- Working Paper
Despite enormous progress both in theoretical and experimental quantum cryptography, the security of most current implementations of quantum key distribution is still not established rigorously. One of the main problems is that the security of the final key is highly dependent on the number, M, of signals exchanged between the legitimate parties. While, in any practical implementation, M is limited by the available resources, existing security proofs are often only valid asymptotically for unrealistically large values of M. Here, we demonstrate that this gap between theory and practice can be overcome using a recently developed proof technique based on the uncertainty relation for smooth entropies. Specifically, we consider a family of Bennett-Brassard 1984 quantum key distribution protocols and show that security against general attacks can be guaranteed already for moderate values of M Show more
Organisational unit03781 - Renner, Renato
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Is previous version of: https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000046592
NotesSubmitted on 21 March 2011.
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