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dc.contributor.author
Gersbach, Hans
dc.contributor.author
Becker, Johannes G.
dc.date.accessioned
2019-05-29T07:46:58Z
dc.date.available
2017-06-11T12:38:58Z
dc.date.available
2017-11-16T14:55:33Z
dc.date.available
2019-05-29T07:46:58Z
dc.date.issued
2013-10
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/89777
dc.identifier.doi
10.3929/ethz-a-009978171
dc.description.abstract
We consider an infinitely repeated reappointment game in a principal-agent relationship. Typical examples are voter-politician or government-public servant relationships. The agent chooses costly effort and enjoys being in office until he is deselected. The principal observes a noisy signal of the agent’s effort and decides whether to reappoint the agent or not. We analyse the stationary Markovian equilibria of this game and examine the consequences of threshold contracts, which forbid reappointment if the principal’s utility is too low. We identify the circumstances under which such threshold contracts are welfare-improving or beneficial for the principal.
en_US
dc.format
application/pdf
en_US
dc.language.iso
en
en_US
dc.publisher
ETH Zurich, Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH)
en_US
dc.rights.uri
http://rightsstatements.org/page/InC-NC/1.0/
dc.subject
Principal-agent model
en_US
dc.subject
Repeated game
en_US
dc.subject
Reappointment
en_US
dc.subject
Stationary Markovian strategies
en_US
dc.subject
Threshold strategies
en_US
dc.subject
Threshold contracts
en_US
dc.subject
Asymmetric information
en_US
dc.subject
Commitment
en_US
dc.title
A theory of threshold contracts
en_US
dc.type
Working Paper
dc.rights.license
In Copyright - Non-Commercial Use Permitted
dc.date.published
2013
ethz.journal.title
Economics Working Paper Series
ethz.journal.volume
13/182
en_US
ethz.size
66 p.
en_US
ethz.code.ddc
DDC - DDC::5 - Science::510 - Mathematics
en_US
ethz.code.ddc
DDC - DDC::3 - Social sciences::330 - Economics
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods::C8 - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs::C83 - Survey Methods; Sampling Methods
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::D - Microeconomics::D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty::D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::D - Microeconomics::D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty::D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
en_US
ethz.code.jel
JEL - JEL::H - Public Economics::H1 - Structure and Scope of Government::H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
en_US
ethz.publication.place
Zurich
en_US
ethz.publication.status
published
en_US
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02045 - Dep. Geistes-, Sozial- u. Staatswiss. / Dep. of Humanities, Social and Pol.Sc.
en_US
ethz.date.deposited
2017-06-11T12:39:29Z
ethz.source
ECOL
ethz.source
ECIT
ethz.identifier.importid
imp59366b468a3c470680
ethz.identifier.importid
imp593652560659e62409
ethz.ecolpid
eth:7412
ethz.ecitpid
pub:141345
ethz.eth
yes
en_US
ethz.availability
Open access
en_US
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2017-07-18T21:16:17Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2019-05-29T07:47:15Z
ethz.rosetta.exportRequired
false
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
ethz.COinS
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