Lemons and Peaches: A (Robust) Multi-stage Buying Mechanism with Multiple Applications
dc.contributor.author
Gersbach, Hans
dc.contributor.author
Mamageishvili, Akaki
dc.contributor.author
Tejada, Oriol
dc.date.accessioned
2022-09-30T14:50:34Z
dc.date.available
2021-03-10T10:07:16Z
dc.date.available
2022-09-30T14:50:34Z
dc.date.issued
2019-10
dc.identifier.issn
0265-8003
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/473769
dc.description.abstract
We introduce a four-stage, multi-price buying mechanism, which can be used by a (big) buyer to separate low-quality sellers - called "lemon" owners - from high-quality sellers - called "peach" owners. With a partition of sellers, the buyer obtains the commodities from the "peach" owners at a price that matches the willingness to sell. By contrast, "lemon" owners are trapped into selling their items at a low, or even negligible, price. Our mechanism is robust for several extensions of our baseline setup, offers applications for market makers and regulators, and may be used by interest groups in politics.
en_US
dc.language.iso
en
en_US
dc.publisher
Centre for Economic Policy Research
en_US
dc.subject
Lemons market
en_US
dc.subject
Partition
en_US
dc.subject
Signaling
en_US
dc.subject
Commitment
en_US
dc.subject
Decoy ballots
en_US
dc.title
Lemons and Peaches: A (Robust) Multi-stage Buying Mechanism with Multiple Applications
en_US
dc.type
Working Paper
ethz.journal.title
CEPR Discussion Papers
ethz.pages.start
DP14063
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods::C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory::C72 - Noncooperative Games
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::D - Microeconomics::D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::D - Microeconomics::D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::D - Microeconomics::D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making::D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::D - Microeconomics::D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty::D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::D - Microeconomics::D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty::D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
en_US
ethz.publication.place
London
en_US
ethz.publication.status
published
en_US
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.::03729 - Gersbach, Hans / Gersbach, Hans
en_US
ethz.leitzahl.certified
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.::03729 - Gersbach, Hans / Gersbach, Hans
en_US
ethz.date.deposited
2020-01-16T09:03:04Z
ethz.source
FORM
ethz.eth
yes
en_US
ethz.availability
Metadata only
en_US
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2021-03-10T10:07:28Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2023-02-07T06:53:45Z
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
dc.identifier.olduri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/390972
dc.identifier.olduri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/455249
ethz.COinS
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