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dc.contributor.author
Karaca, Orcun
dc.contributor.author
Delikaraoglou, Stefanos
dc.contributor.author
Hug, Gabriela
dc.contributor.author
Kamgarpour, Maryam
dc.date.accessioned
2022-08-15T10:24:33Z
dc.date.available
2022-07-13T03:07:10Z
dc.date.available
2022-08-15T10:24:33Z
dc.date.issued
2022-12
dc.identifier.other
10.1016/j.omega.2022.102711
en_US
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/557743
dc.identifier.doi
10.3929/ethz-b-000557743
dc.description.abstract
The establishment of a single European day-ahead market has accomplished the integration of the regional day-ahead markets. However, reserve provision and activation remain an exclusive responsibility of regional operators. This limited spatial coordination and the separated structure hinder the efficient utilization of flexible generation and transmission, since their capacities have to be ex-ante allocated between energy and reserves. To promote reserve exchange, recent work proposed a preemptive model that withdraws a portion of the inter-area transmission capacity available from day-ahead energy for reserves by minimizing the expected system cost. This decision-support tool, formulated as a stochastic bilevel program, respects the current architecture but does not suggest area-specific costs that guarantee sufficient benefits for areas to accept the solution. To this end, we formulate a preemptive model in a framework that allows application of game theory methods to obtain a stable benefit allocation, i.e., an outcome immune to coalitional deviations ensuring willingness of areas to coordinate. We show that benefit allocation mechanisms can be formulated either at the day-ahead or the real-time stages, in order to distribute the expected or the scenario-specific benefits, respectively. For both games, the proposed benefits achieve minimal stability violation, while allowing for a tractable computation with limited queries to the bilevel program. Our case studies, based on an illustrative and a more realistic test case, compare our method with well-studied benefit allocations, namely, the Shapley value and nucleolus, and analyze the factors that drive these allocations (e.g., flexibility, network structure, wind correlations). We show that our method performs better in stability and tractability.
en_US
dc.format
application/pdf
en_US
dc.language.iso
en
en_US
dc.publisher
Elsevier
en_US
dc.rights.uri
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.subject
Stochastic programming
en_US
dc.subject
Bilevel programming
en_US
dc.subject
Coalitional game theory
en_US
dc.subject
Electricity markets
en_US
dc.title
Enabling inter-area reserve exchange through stable benefit allocation mechanisms
en_US
dc.type
Journal Article
dc.rights.license
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
dc.date.published
2022-06-10
ethz.journal.title
Omega (United Kingdom)
ethz.journal.volume
113
en_US
ethz.pages.start
102711
en_US
ethz.size
17 p.
en_US
ethz.version.deposit
publishedVersion
en_US
ethz.identifier.wos
ethz.identifier.scopus
ethz.publication.place
Oxford
en_US
ethz.publication.status
published
en_US
ethz.date.deposited
2022-07-13T03:07:28Z
ethz.source
SCOPUS
ethz.eth
yes
en_US
ethz.availability
Open access
en_US
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2022-08-15T10:24:58Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2022-08-15T10:24:58Z
ethz.rosetta.exportRequired
true
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
ethz.COinS
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