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dc.contributor.author
Grech, Philip D.
dc.date.accessioned
2021-02-24T08:56:12Z
dc.date.available
2020-09-09T03:01:40Z
dc.date.available
2020-09-10T07:32:03Z
dc.date.available
2021-01-06T08:33:01Z
dc.date.available
2021-02-24T08:56:12Z
dc.date.issued
2021-02
dc.identifier.issn
1432-217X
dc.identifier.issn
0176-1714
dc.identifier.other
10.1007/s00355-020-01273-z
en_US
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/439155
dc.identifier.doi
10.3929/ethz-b-000439155
dc.description.abstract
We aim to estimate the power distribution in the Council of the European Union-both a priori and a posteriori. With respect to the latter, our analysis suggests that several previously used indices are ill-suited for this application. By introducing minimal modifications, we propose a new index and compare it with previous constructions in a unified framework. Empirically, we find that that all countries gain a priori voting power in the Council as a result of Brexit. We rely on data from the Chapel Hill Expert survey to compute a posteriori power and find that it is more unequally distributed than a priori power. Specifically, a posteriori power is almost exclusively held by relatively few rather populous states (yet not the United Kingdom). As regards Brexit, France appears as the main benefactor in terms of gaining a posteriori power; Poland loses substantive power in several areas but remains one of the most powerful EU member states.
en_US
dc.format
application/pdf
en_US
dc.language.iso
en
en_US
dc.publisher
Springer
en_US
dc.rights.uri
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.subject
A posteriori voting power
en_US
dc.subject
Council of the European Union
en_US
dc.subject
Brexit
en_US
dc.title
Power in the Council of the EU: organizing theory, a new index, and Brexit
en_US
dc.type
Journal Article
dc.rights.license
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
dc.date.published
2020-08-24
ethz.journal.title
Social Choice and Welfare
ethz.journal.volume
56
en_US
ethz.journal.abbreviated
Soc. choice welf.
ethz.pages.start
223
en_US
ethz.pages.end
258
en_US
ethz.size
36 p.
en_US
ethz.version.deposit
publishedVersion
en_US
ethz.identifier.wos
ethz.identifier.scopus
ethz.publication.place
Heidelberg
en_US
ethz.publication.status
published
en_US
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.::09460 - Ambühl, Michael / Ambühl, Michael
en_US
ethz.leitzahl.certified
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.::09460 - Ambühl, Michael / Ambühl, Michael
en_US
ethz.relation.hasPart
20.500.11850/379788
ethz.date.deposited
2020-09-09T03:01:45Z
ethz.source
WOS
ethz.eth
yes
en_US
ethz.availability
Open access
en_US
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2021-02-24T08:56:26Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2021-02-24T08:56:26Z
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
ethz.COinS
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