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dc.contributor.author
Britz, Volker
dc.contributor.author
Gersbach, Hans
dc.date.accessioned
2020-07-30T14:42:00Z
dc.date.available
2020-07-12T04:24:51Z
dc.date.available
2020-07-30T14:42:00Z
dc.date.issued
2020-06
dc.identifier.issn
0020-7276
dc.identifier.issn
1432-1270
dc.identifier.other
10.1007/s00182-020-00708-2
en_US
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/425962
dc.description.abstract
We examine how democratic mechanisms can yield socially desirable outcomes in the presence of uncertainty about an underlying state of nature. We depart from a conventional mechanism design approach because we aim for democratic mechanisms to reflect some basic properties of decision-making in democracies. In particular, actual decisions are made by majority voting. The proposals to be voted upon are made by a selfish agenda-setter. Moreover, communication is limited to a binary message space (that is, voting Yes or No). We show how suitable democratic mechanisms can resolve uncertainty, reveal the state of nature, and implement the Condorcet winner. We demonstrate that this implementation result requires (at most) two voting stages regardless of the number of states or the number of alternatives. We also show that implementation requires a conditional privilege for a small representative subset of the population. © 2020, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.
en_US
dc.language.iso
en
en_US
dc.publisher
Springer
en_US
dc.subject
Democratic mechanisms
en_US
dc.subject
Polling
en_US
dc.subject
Sampling
en_US
dc.subject
Public goods
en_US
dc.subject
Voting
en_US
dc.subject
Information sharing
en_US
dc.title
Information sharing in democratic mechanisms
en_US
dc.type
Journal Article
dc.date.published
2020-03-06
ethz.journal.title
International Journal of Game Theory
ethz.journal.volume
49
en_US
ethz.journal.issue
2
en_US
ethz.journal.abbreviated
Int. j. game theory
ethz.pages.start
547
en_US
ethz.pages.end
577
en_US
ethz.identifier.wos
ethz.identifier.scopus
ethz.publication.place
Berlin
en_US
ethz.publication.status
published
en_US
ethz.date.deposited
2020-07-12T04:24:58Z
ethz.source
SCOPUS
ethz.eth
yes
en_US
ethz.availability
Metadata only
en_US
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2020-07-30T14:42:12Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2020-07-30T14:42:12Z
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
ethz.COinS
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