Nash and Wardrop Equilibria in Aggregative Games with Coupling Constraints
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Date
2019-04
Publication Type
Journal Article
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yes
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Abstract
We consider the framework of aggregative games, in which the cost function of each agent depends on his own strategy and on the average population strategy. As first contribution, we investigate the relations between the concepts of Nash and Wardrop equilibria. By exploiting a characterization of the two equilibria as solutions of variational inequalities, we bound their distance with a decreasing function of the population size. As second contribution, we propose two decentralized algorithms that converge to such equilibria and are capable of coping with constraints coupling the strategies of different agents. Finally, we study the applications of charging of electric vehicles and of route choice on a road network.
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published
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Journal / series
Volume
64 (4)
Pages / Article No.
1373 - 1388
Publisher
IEEE
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Subject
Aggregative games; Coupling constraints; Generalized Nash equilibrium; Distributed algorithm; Large-scale systems; Electric vehicles; Vehicle routing
Organisational unit
03751 - Lygeros, John / Lygeros, John
09578 - Kamgarpour, Maryam (ehemalig) / Kamgarpour, Maryam (former)