From Dolev-Yao to Strong Adaptive Corruption: Analyzing Security in the Presence of Compromising Adversaries
dc.contributor.author
Basin, David
dc.contributor.author
Cremers, Cas J.F.
dc.date.accessioned
2017-06-10T07:25:02Z
dc.date.available
2017-06-10T07:25:02Z
dc.date.issued
2009
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/53700
dc.description.abstract
We formalize a hierarchy of adversary models for security protocol analysis, ranging from a Dolev-Yao style adversary to more powerful adversaries who can reveal different parts of principals' states during protocol execution. We define our hierarchy by a modular operational semantics describing adversarial capabilities. We use this to formalize various, practically-relevant notions of key and state compromise. Our semantics can be used as a basis for protocol analysis tools. As an example, we extend an existing symbolic protocol-verification tool with our adversary models. The result is the first tool that systematically supports notions such as weak perfect forward secrecy, key compromise impersonation, and adversaries capable of so-called strong corruptions and state-reveal queries. As further applications, we use our model hierarchy to relate different adversarial notions, gaining new insights on their relative strengths, and we use our tool to find new attacks on protocols.
dc.language.iso
en
dc.publisher
Cryptology ePrint Archive
dc.title
From Dolev-Yao to Strong Adaptive Corruption: Analyzing Security in the Presence of Compromising Adversaries
dc.type
Report
ethz.journal.title
Cryptology ePrint Archive
ethz.journal.volume
2009
ethz.journal.issue
79
ethz.size
20 p.
ethz.notes
Received 12 February 2009, Last revised 9 November 2009.
ethz.publication.status
published
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02150 - Dep. Informatik / Dep. of Computer Science::02660 - Institut für Informationssicherheit / Institute of Information Security::03634 - Basin, David / Basin, David
ethz.leitzahl.certified
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02150 - Dep. Informatik / Dep. of Computer Science::02660 - Institut für Informationssicherheit / Institute of Information Security::03634 - Basin, David / Basin, David
ethz.date.deposited
2017-06-10T07:25:33Z
ethz.source
ECIT
ethz.identifier.importid
imp59364f9a58c2f18276
ethz.ecitpid
pub:86886
ethz.eth
yes
ethz.availability
Metadata only
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2017-07-25T11:56:25Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2022-03-28T10:54:47Z
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
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