
Open access
Date
2012-01Type
- Working Paper
ETH Bibliography
yes
Altmetrics
Abstract
We investigate the efficiency of Coasean bargaining when restrictions are placed on the set of feasible bargaining outcomes. When property rights are costly to (defend) appropriate, we find bargaining restrictions may be Pareto superior to unconstrained voluntary exchange. Under cost uncertainty over the externality, we show an efficient configuration of restrictions must balance the potential reduction in appropriation costs with the possibility of allocatively inefficient bargaining restrictions. For cases where the restrictions are contested, we show conditions for the continuing existence of welfare improvements. Show more
Permanent link
https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-a-006832410Publication status
publishedJournal / series
Economics Working Paper SeriesVolume
Publisher
ETH Zurich, Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH)Subject
Coase theorem; Bargaining restrictions; AppropriationOrganisational unit
03635 - Bretschger, Lucas / Bretschger, Lucas
02045 - Dep. Geistes-, Sozial- u. Staatswiss. / Dep. of Humanities, Social and Pol.Sc.
03361 - Schubert, Renate (emeritus) / Schubert, Renate (emeritus)
Related publications and datasets
Is previous version of: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/64775
More
Show all metadata
ETH Bibliography
yes
Altmetrics