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dc.contributor.author
Gersbach, Hans
dc.date.accessioned
2021-05-07T11:58:56Z
dc.date.available
2017-06-11T00:29:14Z
dc.date.available
2021-05-07T11:58:56Z
dc.date.issued
2014-10
dc.identifier.issn
0048-5829
dc.identifier.issn
1573-7101
dc.identifier.other
10.1007/s11127-013-0125-3
en_US
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/75096
dc.identifier.doi
10.3929/ethz-b-000075096
dc.description.abstract
We study the interdependence between campaign contributions, the candidates’ positions, and electoral outcomes. In our model, a candidate who moves away from his firmly established position towards a more risky one generates costs for the voters. Campaign contributions allow the candidates to reduce these mobility costs. We show that if donations were prohibited, then a unique equilibrium regarding the position choices of candidates would exist. With unrestricted financing of political campaigns, two equilibria emerge, depending on whether a majority of interest groups runs to support the leftist or rightist candidate. Interest groups may finance candidates whose position is far away from their own ideal point. The equilibria generate a variety of new features of campaign games, and may help identify the objective functions of candidates empirically.
en_US
dc.format
application/pdf
en_US
dc.language.iso
en
en_US
dc.publisher
Springer
en_US
dc.rights.uri
http://rightsstatements.org/page/InC-NC/1.0/
dc.subject
Elections
en_US
dc.subject
Campaign contributions
en_US
dc.subject
Interest groups
en_US
dc.subject
Run of donors
en_US
dc.title
Campaigns, political mobility, and communication
en_US
dc.type
Journal Article
dc.rights.license
In Copyright - Non-Commercial Use Permitted
dc.date.published
2013-12-03
ethz.journal.title
Public Choice
ethz.journal.volume
161
en_US
ethz.journal.issue
1
en_US
ethz.journal.abbreviated
Public choice
ethz.pages.start
31
en_US
ethz.pages.end
49
en_US
ethz.version.deposit
publishedVersion
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods::C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory::C72 - Noncooperative Games
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::D - Microeconomics::D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making::D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
en_US
ethz.notes
It was possible to publish this article open access thanks to a Swiss National Licence with the publisher.
en_US
ethz.identifier.wos
ethz.identifier.scopus
ethz.publication.place
Dordrecht
en_US
ethz.publication.status
published
en_US
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.::03729 - Gersbach, Hans / Gersbach, Hans
en_US
ethz.leitzahl.certified
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.::03729 - Gersbach, Hans / Gersbach, Hans
ethz.date.deposited
2017-06-11T00:30:56Z
ethz.source
ECIT
ethz.identifier.importid
imp5936513c3227275290
ethz.ecitpid
pub:118700
ethz.eth
yes
en_US
ethz.availability
Open access
en_US
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2017-07-20T18:23:44Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2022-03-29T07:09:32Z
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
ethz.COinS
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