
Open access
Date
2013-06-19Type
- Journal Article
Abstract
Amounts of empirical evidence, ranging from microbial cooperation to collective hunting, suggests public goods produced often nonlinearly depend on the total amount of contribution. The implication of such nonlinear public goods for the evolution of cooperation is not well understood. There is also little attention paid to the divisibility nature of individual contribution amount, divisible vs. non-divisible ones. The corresponding strategy space in the former is described by a continuous investment while in the latter by a continuous probability to contribute all or nothing. Here, we use adaptive dynamics in finite populations to quantify and compare the roles nonlinearity of public-goods production plays in cooperation between these two contribution mechanisms. Although under both contribution mechanisms the population can converge into a coexistence equilibrium with an intermediate cooperation level, the branching phenomenon only occurs in the divisible contribution mechanism. The results shed insight into understanding observed individual difference in cooperative behavior. Show more
Permanent link
https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000069081Publication status
publishedExternal links
Journal / series
Scientific ReportsVolume
Pages / Article No.
Publisher
Nature Publishing GroupSubject
social evolution; Chemical origin of life; Evolutionary theory; CoevolutionOrganisational unit
03584 - Bonhoeffer, Sebastian / Bonhoeffer, Sebastian
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