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Date
2020-06-30Type
- Working Paper
ETH Bibliography
yes
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Abstract
We analyze dynamic electoral competition policy changes. The costs of changing a policy increase with the extent of the shift and generate an incumbency advantage. We characterize the dynamics of Markov equilibria in terms of history and party polarization, and analyze how policies are influenced by the amplitude and convexity of costs of change, as well as by the degree of party and voter farsightedness. Regardless of the initial policy, party choices converge in the long run to a stochastic alternation between two (regions of) policies, with transitions occurring when office-holders suffer a shock to their capacity or valence. Although costs of change have a moderating effect on policies, full convergence to the median voter position does not take place. Show more
Publication status
publishedExternal links
Journal / series
SSRNPages / Article No.
Publisher
Social Science Research NetworkSubject
Democracy; Dynamic elections; Political polarization; Costs of change; Markov perfect equilibriumOrganisational unit
03729 - Gersbach, Hans / Gersbach, Hans
Funding
153482 - Towards Better Blueprints for Democracy (SNF)
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ETH Bibliography
yes
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