Minority Voting and Public Project Provision
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Author / Producer
Date
2009-09-24
Publication Type
Journal Article
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yes
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Abstract
The author proposes a two-round process called minority voting to allocate public projects in a polity. In the first round, a society decides by a simple majority decision whether to provide the public project. If the proposal in the first round is rejected, the process ends. Otherwise the process continues, but only the members of the minority keep agenda and voting rights for the second round, in which the financing scheme is determined. In the second round, the unanimity rule or the simple majority rule is applied. The author provides a first pass of relative welfare comparisons between minority voting and simple majority voting and outline the research program.
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Publication status
published
Editor
Book title
Journal / series
Volume
3 (1)
Pages / Article No.
Publisher
Kiel Institute for the World Economy
Event
Edition / version
Methods
Software
Geographic location
Date collected
Date created
Subject
Democratic constitutions; Minority voting; Public projects
Organisational unit
03729 - Gersbach, Hans / Gersbach, Hans