Can Democracy Cope with Extreme Views?
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Date
2025-07-08
Publication Type
Working Paper
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yes
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Abstract
We study how democracies can manage extremist minority views through Coalition-Preclusion Promises (CPPs), where parties credibly commit to excluding extremists from governing coalitions. We identify conditions under which CPPs improve social welfare by preventing extreme policy shifts. However, these benefits depend on parties’ incentives and voters’ ability to coordinate. The resulting voting game features multiple equilibria, and we extend typical equilibrium selection criteria. Our findings suggest CPPs can be an effective strategy to keep extremist parties out of government.
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published
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Publisher
Centre for Economic Policy Research
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Subject
Coalition formation; Political contracts; Elections; Government formation
Organisational unit
03729 - Gersbach, Hans / Gersbach, Hans
06338 - KOF FB KOF Lab / KOF FB KOF Lab
02525 - KOF Konjunkturforschungsstelle / KOF Swiss Economic Institute