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dc.contributor.author
Millner, Antony
dc.contributor.author
Ollivier, Hélène
dc.contributor.author
Simon, Leo
dc.date.accessioned
2019-12-06T12:26:20Z
dc.date.available
2017-06-11T14:09:37Z
dc.date.available
2019-12-06T12:26:20Z
dc.date.issued
2014-12
dc.identifier.issn
0047-2727
dc.identifier.issn
1879-2316
dc.identifier.other
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.08.008
en_US
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/93336
dc.identifier.doi
10.3929/ethz-b-000093336
dc.description.abstract
We consider a two period model in which an incumbent political party chooses the level of a current policy variable unilaterally, but faces competition from a political opponent in the future. Both parties care about voters' payoffs, but they have different beliefs about how policy choices will map into future economic outcomes. We show that when the incumbent party can endogenously influence whether learning occurs through its policy choices (policy experimentation), future political competition gives it a new incentive to distort its policies — it manipulates them so as to reduce uncertainty and disagreement in the future, thus avoiding facing competitive elections with an opponent very different from itself. The model thus demonstrates that all incumbents can find it optimal to ‘over experiment’, relative to a counterfactual in which they are sure to be in power in both periods. We thus identify an incentive for strategic policy manipulation that does not depend on parties having conflicting objectives, but rather stems from their differing beliefs about the consequences of their actions.
en_US
dc.format
application/pdf
en_US
dc.language.iso
en
en_US
dc.publisher
Elsevier
en_US
dc.rights.uri
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
dc.subject
Beliefs
en_US
dc.subject
Learning
en_US
dc.subject
Political economy
en_US
dc.title
Policy experimentation, political competition, and heterogeneous beliefs
en_US
dc.type
Journal Article
dc.rights.license
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported
dc.date.published
2014-09-07
ethz.journal.title
Journal of Public Economics
ethz.journal.volume
120
en_US
ethz.pages.start
84
en_US
ethz.pages.end
96
en_US
ethz.version.deposit
publishedVersion
en_US
ethz.identifier.wos
ethz.identifier.scopus
ethz.identifier.nebis
000979344
ethz.publication.place
Amsterdam
en_US
ethz.publication.status
published
en_US
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.::03635 - Bretschger, Lucas / Bretschger, Lucas
en_US
ethz.leitzahl.certified
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02120 - Dep. Management, Technologie und Ökon. / Dep. of Management, Technology, and Ec.::03635 - Bretschger, Lucas / Bretschger, Lucas
ethz.date.deposited
2017-06-11T14:09:58Z
ethz.source
ECIT
ethz.identifier.importid
imp59365296eb5a262026
ethz.ecitpid
pub:146677
ethz.eth
yes
en_US
ethz.availability
Open access
en_US
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2017-07-13T08:57:15Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2021-02-15T06:59:00Z
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
ethz.COinS
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