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dc.contributor.author
Gersbach, Hans
dc.contributor.author
Jackson, Matthew O.
dc.contributor.author
Tejada, Oriol
dc.date.accessioned
2020-12-16T10:48:34Z
dc.date.available
2020-12-08T10:46:09Z
dc.date.available
2020-12-16T10:48:34Z
dc.date.issued
2020-06-30
dc.identifier.other
10.2139/ssrn.3615407
en_US
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/455253
dc.description.abstract
We analyze the optimal length of political terms (equivalently, the optimal frequency with which elections should be held) when the candidates of two polarized parties compete for office and the median voter shifts over time. Office-holders determine policy and experience persistent random shocks to their valence. Policy changes are costly for citizens and politicians. Optimal term-length balances the frequency of costly policy changes when parties change office with the incumbent's average valence during tenure. We find that optimal term-length increases with party polarization, with the degree to which the median voter cares about valence, and with the frequency and the size of swings in the electorate. In contrast, optimal term-length decreases when candidates for office undergo less scrutiny or when parties care more about future outcomes. Finally, with small swings in the electorate and large polarization, optimal term-length increases if checks and balances increase.
en_US
dc.language.iso
en
en_US
dc.publisher
Social Science Research Network
en_US
dc.subject
Elections
en_US
dc.subject
Term-length
en_US
dc.subject
Costs of change
en_US
dc.subject
Polarization
en_US
dc.title
The Optimal Length of Political Terms
en_US
dc.type
Working Paper
ethz.journal.title
SSRN
ethz.pages.start
3615407
ethz.size
92 p.
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods::C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory::C72 - Noncooperative Games
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods::C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory::C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::D - Microeconomics::D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making::D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::D - Microeconomics::D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making::D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
en_US
ethz.publication.place
Rochester, NY
en_US
ethz.publication.status
published
en_US
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.::03729 - Gersbach, Hans / Gersbach, Hans
en_US
ethz.leitzahl.certified
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.::03729 - Gersbach, Hans / Gersbach, Hans
en_US
ethz.date.deposited
2020-12-08T10:46:20Z
ethz.source
FORM
ethz.eth
yes
en_US
ethz.availability
Metadata only
en_US
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2020-12-16T10:48:43Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2021-02-15T22:33:32Z
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
ethz.COinS
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