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dc.contributor.author
Gersbach, Hans
dc.contributor.author
Tejada, Oriol
dc.date.accessioned
2021-03-10T07:07:53Z
dc.date.available
2021-01-26T12:22:05Z
dc.date.available
2021-03-10T07:07:53Z
dc.date.issued
2020-07
dc.identifier.issn
0265-8003
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/465650
dc.description.abstract
We introduce semi-flexible majority rules for public good provision with private valuations. Such rules take the form of a two-stage, multiple-round voting mechanism where the output of the first stage is the default alternative for the second stage and the voting thresholds (a) vary with the proposal on the table and (b) require a qualified majority for final approval in the second stage. We show that the (detail-free) mechanism elicits the information about the valuations and uses it to implement the utilitarian optimal public-good level if valuations can be only high or low. This level is chosen after all potential socially optimal policies have been considered for voting. We explore ways to reduce the number of voting rounds and develop a compound mechanism when there are many types of citizens to approximate the optimal public-good level.
en_US
dc.language.iso
en
en_US
dc.publisher
Centre for Economic Policy Research
en_US
dc.subject
Voting
en_US
dc.subject
Utilitarianism
en_US
dc.subject
Implementation
en_US
dc.subject
Procedural democracy
en_US
dc.title
Semi-flexible Majority Rules for Public Good Provision
en_US
dc.type
Working Paper
ethz.journal.title
CEPR Discussion Papers
ethz.pages.start
DP15099
en_US
ethz.size
53 p.
en_US
ethz.publication.place
London
en_US
ethz.publication.status
published
en_US
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.::03729 - Gersbach, Hans / Gersbach, Hans
en_US
ethz.leitzahl.certified
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.::03729 - Gersbach, Hans / Gersbach, Hans
en_US
ethz.identifier.url
https://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=15099
ethz.date.deposited
2021-01-26T12:22:13Z
ethz.source
FORM
ethz.eth
yes
en_US
ethz.availability
Metadata only
en_US
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2021-03-10T07:08:04Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2021-03-10T07:08:04Z
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
ethz.COinS
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