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dc.contributor.author
Li, Jiliang
dc.contributor.author
Wang, Yuheng
dc.contributor.author
Su, Yuan
dc.contributor.author
Su, Zhou
dc.contributor.author
Meng, Weizhi
dc.contributor.author
Shen, Yinghua
dc.date.accessioned
2023-10-23T07:20:27Z
dc.date.available
2023-10-18T01:36:36Z
dc.date.available
2023-10-23T07:20:27Z
dc.date.issued
2024-01
dc.identifier.issn
0020-0255
dc.identifier.issn
1872-6291
dc.identifier.other
10.1016/j.ins.2023.119742
en_US
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/637234
dc.description.abstract
Due to the nature of decentralization, blockchain-based applications are gradually adopted by more and more systems in different fields to replace centralized third-party agencies. Many applications, like blockchain oracles, rely on on-chain transactions to deliver information that is used to make final decisions. There have been many methods proposed to guarantee the correctness of the final results, and most of them are in terms of the management of information providers and the application's design. However, to our notice, only a few works have discussed the security threat caused by rational mining pools that are responsible for packing transactions and information into blocks and uploading them to the blockchain. Therefore in this paper, we propose a possible delayed packing attack carried out by rational mining pools against these transaction information based applications. Game theory analysis is conducted to obtain the Nash equilibrium strategy, and the price of anarchy is calculated to depict the success probability of such an attack under different circumstances. In addition, we design a countermeasure protocol based on cryptography tools to defend against the delayed packing attack. Finally, we carry out a thorough security analysis as well as corresponding experiments to prove the security and feasibility of our countermeasure.
en_US
dc.language.iso
en
en_US
dc.publisher
Elsevier
en_US
dc.subject
Blockchain
en_US
dc.subject
Mining pool
en_US
dc.subject
Nash equilibrium
en_US
dc.subject
Price of anarchy
en_US
dc.title
Delayed packing attack and countermeasure against transaction information based applications
en_US
dc.type
Journal Article
dc.date.published
2023-10-05
ethz.journal.title
Information Sciences
ethz.journal.volume
652
en_US
ethz.journal.abbreviated
Inf. sci. (Print)
ethz.pages.start
119742
en_US
ethz.size
15 p.
en_US
ethz.identifier.wos
ethz.identifier.scopus
ethz.publication.place
Amsterdam
en_US
ethz.publication.status
published
en_US
ethz.date.deposited
2023-10-18T01:36:37Z
ethz.source
SCOPUS
ethz.eth
yes
en_US
ethz.availability
Metadata only
en_US
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2023-10-23T07:20:28Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2024-02-03T05:28:08Z
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
ethz.COinS
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