Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author
Saha, Sayandeep
dc.contributor.author
Bag, Arnab
dc.contributor.author
Basu Roy, Debapriya
dc.contributor.author
Patranabis, Sikhar
dc.contributor.author
Mukhopadhyay, Debdeep
dc.contributor.editor
Canteaut, Anne
dc.contributor.editor
Ishai, Yuval
dc.date.accessioned
2020-09-28T12:45:00Z
dc.date.available
2020-01-21T10:57:16Z
dc.date.available
2020-02-18T11:37:36Z
dc.date.available
2020-07-06T05:02:55Z
dc.date.available
2020-07-08T14:28:57Z
dc.date.available
2020-07-09T05:14:05Z
dc.date.available
2020-09-11T07:24:33Z
dc.date.available
2020-09-28T12:45:00Z
dc.date.issued
2020
dc.identifier.isbn
978-3-030-45720-4
en_US
dc.identifier.isbn
978-3-030-45721-1
en_US
dc.identifier.issn
0302-9743
dc.identifier.issn
1611-3349
dc.identifier.other
10.1007/978-3-030-45721-1_22
en_US
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/392569
dc.identifier.doi
10.3929/ethz-b-000392569
dc.description.abstract
Fault attacks (FA) are one of the potent practical threats to modern cryptographic implementations. Over the years the FA techniques have evolved, gradually moving towards the exploitation of device-centric properties of the faults. In this paper, we exploit the fact that activation and propagation of a fault through a given combinational circuit (i.e., observability of a fault) is data-dependent. Next, we show that this property of combinational circuits leads to powerful Fault Template Attacks (FTA), even for implementations having dedicated protections against both power and fault-based vulnerabilities. The attacks found in this work are applicable even if the fault injection is made at the middle rounds of a block cipher, which are out of reach for most of the other existing fault analysis strategies. Quite evidently, they also work for a known-plaintext scenario. Moreover, the middle round attacks are entirely blind in the sense that no access to the ciphertexts (correct/faulty) or plaintexts are required. The adversary is only assumed to have the power of repeating an unknown plaintext several times. Practical validation over a hardware implementation of SCA-FA protected PRESENT, and simulated evaluation on a public software implementation of protected AES prove the efficacy of the proposed attacks.
en_US
dc.format
application/pdf
en_US
dc.language.iso
en
en_US
dc.publisher
Springer
en_US
dc.rights.uri
http://rightsstatements.org/page/InC-NC/1.0/
dc.subject
Fault attack
en_US
dc.subject
Fault propagation
en_US
dc.subject
Masking
en_US
dc.title
Fault Template Attacks on Block Ciphers Exploiting Fault Propagation
en_US
dc.type
Conference Paper
dc.rights.license
In Copyright - Non-Commercial Use Permitted
dc.date.published
2020-05-01
ethz.book.title
Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2020
en_US
ethz.journal.title
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
ethz.journal.volume
12105
en_US
ethz.journal.abbreviated
LNCS
ethz.pages.start
612
en_US
ethz.pages.end
643
en_US
ethz.size
43 p. accepted version
en_US
ethz.version.deposit
acceptedVersion
en_US
ethz.event
39th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques (Eurocrypt 2020) (virtual)
en_US
ethz.event.location
Zagreb, Croatia
en_US
ethz.event.date
May 11-15, 2020
en_US
ethz.notes
Due to the Corona virus (COVID-19) the conference was conducted virtually.
en_US
ethz.identifier.wos
ethz.publication.place
Cham
en_US
ethz.publication.status
published
en_US
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02150 - Dep. Informatik / Dep. of Computer Science::02660 - Institut für Informationssicherheit / Institute of Information Security::09653 - Paterson, Kenneth / Paterson, Kenneth
en_US
ethz.leitzahl.certified
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02150 - Dep. Informatik / Dep. of Computer Science::02660 - Institut für Informationssicherheit / Institute of Information Security::09653 - Paterson, Kenneth / Paterson, Kenneth
en_US
ethz.date.deposited
2020-01-21T10:57:25Z
ethz.source
FORM
ethz.eth
no
en_US
ethz.availability
Open access
en_US
ethz.date.embargoend
2020-09-11
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2020-07-06T05:03:17Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2022-03-29T03:13:58Z
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
ethz.COinS
ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.atitle=Fault%20Template%20Attacks%20on%20Block%20Ciphers%20Exploiting%20Fault%20Propagation&rft.jtitle=Lecture%20Notes%20in%20Computer%20Science&rft.date=2020&rft.volume=12105&rft.spage=612&rft.epage=643&rft.issn=0302-9743&1611-3349&rft.au=Saha,%20Sayandeep&Bag,%20Arnab&Basu%20Roy,%20Debapriya&Patranabis,%20Sikhar&Mukhopadhyay,%20Debdeep&rft.isbn=978-3-030-45720-4&978-3-030-45721-1&rft.genre=proceeding&rft_id=info:doi/10.1007/978-3-030-45721-1_22&rft.btitle=Advances%20in%20Cryptology%20%E2%80%93%20EUROCRYPT%202020
 Search print copy at ETH Library

Files in this item

Thumbnail

Publication type

Show simple item record