanism Design and Experimental Economics, one can identify and understand the underlying conflicting forces leading to such free-riders problems in human interactions. This understanding can then be used to design suitable mechanisms to avoid ``tragedies of the commons", i.e. convergence to socially sub-optimal outcomes. In this dissertation, I focus on Public Goods games, and in particular on understanding under which conditions the public good is successfully provided and sustained through voluntary contributions, when players interact in groups. I not only focus on how cooperation can emerge as a result of incentive mechanisms and/or behavioural regularities, but I also study the implications of said mechanisms in terms of the total welfare of the players. The aim is to assess how robust positive predictions obtained for Voluntary Contribution Games are, when transferred to more general models which are closer to real-world social dilemmas situations. I extend the Voluntary Contribution Game in several ways: by considering different strategy spaces and public good provision efficacies, by adding noise, and, crucially, by accounting for heterogeneity among players. Using a mixture of analytical, experimental and computational tools, I show that highly-efficient equilibria are enabled by so called ``grouping'' mechanisms but that they also often cease to exist when heterogeneity is taken into account. I identify under which conditions high cooperation can be achieved and determine what is the optimal mechanism in terms of social welfare, as a function of a social planner's preference. Finally, I also investigate mechanisms based on reputations expressed by ``scores", and show that the positive results obtained in pairwise interactions do not necessary apply to multiplayer prisoner’s dilemmas, regardless of how much information is provided about the past behaviour of the interacting partners.
en_US
dc.format
application/pdf
en_US
dc.language.iso
en
en_US
dc.publisher
ETH Zurich
en_US
dc.rights.uri
http://rightsstatements.org/page/InC-NC/1.0/
dc.subject
Game theory
en_US
dc.subject
Cooperation
en_US
dc.subject
Mechanism Design
en_US
dc.subject
Prisoner's Dilemma
en_US
dc.subject
Group behavior
en_US
dc.title
Cooperation in Groups: a Game-Theoretic Investigation of Behaviour, Mechanisms, and Dynamics
en_US
dc.type
Doctoral Thesis
dc.rights.license
In Copyright - Non-Commercial Use Permitted
dc.date.published
2019-09-16
ethz.size
215 p.
en_US
ethz.code.ddc
DDC - DDC::5 - Science::510 - Mathematics
ethz.code.ddc
DDC - DDC::3 - Social sciences::300 - Social sciences
ethz.identifier.diss
25753
en_US
ethz.publication.place
Zurich
en_US
ethz.publication.status
published
en_US
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02045 - Dep. Geistes-, Sozial- u. Staatswiss. / Dep. of Humanities, Social and Pol.Sc.::03784 - Helbing, Dirk / Helbing, Dirk
en_US
ethz.leitzahl.certified
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02045 - Dep. Geistes-, Sozial- u. Staatswiss. / Dep. of Humanities, Social and Pol.Sc.::03784 - Helbing, Dirk / Helbing, Dirk
en_US
ethz.tag
doctoral dissertation
en_US
ethz.tag
COSS
en_US
ethz.date.deposited
2019-09-15T19:03:55Z
ethz.source
FORM
ethz.eth
yes
en_US
ethz.availability
Open access
en_US
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2019-09-16T06:44:37Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2020-02-15T21:37:14Z
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
ethz.COinS
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