Appointed Learning for the Common Good: Optimal Committee Sitze and Efficient Rewards
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Date
2020-09Type
- Working Paper
ETH Bibliography
yes
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Abstract
A population of identical individuals must choose one of two alternatives under uncertainty about what the right alternative is. Individuals can gather information of increasing accuracy at an increasing convex utility cost. For such a setup, we analyze how vote delegation to a committee and suitable monetary transfers for its members can ensure that high or optimal levels of information are (jointly) acquired. Our main insight is that to maximize the probability of choosing the right alternative committee size must be small, no matter whether information acquisition costs are private or not. Our analysis and results cover two polar cases--information costs are either private or public--and unravel both the potential and the limitations of monetary transfers in committee design. Show more
Publication status
publishedJournal / series
CEPR Discussion PapersPages / Article No.
Publisher
Centre for Economic Policy ResearchSubject
Voting; Committee; Cost sharing; Information acquisition; Reward scheme; Monetary transfers; Majority ruleOrganisational unit
03729 - Gersbach, Hans / Gersbach, Hans
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ETH Bibliography
yes
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