Open access
Date
2022Type
- Conference Paper
ETH Bibliography
yes
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Abstract
Bridgefy is a messaging application that uses Bluetooth-based mesh networking. Its developers and others have advertised it for use in areas witnessing large-scale protests involving confrontations between protesters and state agents. In August 2020, a security analysis reported severe vulnerabilities that invalidated Bridgefy’s claims of confidentiality, authentication, and resilience. In response, the developers adopted the Signal protocol and then continued to advertise their application as being suitable for use by higher-risk users.
In this work, we analyse the security of the revised Bridgefy messenger and SDK and invalidate its security claims. One attack (targeting the messenger) enables an adversary to compromise the confidentiality of private messages by exploiting a time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) issue, side-stepping Signal’s guarantees. The other attack (targeting the SDK) allows an adversary to recover broadcast messages without knowing the network-wide shared encryption key.
We also found that the changes deployed in response to the August 2020 analysis failed to remedy the previously reported vulnerabilities. In particular, we show that (i) the protocol persisted to be susceptible to an active attacker-in-the-middle, (ii) an adversary continued to be able to impersonate other users in the broadcast channel of the Bridgefy messenger, (iii) the DoS attack using a decompression bomb was still applicable, albeit in a limited form, and that (iv) the privacy issues of Bridgefy remained largely unresolved. Show more
Permanent link
https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000535118Publication status
publishedBook title
Proceedings of the 31st USENIX Security SymposiumPages / Article No.
Publisher
USENIX AssociationEvent
Organisational unit
09653 - Paterson, Kenneth / Paterson, Kenneth
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ETH Bibliography
yes
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