A Fistful of Dollars: Rent Seeking Behaviour and Local Tax Manipulation
dc.contributor.author
Giommoni, Tommaso
dc.date.accessioned
2022-01-26T14:22:11Z
dc.date.available
2019-12-20T10:42:01Z
dc.date.available
2020-01-08T16:36:54Z
dc.date.available
2020-01-29T09:47:04Z
dc.date.available
2022-01-26T14:22:11Z
dc.date.issued
2019-10
dc.identifier.issn
2035-2034
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/386844
dc.description.abstract
The aim of this paper is to study whether politicians manipulate fiscal policy to extract private rents. We focus on the local personal income tax (PIT), in the setting of Italian cities, which is a progressive instrument that allows mayors to set different rates to distinct wage groups. We exploit discontinuities in mayors’ salaries, that are based on population thresholds, to study whether mayors systematically apply lower rates to their own tax bracket. The main results document large rent-seeking activity in fiscal policy. First, we show that when mayors’s salary is exogenously located in the following tax bracket this receives a significantly lower tax rate than the previous bracket, compared to the control group. Second, we show that this rent-seeking activity is highly detrimental for the public treasury, with a considerable reduction in fiscal revenues. And finally, we document that the monetary gains for rent-seeker politicians are rather limited. These results suggest that when fiscal policy is prone to be manipulated politicians do not hesitate to engage in rent-seeking activities even in case of little profits.
en_US
dc.language.iso
en
en_US
dc.publisher
Dondena Centre for Research on Social Dynamics and Public Policy, Bocconi University
en_US
dc.subject
Rent-seeking
en_US
dc.subject
Fiscal policy
en_US
dc.subject
Personal income tax
en_US
dc.subject
Efficiency wage
en_US
dc.subject
Regression discontinuity design
en_US
dc.title
A Fistful of Dollars: Rent Seeking Behaviour and Local Tax Manipulation
en_US
dc.type
Working Paper
ethz.journal.title
Dondena Working Papers
ethz.journal.volume
130
en_US
ethz.size
40 p.
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::D - Microeconomics::D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making::D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics::E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook::E62 - Fiscal Policy
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::H - Public Economics::H7 - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations::H71 - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::P - Economic Systems::P1 - Capitalist Systems::P16 - Political Economy
en_US
ethz.publication.place
Milano
en_US
ethz.publication.status
published
en_US
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.::03988 - Köthenbürger, Marko / Köthenbürger, Marko
en_US
ethz.leitzahl.certified
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.::03988 - Köthenbürger, Marko / Köthenbürger, Marko
ethz.relation.isPreviousVersionOf
10.3929/ethz-b-000666191
ethz.date.deposited
2019-12-20T10:42:09Z
ethz.source
FORM
ethz.eth
yes
en_US
ethz.availability
Metadata only
en_US
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2020-01-29T09:47:13Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2022-03-29T18:02:35Z
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
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