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dc.contributor.author
Schneider, Stephan A.
dc.contributor.author
Kunze, Sven
dc.date.accessioned
2022-05-16T06:50:31Z
dc.date.available
2022-05-11T22:15:20Z
dc.date.available
2022-05-16T06:50:31Z
dc.date.issued
2022-04
dc.identifier.issn
2364-1428
dc.identifier.issn
1617-9595
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/546684
dc.description.abstract
Allocation decisions are vulnerable to political influence, but it is unclear in which situations politicians use their discretionary power in a partisan manner. We analyze the allocation of presidential disaster declarations in the United States, exploiting the spatiotemporal randomness of hurricane strikes from 1965–2018 along with changes in political alignment. We show that decisions are not biased when disasters are unambiguously strong or weak. Only in ambiguous situations, after medium-intensity hurricanes, do areas governed by presidents’ co-partisans receive up to twice as many declarations. This political bias explains 10 percent of total relief spending, totaling USD 450 million per year.
en_US
dc.language.iso
en
en_US
dc.publisher
CESifo
en_US
dc.subject
disaster relief
en_US
dc.subject
distributive politics
en_US
dc.subject
hurricanes
en_US
dc.subject
natural disasters
en_US
dc.subject
nonlinearity
en_US
dc.subject
party alignment
en_US
dc.subject
political favouritism
en_US
dc.subject
political economy
en_US
dc.subject
situational ambiguity.
en_US
dc.title
Disastrous Discretion: Ambiguous Decision Situations Foster Political Favoritism
en_US
dc.type
Working Paper
ethz.journal.title
CESifo Working Papers
ethz.journal.volume
9710
en_US
ethz.size
100 p.
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::D - Microeconomics::D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making::D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::H - Public Economics::H3 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents::H30 - General
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::H - Public Economics::H8 - Miscellaneous Issues::H84 - Disaster Aid
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::P - Economic Systems::P1 - Capitalist Systems::P16 - Political Economy
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics::Q5 - Environmental Economics::Q54 - Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
en_US
ethz.publication.place
Munich
en_US
ethz.publication.status
published
en_US
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.::02525 - KOF Konjunkturforschungsstelle / KOF Swiss Economic Institute
en_US
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.::03716 - Sturm, Jan-Egbert / Sturm, Jan-Egbert
en_US
ethz.leitzahl.certified
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.::02525 - KOF Konjunkturforschungsstelle / KOF Swiss Economic Institute
en_US
ethz.leitzahl.certified
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.::03716 - Sturm, Jan-Egbert / Sturm, Jan-Egbert
en_US
ethz.identifier.url
https://www.cesifo.org/en/publikationen/2022/working-paper/disastrous-discretion-ambiguous-decision-situations-foster
ethz.relation.hasPart
20.500.11850/522460
ethz.relation.hasPart
20.500.11850/468932
ethz.relation.hasPart
20.500.11850/522461
ethz.date.deposited
2022-05-11T22:15:35Z
ethz.source
FORM
ethz.eth
yes
en_US
ethz.availability
Metadata only
en_US
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2022-05-16T06:50:51Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2022-05-16T06:50:51Z
ethz.rosetta.exportRequired
true
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
ethz.COinS
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