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dc.contributor.author
Vannoni, Matia
dc.contributor.author
Ash, Elliott
dc.contributor.author
Morelli, Massimo
dc.date.accessioned
2021-01-07T12:57:58Z
dc.date.available
2021-01-01T04:23:37Z
dc.date.available
2021-01-07T12:57:58Z
dc.date.issued
2021-01
dc.identifier.issn
1047-1987
dc.identifier.issn
1476-4989
dc.identifier.other
10.1017/pan.2020.9
en_US
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/458799
dc.description.abstract
Bureaucratic discretion and executive delegation are central topics in political economy and political science. The previous empirical literature has measured discretion and delegation by manually coding large bodies of legislation. Drawing from computational linguistics, we provide an automated procedure for measuring discretion and delegation in legal texts to facilitate large-scale empirical analysis. The method uses information in syntactic parse trees to identify legally relevant provisions, as well as agents and delegated actions. We undertake two applications. First, we produce a measure of bureaucratic discretion by looking at the level of legislative detail for US states and find that this measure increases after reforms giving agencies more independence. This effect is consistent with an agency cost model, where a more independent bureaucracy requires more specific instructions (less discretion) to avoid bureaucratic drift. Second, we construct measures of delegation to governors in state legislation. Consistent with previous estimates using non-text metrics, we find that executive delegation increases under unified government.
en_US
dc.language.iso
en
en_US
dc.publisher
Cambridge University Press
en_US
dc.subject
Natural language processing
en_US
dc.subject
Text analysis
en_US
dc.subject
Executive delegation
en_US
dc.subject
Bureaucratic independence
en_US
dc.subject
US politics
en_US
dc.title
Measuring Discretion and Delegation in Legislative Texts: Methods and Application to US States
en_US
dc.type
Journal Article
dc.date.published
2020-05-26
ethz.journal.title
Political Analysis
ethz.journal.volume
29
en_US
ethz.journal.issue
1
en_US
ethz.pages.start
43
en_US
ethz.pages.end
57
en_US
ethz.identifier.wos
ethz.identifier.scopus
ethz.publication.place
Cambridge
en_US
ethz.publication.status
published
en_US
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02045 - Dep. Geistes-, Sozial- u. Staatswiss. / Dep. of Humanities, Social and Pol.Sc.::09627 - Ash, Elliott / Ash, Elliott
ethz.leitzahl.certified
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02045 - Dep. Geistes-, Sozial- u. Staatswiss. / Dep. of Humanities, Social and Pol.Sc.::09627 - Ash, Elliott / Ash, Elliott
ethz.date.deposited
2021-01-01T04:23:41Z
ethz.source
WOS
ethz.eth
yes
en_US
ethz.availability
Metadata only
en_US
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2021-01-07T12:58:06Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2024-02-02T12:46:47Z
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
ethz.COinS
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