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dc.contributor.author
Ciampaglia, Giovanni L.
dc.contributor.author
Lozano, Sergi
dc.contributor.author
Helbing, Dirk
dc.date.accessioned
2018-11-29T09:19:02Z
dc.date.available
2017-06-11T10:39:50Z
dc.date.available
2018-11-29T09:19:02Z
dc.date.issued
2014-06-06
dc.identifier.issn
1932-6203
dc.identifier.other
10.1371/journal.pone.0099039
en_US
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/86426
dc.identifier.doi
10.3929/ethz-b-000086426
dc.description.abstract
Power is the ability to influence others towards the attainment of specific goals, and it is a fundamental force that shapes behavior at all levels of human existence. Several theories on the nature of power in social life exist, especially in the context of social influence. Yet, in bargaining situations, surprisingly little is known about its role in shaping social preferences. Such preferences are considered to be the main explanation for observed behavior in a wide range of experimental settings. In this work, we set out to understand the role of bargaining power in the stylized environment of a Generalized Ultimatum Game (GUG). We modify the payoff structure of the standard Ultimatum Game (UG) to investigate three situations: two in which the power balance is either against the proposer or against the responder, and a balanced situation. We find that other-regarding preferences, as measured by the amount of money donated by participants, do not change with the amount of power, but power changes the offers and acceptance rates systematically. Notably, unusually high acceptance rates for lower offers were observed. This finding suggests that social preferences may be invariant to the balance of power and confirms that the role of power on human behavior deserves more attention.
en_US
dc.format
application/pdf
en_US
dc.language.iso
en
en_US
dc.publisher
Public Library of Science
en_US
dc.rights.uri
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.title
Power and Fairness in a Generalized Ultimatum Game
en_US
dc.type
Journal Article
dc.rights.license
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
ethz.journal.title
PLoS ONE
ethz.journal.volume
9
en_US
ethz.journal.issue
6
en_US
ethz.journal.abbreviated
PLoS ONE
ethz.pages.start
e99039
en_US
ethz.size
9 p.
en_US
ethz.version.deposit
publishedVersion
en_US
ethz.identifier.wos
ethz.identifier.scopus
ethz.identifier.nebis
006206116
ethz.publication.place
S.l.
en_US
ethz.publication.status
published
en_US
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02045 - Dep. Geistes-, Sozial- u. Staatswiss. / Dep. of Humanities, Social and Pol.Sc.::03784 - Helbing, Dirk / Helbing, Dirk
en_US
ethz.leitzahl.certified
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02045 - Dep. Geistes-, Sozial- u. Staatswiss. / Dep. of Humanities, Social and Pol.Sc.::03784 - Helbing, Dirk / Helbing, Dirk
ethz.date.deposited
2017-06-11T10:42:28Z
ethz.source
ECIT
ethz.identifier.importid
imp59365214010a034981
ethz.ecitpid
pub:136044
ethz.eth
yes
en_US
ethz.availability
Open access
en_US
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2017-07-12T15:56:11Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2018-11-02T15:06:38Z
ethz.rosetta.exportRequired
true
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
ethz.COinS
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