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dc.contributor.author
Gersbach, Hans
dc.contributor.author
Mamageishvili, Akaki
dc.contributor.author
Tejada, Oriol
dc.date.accessioned
2021-03-10T07:16:44Z
dc.date.available
2021-01-26T12:19:22Z
dc.date.available
2021-03-10T07:16:44Z
dc.date.issued
2020-09
dc.identifier.issn
0265-8003
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/465646
dc.description.abstract
A population of identical individuals must choose one of two alternatives under uncertainty about what the right alternative is. Individuals can gather information of increasing accuracy at an increasing convex utility cost. For such a setup, we analyze how vote delegation to a committee and suitable monetary transfers for its members can ensure that high or optimal levels of information are (jointly) acquired. Our main insight is that to maximize the probability of choosing the right alternative committee size must be small, no matter whether information acquisition costs are private or not. Our analysis and results cover two polar cases--information costs are either private or public--and unravel both the potential and the limitations of monetary transfers in committee design.
en_US
dc.language.iso
en
en_US
dc.publisher
Centre for Economic Policy Research
en_US
dc.subject
Voting
en_US
dc.subject
Committee
en_US
dc.subject
Cost sharing
en_US
dc.subject
Information acquisition
en_US
dc.subject
Reward scheme
en_US
dc.subject
Monetary transfers
en_US
dc.subject
Majority rule
en_US
dc.title
Appointed Learning for the Common Good: Optimal Committee Sitze and Efficient Rewards
en_US
dc.type
Working Paper
ethz.journal.title
CEPR Discussion Papers
ethz.pages.start
DP15311
en_US
ethz.size
63 p.
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods::C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory::C72 - Noncooperative Games
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::D - Microeconomics::D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making::D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::D - Microeconomics::D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
en_US
ethz.publication.place
London
en_US
ethz.publication.status
published
en_US
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.::03729 - Gersbach, Hans / Gersbach, Hans
en_US
ethz.leitzahl.certified
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.::03729 - Gersbach, Hans / Gersbach, Hans
en_US
ethz.identifier.url
https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=15311
ethz.date.deposited
2021-01-26T12:19:31Z
ethz.source
FORM
ethz.eth
yes
en_US
ethz.availability
Metadata only
en_US
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2021-03-10T07:17:00Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2021-03-10T07:17:00Z
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
ethz.COinS
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