Endogenous enforcement of intellectual property, North-South trade, and growth
Schneider, Maik T.
- Working Paper
Rights / licenseIn Copyright - Non-Commercial Use Permitted
While most countries have harmonized intellectual property rights (IPR) legislation, the dispute about the optimal level of IPR-enforcement remains. This paper develops an endogenous growth framework with two open economies satisfying the classical North-South assumptions to study (a) IPR-enforcement in a decentralized game and (b) the desired globally-harmonized IPR-enforcement of the two regions. The results are compared to the constrained-efficient enforcement level. Our main insights are: The regions’ desired harmonized enforcement levels are higher than their equilibrium choices, however, the gap between the two shrinks with relative market size. While growth rates substiantially increase when IPR-enforcement is harmonized at the North’s desired level, our numerical simulation suggests that the South may also benefit in terms of long-run welfare Show more
External linksSearch via SFX
Journal / seriesEconomics Working Paper Series
PublisherCER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich
SubjectMARKT + HANDEL+ KOMMERZ; INDUSTRIELLES EIGENTUMS-, PATENT-, MARKENRECHT (SPEZIELLE RECHTSZWEIGE); MARKET + TRADE + COMMERCE; ECONOMIC GROWTH; WIRTSCHAFTSWACHSTUM; INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY LAW, PATENT LAW, TRADEMARK LAW (SPECIAL BRANCHES OF LAW); Trade, Dynamic Game; Endogenous Growth; Intellectual Property Rights
Organisational unit02045 - Dep. Geistes-, Sozial- u. Staatswiss. / Dep. of Humanities, Social and Pol.Sc.
03729 - Gersbach, Hans / Gersbach, Hans
MoreShow all metadata