Rights / licenseIn Copyright - Non-Commercial Use Permitted
In , Rasmussen and Capkun present a practical distance verification mechanism and use it to construct the first practical distance bounding protocol. In this paper we show that the protocol is vulnerable to what we call a distance hijacking attack, in which a malicious prover Q can convince the verifier V that he is at the same distance as some honest prover P, even though Q is further from V than P, by inserting his own identity into a run of the distance bounding protocol between P and V Show more
Journal / seriesTechnical report / Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zürich, Department of Computer Science
PublisherETH, Department of Computer Science
SubjectVERIFICATION (SOFTWARE ENGINEERING); DATA SECURITY + DATA PROTECTION (OPERATING SYSTEMS); NETWORK PROTOCOLS + COMMUNICATION PROTOCOLS (COMPUTER SYSTEMS); NETZWERKPROTOKOLLE + KOMMUNIKATIONSPROTOKOLLE (COMPUTERSYSTEME); VERIFIKATION (SOFTWARE ENGINEERING); DATENSICHERHEIT + DATENSCHUTZ (BETRIEBSSYSTEME)
Organisational unit02150 - Departement Informatik / Department of Computer Science
NotesVersion 1.1, February 25, 2011.
Technical Reports D-INFK.
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