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dc.contributor.author
Sturm, Jan-Egbert
dc.contributor.author
Dreher, Axel
dc.contributor.author
Vreeland, James R.
dc.date.accessioned
2017-07-20T12:59:06Z
dc.date.available
2017-06-10T17:57:43Z
dc.date.available
2017-07-20T12:59:06Z
dc.date.issued
2013-06
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/67929
dc.identifier.doi
10.3929/ethz-a-009899619
dc.description.abstract
Bailouts sponsored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are famous for their conditionality: in return for continued installments of desperately needed loans, governments must comply with austere policy changes. Many have suggested, however, that politically important countries face rather weak stringency. Obstacles to testing this hypothesis include finding a measure of political importance that is not plagued by endogeneity and obtaining data on IMF conditionality. We propose to measure political importance using temporary membership on the United Nations Security Council and analyze a newly available dataset on the level of conditionality attached to (a maximum of) 314 IMF arrangements with 101 countries over the 1992 to 2008 period. We find a negative relationship: Security Council members receive about 30 percent fewer conditions. This suggests that the major shareholders of the IMF trade softer conditionality in return for political influence over the Security Council.
en_US
dc.format
application/pdf
dc.language.iso
en
en_US
dc.publisher
KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich
dc.rights.uri
http://rightsstatements.org/page/InC-NC/1.0/
dc.subject
Conditionality
en_US
dc.subject
STIMMABGABE (INNENPOLITIK)
en_US
dc.subject
VOTINGS + BALLOTS (INTERNAL POLITICS)
en_US
dc.subject
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
en_US
dc.subject
INTERNATIONALER WÄHRUNGSFONDS
en_US
dc.subject
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AID
en_US
dc.subject
UN Security Council
en_US
dc.subject
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
en_US
dc.subject
SPECIAL ORGANISATIONS OF UNITED NATIONS, UN (INTERNATIONAL LAW)
en_US
dc.subject
WIRTSCHAFTSENTWICKLUNG
en_US
dc.subject
ZWISCHENSTAATLICHE WIRTSCHAFTSHILFE
en_US
dc.subject
Aid
en_US
dc.subject
IMF
en_US
dc.subject
Voting
en_US
dc.subject
SONDERORGANISATIONEN DER VEREINIGTEN NATIONEN, UN (INTERNATIONALES RECHT)
en_US
dc.title
Politics and IMF Conditionality
en_US
dc.type
Working Paper
dc.rights.license
In Copyright - Non-Commercial Use Permitted
dc.date.published
2013
ethz.journal.title
KOF Working Papers
ethz.journal.volume
338
en_US
ethz.size
43 p.
en_US
ethz.code.ddc
DDC - DDC::3 - Social sciences::330 - Economics
en_US
ethz.identifier.nebis
009899619
ethz.publication.place
Zürich
en_US
ethz.publication.status
published
en_US
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.::02525 - KOF Konjunkturforschungsstelle / KOF Swiss Economic Institute
en_US
ethz.leitzahl.certified
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.::02525 - KOF Konjunkturforschungsstelle / KOF Swiss Economic Institute
ethz.date.deposited
2017-06-10T17:59:30Z
ethz.source
ECOL
ethz.source
ECIT
ethz.identifier.importid
imp59366b3fab1a359706
ethz.identifier.importid
imp593650aebf51219161
ethz.ecolpid
eth:7068
ethz.ecitpid
pub:108008
ethz.eth
yes
en_US
ethz.availability
Open access
en_US
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2017-07-18T15:54:12Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2022-03-28T17:15:30Z
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
ethz.COinS
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