A note on the complexity of manipulating weighted Schulze voting
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Author / Producer
Date
2020-10
Publication Type
Journal Article
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yes
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Abstract
We prove that the constructive weighted coalitional manipulation problem for the Schulze voting rule can be solved in polynomial time for an unbounded number of candidates and an unbounded number of manipulators. © 2020 Elsevier B.V.
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published
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Journal / series
Volume
162
Pages / Article No.
105989
Publisher
Elsevier
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Edition / version
Methods
Software
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Date collected
Date created
Subject
Computational social choice; Schulze voting; Computational complexity
Organisational unit
09610 - Brandes, Ulrik / Brandes, Ulrik