
Open access
Author
Date
2014-04Type
- Journal Article
Abstract
In moral epistemology, the method of reflective equilibrium is often characterized in terms of intuitions or understood as a method for justifying intuitions. An analysis of reflective equilibrium and current theories of moral intuitions reveals that this picture is problematic. Reflective equilibrium cannot be adequately characterized in terms of intuitions. Although the method presupposes that we have initially credible commitments, it does not presuppose that they are intuitions. Nonetheless, intuitions can enter the process of developing a reflective equilibrium and, if the process is successful, be justified. Since the method of reflective equilibrium does not essentially involve intuitions, it does not constitute a form of intuitionism in any substantial sense. It may be classified as intuitionist only in the minimal sense of not reducing justification to a matter of inference relations alone. Show more
Permanent link
https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000082373Publication status
publishedExternal links
Journal / series
Ethical Theory and Moral PracticeVolume
Pages / Article No.
Publisher
SpringerSubject
Reflective equilibrium; Intuition; Intuitionism; Justification; Foundationalism; CoherentismNotes
It was possible to publish this article open access thanks to a Swiss National Licence with the publisher.More
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