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dc.contributor.author
Kim, Jeremie
dc.contributor.author
Patel, Minesh
dc.contributor.author
Yağlikçi, A. Giray
dc.contributor.author
Hassan, Hasan
dc.contributor.author
Azizi, Roknoddin
dc.contributor.author
Orosa, Lois
dc.contributor.author
Mutlu, Onur
dc.date.accessioned
2020-10-21T12:28:52Z
dc.date.available
2020-10-11T05:13:11Z
dc.date.available
2020-10-21T12:28:52Z
dc.date.issued
2020
dc.identifier.isbn
978-1-7281-4661-4
en_US
dc.identifier.isbn
978-1-7281-4662-1
en_US
dc.identifier.other
10.1109/ISCA45697.2020.00059
en_US
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/445422
dc.description.abstract
RowHammer is a circuit-level DRAM vulnerability, first rigorously analyzed and introduced in 2014, where repeatedly accessing data in a DRAM row can cause bit flips in nearby rows. The RowHammer vulnerability has since garnered significant interest in both computer architecture and computer security research communities because it stems from physical circuit-level interference effects that worsen with continued DRAM density scaling. As DRAM manufacturers primarily depend on density scaling to increase DRAM capacity, future DRAM chips will likely be more vulnerable to RowHammer than those of the past. Many RowHammer mitigation mechanisms have been proposed by both industry and academia, but it is unclear whether these mechanisms will remain viable solutions for future devices, as their overheads increase with DRAM's vulnerability to RowHammer. In order to shed more light on how RowHammer affects modern and future devices at the circuit-level, we first present an experimental characterization of RowHammer on 1580 DRAM chips (408×DDR3, 652×DDR4, and 520×LPDDR4) from 300 DRAM modules (60×DDR3, 110×DDR4, and 130×LPDDR4) with RowHammer protection mechanisms disabled, spanning multiple different technology nodes from across each of the three major DRAM manufacturers. Our studies definitively show that newer DRAM chips are more vulnerable to RowHammer: as device feature size reduces, the number of activations needed to induce a RowHammer bit flip also reduces, to as few as 9.6 k (4.8k to two rows each) in the most vulnerable chip we tested. We evaluate five state-of-the-art RowHammer mitigation mechanisms using cycle-accurate simulation in the context of real data taken from our chips to study how the mitigation mechanisms scale with chip vulnerability. We find that existing mechanisms either are not scalable or suffer from prohibitively large performance overheads in projected future devices given our observed trends of RowHammer vulnerability. Thus, it is critical to research more effective solutions to RowHammer. © 2020 IEEE.
en_US
dc.language.iso
en
en_US
dc.publisher
IEEE
en_US
dc.title
Revisiting RowHammer: An Experimental Analysis of Modern DRAM Devices and Mitigation Techniques
en_US
dc.type
Conference Paper
dc.date.published
2020-07-13
ethz.book.title
2020 ACM/IEEE 47th Annual International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA)
en_US
ethz.pages.start
638
en_US
ethz.pages.end
651
en_US
ethz.event
47th ACM/IEEE Annual International Symposium on Computer Architecture (ISCA 2020) (virtual)
en_US
ethz.event.location
Valencia, Spain
en_US
ethz.event.date
May 30 - June 3, 2020
en_US
ethz.notes
Due to the Coronavirus (COVID-19) the conference was conducted virtually.
en_US
ethz.identifier.wos
ethz.identifier.scopus
ethz.publication.place
Piscataway, NJ
en_US
ethz.publication.status
published
en_US
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02140 - Dep. Inf.technologie und Elektrotechnik / Dep. of Inform.Technol. Electrical Eng.::09483 - Mutlu, Onur / Mutlu, Onur
ethz.leitzahl.certified
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02140 - Dep. Inf.technologie und Elektrotechnik / Dep. of Inform.Technol. Electrical Eng.::09483 - Mutlu, Onur / Mutlu, Onur
ethz.date.deposited
2020-10-11T05:13:21Z
ethz.source
SCOPUS
ethz.eth
yes
en_US
ethz.availability
Metadata only
en_US
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2020-10-21T12:29:04Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2022-03-29T03:37:54Z
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
ethz.COinS
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