Journal: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking

Abbreviation

J Money Cred Bank

Publisher

Ohio State University

Journal Volumes

ISSN

0022-2879
1538-4616

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Publications 1 - 10 of 13
  • Flexible Majority Rules for Central Banks
    Item type: Journal Article
    Gersbach, Hans; Pachl, Bernhard (2009)
    Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
  • Monetary Policy Inclinations
    Item type: Journal Article
    Gersbach, Hans; Hahn, Volker (2011)
    Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
  • Information Content of Wages and Monetary Policy
    Item type: Journal Article
    Gersbach, Hans; Hahn, Volker (2007)
    Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
    We examine whether it is sufficient for central banks to observe and forecast nominal variables only. Analyzing the interplay of wage-setting unions and a central bank we show that although central banks may not gain more information by directly acquiring data about indicators of real shocks in the economy, such activities are nevertheless beneficial for central banks and yield lower social losses. Moreover, the extent of research activities by central banks should depend on the process of union formation.
  • Voting Transparency in a Monetary Union
    Item type: Journal Article
    Gersbach, Hans; Hahn, Volker (2009)
    Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
  • Do Markets Care About Central Bank Governor Changes?
    Item type: Journal Article
    Dreher, Axel; Moser, Christoph (2010)
    Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
  • Saving and Portfolio Allocation Before and After Job Loss
    Item type: Journal Article
    Basten, Christoph; Fagereng, Andreas; Telle, Kjetl (2016)
    Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
  • Capitalizing on Partisan Politics? The Political Economy of Sector-Specific Redistribution in Germany
    Item type: Journal Article
    Bechtel, Michael M.; Füss, Roland (2010)
    Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
    This paper studies the redistributive effects of government partisanship on economic sectors in a parliamentary democracy. Based on a rational partisan perspective and policy-induced campaign contribution models, we expect that once in office, ideologically different parties deliver favorable policies to different industries in order to enrich their electoral and sector-specific supporters. Using daily stock market data, we empirically evaluate whether and how the mean and the volatility of returns to four important economic sectors covaried with the electoral prospects of a right-/left-leaning coalition in Germany from 1991 to 2005. This sheds light on the magnitude of sector-specific redistribution to be expected from ideologically different governments holding office. The results show that the mean and the volatility of defense and pharmaceutical sector returns increase if a right-leaning government is becoming more likely to win the upcoming election. In contrast, an increase in the probability of a left-leaning government triggers higher returns to the alternative energy sector and increases the volatility of consumer sector returns. Thus, our estimates partly support the idea that parties redistribute across sectors.
  • Contingent Contracts in Banking: Insurance or Risk Magnification?
    Item type: Journal Article
    Gersbach, Hans (2025)
    Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
    What happens when banks compete with deposit and loan contracts contingent on macro-economic shocks? The private sector insures the banking system efficiently against crises through such contracts when failing banks go bankrupt. When risks are large, banks may shift part of the risk to depositors who receive state-contingent contracts. In contrast, when failing banks are rescued, new phenomena such as risk magnification emerge. Depositors receive noncontingent contracts, while loan contracts demand high repayment in good times and low repayment in bad times. Banks overinvest and generate large macro-economic risks, even if the underlying productivity risk is small or zero.
  • Aggregate Investment Externalities and Macroprudential Regulation
    Item type: Journal Article
    Gersbach, Hans; Rochet, Jean-Charles (2012)
    Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
    Evidence suggests that banks tend to lend a lot during booms and very little during recessions. We propose a simple explanation for this phenomenon. We show that instead of dampening productivity shocks, the banking sector tends to exacerbate them, leading to excessive fluctuations of bank credit, output, and asset prices. Our explanation relies on three ingredients that are characteristic of modern banks’ activities: moral hazard, high exposure to aggregate shocks, and the ease with which capital can be reallocated to its most productive use. At the competitive equilibrium, banks offer privately optimal contracts to their investors, but these contracts are not socially optimal: banks reallocate capital excessively upon aggregate shocks. This is because banks do not internalize the impact of their decisions on asset prices. We examine the efficacy of possible policy responses to these properties of credit markets, and derive a rationale for macroprudential regulation in the spirit of a Net Stable Funding Ratio.
  • The Role of Media for Inflation Forecast Disagreement of Households and Professional Forecasters
    Item type: Journal Article
    Lamla, M. J.; Maag, T. (2012)
    Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
Publications 1 - 10 of 13