A New Era: Power in Partnership Peacekeeping

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UN blue helmets increasingly deploy in partnership with regional organizations and coalitions of states. While this development is hailed as a way out of geopolitical fragmentation and capacity overstretch, little is known about the effectiveness of these peacekeeping partnerships. We argue that UN and non-UN operations exercise different forms of power, which reinforce each other to reduce battle violence in active wars. If non-UN military operations actively engage in combat, the UN can focus on what it does best—employing its broad toolbox to coerce, induce, and persuade. Our quantitative analysis of the interaction between UN and non-UN peacekeeping supports these expectations: partnership peacekeeping works. With a non-UN partner, UN troops can reduce battlefield violence more effectively, that is, with fewer blue helmets. Importantly, non-UN missions need UN operations to successfully curb violence. The UN's multidimensional engagement offsets the potential negative effects of an all-too militarized approach to violence reduction. Regional and coalition peacekeeping can only support the UN, not replace it.

El despliegue de los cascos azules de la ONU se produce, de manera cada vez más frecuente, en asociación con organizaciones regionales y coaliciones de estados. Aunque esta evolución es encomiada por entenderse como una forma de salir de la fragmentación geopolítica y del sobredimensionamiento de la capacidad, existe poca información sobre la efectividad de estas alianzas para el mantenimiento de la paz. Argumentamos que las operaciones de la ONU y las operaciones no pertenecientes a la ONU ejercen diferentes formas de poder, que se refuerzan mutuamente con el fin de reducir la violencia en el campo de batalla en las guerras activas. Si las operaciones militares que no forman parte de la ONU participan activamente en combate, la ONU puede centrarse en lo que mejor sabe hacer: emplear su amplio abanico de recursos con el fin de coaccionar, inducir y persuadir. Nuestro análisis cuantitativo de la interacción entre el mantenimiento de la paz llevado a cabo por parte de las Naciones Unidas y el mantenimiento de la paz no perteneciente a las Naciones Unidas respalda estas expectativas: el mantenimiento de la paz procedente de esta alianza funciona. Con un socio que no pertenece a la ONU, las tropas de la ONU pueden reducir la violencia en el campo de batalla de manera más efectiva, es decir, necesitan menos cascos azules. Resulta importante destacar que las misiones que no pertenecen a la ONU necesitan operaciones de la ONU para conseguir frenar con éxito la violencia. El compromiso multidimensional de la ONU compensa los posibles efectos negativos que pudiera tener un enfoque demasiado militarizado para la reducción de la violencia. El mantenimiento de la paz regional o de coalición solo pueden servir de apoyo a la ONU, no reemplazarla.

Le déploiement des Casques bleus de l'ONU s'effectue de plus en plus en partenariat avec les organismes régionaux et les coalitions d'États. Perçue comme une réponse à la fragmentation géopolitique et à la saturation des capacités, cette évolution bénéficie d'un accueil positif. Pourtant, nous en savons peu sur l'efficacité de ces partenariats pour le maintien de la paix. Selon nous, les opérations de l'ONU et extérieures à l'ONU exercent des formes de pouvoir différentes, qui se renforcent mutuellement pour réduire la violence des combats des guerres actuelles. Si les opérations militaires extérieures jouent un rôle actif dans les combats, l'ONU peut se concentrer sur ce qu'elle fait de mieux : exploiter toutes ses ressources pour contraindre, inciter et persuader. Les résultats de notre analyse quantitative des interactions entre les efforts de maintien de la paix de l'ONU et extérieurs se révèlent conformes aux attentes : les partenariats fonctionnent. Avec un partenaire extérieur, les efforts des troupes de l'ONU pour réduire la violence sur le champ de bataille sont plus efficaces, au sens où ils nécessitent moins de Casques bleus. Les activités de l'ONU sont aussi souvent nécessaires au succès d'autres missions de limitation des violences. L'engagement multidimensionnel de l'ONU compense les effets négatifs potentiels d'une approche pourtant trop militarisée de la réduction des violences. Le maintien de la paix régional et de coalition peut soutenir l'ONU, mais pas la remplacer.

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"We have entered an era of partnership peacekeeping."
United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in 2015

Introduction

In the past three decades, the UN has increasingly relied on peacekeeping in partnership with other organizations to restore peace. Geopolitical tensions gridlocking the UN Security Council (UNSC) and expanded security policy ambitions by states and regional organizations have

contributed to a proliferation of non-UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs). Additionally, the deployment into active conflicts and new security threats brought UN operations to the limit of their capacities. Partners were needed to fill the gaps, and over forty non-UN PKOs have been authorized or endorsed by the UNSC since the end of the Cold War (Novosseloff and Sharland 2019, 3).

While this development was hailed by former UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon as the new status quo, we have shockingly few lessons learned from this new "era of partnership peacekeeping". Scholars and policymakers imply that non-UN military deployments help UN missions to bring down violence between civil war combatants (see, e.g., Howard 2019b; Novosseloff and Sharland 2019), but this argument remains untested. While the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping has been studied extensively (for reviews, see Di Salvatore and Ruggeri 2017; Gizelis and Benson 2019), little research exists on the effectiveness of non-UN peacekeeping (Bara and Hultman 2020). All the more, the dynamics unfolding when UN and non-UN PKOs are deployed together or in sequence remain a blank page. We aim to fill this page by investigating the following question: *Do parallel non-UN missions increase the effectiveness of UN PKOs in reducing battlefield violence, and vice versa?*

We argue that deploying UN missions and missions led by regional organizations or coalitions of states alongside each other helps curb battlefield violence. Based on Howard's (2019b) classification of power in peacekeeping, we assume that UN and non-UN peacekeepers exercise different forms of power. While non-UN PKOs often actively engage in combat, UN PKOs not only deter, defend, and disarm but also persuade and induce conflict actors into changing behavior. Our main argument is simple. If a non-UN military operation applies active force to reduce battle violence, the UN can focus on what it does best. The UN's vast peacekeeping experience and multidimensional engagement, in turn, offset the potential negative effects of an all-too militarized approach to violence reduction.

We test these expectations for intrastate conflicts in Africa from 1993 to 2018, drawing on novel data on UN and non-UN peacekeeping personnel (Bara and Hultman 2020). We find that partnership peacekeeping works. While UN troops decrease battle violence on their own, they mitigate violence more effectively when supported by a non-UN mission. The larger the non-UN mission, the better. Non-UN peacekeepers alone, on the other hand, are not associated with violence reduction *unless* they work alongside a large UN mission. These results are robust to a variety of modeling specifications, including a matched sample and fixed effects models to address selection bias.

Our results show that peacekeeping by regional organizations and coalitions of states can *support, but not replace,* the UN in active conflicts. Our findings speak to research by Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon (2014), who established that UN PKOs equipped with more military power are more successful in decreasing the number of killed combatants. We show that these results hold even as we control for non-UN mission size. Moreover, our findings on the effectiveness of partnership peacekeeping tally with Beardsley, Cunningham, and White (2019), who show that UN peacekeeping interacts well with other forms of international action, such as mediation.

These findings also offer valuable insights for policymakers. In May 2022, UN Secretary General António Guterres advocated for robust peace and counterterrorism operations in the Sahel, led by the African Union and supported by the UN (United Nations 2022). Guterres is not alone in suggesting that more PKOs should be led by regional organizations and coalitions of the willing. Many discussions in policy circles today focus on whether UN missions should act primarily as support for non-UN PKOs in the future (Dahir, Sarfati, and Sherman 2020). Given the current, and probably lasting, blockage of the UNSC, it might be tempting to delegate action against threats to international peace and security to local actors. Our research suggests that it may not be advisable to reduce UN peacekeeping to a sidekick for non-UN operations, but that UN support would often be preferable to regional missions going in alone.

In the following, we first review what we know about the effectiveness of peacekeeping. We then theorize that UN and non-UN peacekeepers use different forms of power that are mutually reinforcing. Subsequently, we discuss the data and empirical strategy, and present our results. Finally, we explore the implications of our findings for research and practice in international interventions.

Peacekeeping and Violence Reduction

Since 1947, more than 175 peace operations have been deployed globally. Around 40 percent were led by the UN (Bellamy and Williams 2015). Over the years, UN peacekeeping has undergone tremendous change. Initially deployed mostly to oversee the implementation of a cease-fire or peace agreement, today's missions receive what UN insiders like to call "Christmas Tree" mandates. On top of managing violence between combatants and against civilians, UN peacekeepers' tasks include security sector reform, human rights monitoring, election supervision, rebuilding infrastructure, and more. Critics of this development, most famously UN Secretary-General António Guterres who declared that "Christmas is over",[1] fear that overly diverse mandates dilute the UN's efforts. Still, comparative research shows that UN PKOs achieve more than keeping violence in check, contributing, for instance, to maternal health (Gizelis and Cao 2021) and economic development (Cil et al. 2019).

UN missions are also increasingly deployed in violent settings where there is no peace to keep and where a multitude of armed groups fight for local and national dominance. In these contexts, peacekeeping objectives are difficult to achieve within the boundaries of the UN peacekeeping principles of impartiality, consent, and the use of force only in self-defense. The UN has reacted by equipping most newer missions with robust mandates to use force more widely and enforce peace.

Even with these robust mandates and large troop deployments, some doubt that UN peacekeepers can successfully navigate hostile environments. UN troops do not train together ahead of their deployment, have incompatible equipment, speak different languages, and are said to have low combat motivation (Gaibulloev et al. 2015; Goulart 2021). Yet a substantial body of quantitative research links larger UN troop deployments to fewer battlefield and civilian deaths during active conflict (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013, 2014; Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2017; Beardsley, Cunningham, and White 2019; Cil et al. 2020).

Despite these successes, an ever more robust posture of the UN in peacekeeping may be undesirable. As the lines between peacekeeping and counterinsurgency (COIN) become blurred, the UN risks losing its reputation as a neutral arbiter. This, in turn, can undermine the legitimacy of the organization in its political and humanitarian work

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[1] See Security Council Report (2019, 2).

(Karlsrud 2019). If a mission is perceived as biased, its soldiers are also more likely to be attacked by the combatants, with downstream effects on the mission's effectiveness (Fjelde, Hultman, and Lindberg Bromley 2016). Finally, some scholars argue that peacekeeping should not become more like COIN because peacekeeping works, while COIN tends to feed cycles of violence and drive people into the arms of recruiting armed groups (Howard 2019a; Karlsrud 2019).

One solution is to let the UN keep the peace and leave offensive fighting and peace enforcement to others. This is emphasized by Howard (2019b, 545), who recommends "a division of labour between military and peacekeeping forces, which would enable greater effectiveness for both". Today, non-UN PKOs account for the majority of peace operations globally, and while not all are military missions, most are.[2] Bara and Hultman (2020, 354) present statistics on the personnel composition of UN versus non-UN PKOs, showing that multidimensional peacekeeping is carried out by the UN, while non-UN missions tend to be military-focused.

The effectiveness of non-UN PKOs is contested. What makes them potentially effective is that they can deploy more quickly due to geographic proximity and less bloated bureaucracies, and laxer security protocols allow them to tread where the UN does not dare to go (Bellamy and Williams 2005; De Coning, Gelot, and Karlsrud 2016). Critical observers doubt that non-UN missions can ever match the UN's vast peacekeeping experience, and have concerns about impartiality, dominance by regional hegemons, short-term engagement, and limited capacity (e.g., Heldt and Wallensteen 2007; Williams 2017). Unfortunately, research that systematically compares UN and non-UN PKOs is scarce. Older studies primarily associate UN missions with longer peace and violence reduction (Fortna 2004; Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2007; Hultman 2010). However, recent research that accounts for mission size reports that both UN and non-UN PKOs are able to mitigate violence against civilians (Bara and Hultman 2020; Kim and Sandler 2022a, 2022b).

In fact, the UN has frequently made use of non-UN interventions either to reinforce UN PKOs or as a rapid response force since the early 1990s, in accordance with chapter VIII of the UN Charter. In many cases, a non-UN mission was deployed first and later replaced by a UN mission. In other cases, UN operations were reinforced by non-UN troops at critical times. Such partnership peacekeeping, in which a non-UN mission is deployed prior to or alongside a UN PKO (Novosseloff and Sharland 2019, 3), has recently regained traction in UN internal discussions on the future of peacekeeping (Gowan 2020). Table 1 illustrates that in Africa, where most peacekeeping takes place, partnership peacekeeping is the norm rather than the exception, and we have indeed entered "an era of partnership peacekeeping" (United Nations 2015a).[3]

Think tanks have taken stock of this development and provided definitions and categorization frameworks (Novosseloff and Sharland 2019; Dahir, Sarfati, and Sherman 2020). Lagging behind is systematic research on the effectiveness of these peacekeeping partnerships. Doyle and Sambanis (2006, 114) mention that non-UN PKOs on their own are not effective peacebuilders, but they may boost the efficiency of UN missions. Howard (2019b) argues similarly. In her book, she describes how the interaction between French Sangaris forces and UN peacekeepers in the Central African Republic proved highly effective. She concludes that "[m]any UN peacekeeping missions have succeeded in part because they were assisted, in an ad hoc fashion, by actual military troops" (Howard 2019b, 31).

Thus far, the expectation that partnership peacekeeping is more than the sum of its parts remains largely untested. In the following, we thus develop a theoretical argument about power and effectiveness in partnership peacekeeping, and derive observable implications for subsequent testing.

Power in (Partnership) Peacekeeping

In the UN Charter, the use of coercive power is codified as a self-defense mechanism (Article 51) or as a tool to battle threats to international peace and security (Article 39). However, the UN suffers from a "birth defect" when it comes to exerting power: a child of realist and liberal worldviews alike, it oscillates between its idealistic founding purpose as a global regulator and its function as a multilateral organization under the will of its member states (Tardy 2007, 50). This ambiguity influences the mechanisms through which UN peacekeepers wield power.

From the start, UN peacekeeping was designed to offer security guarantees through monitoring of negotiated settlements and ensuring that no party exploits the postwar power vacuum (Walter 2002). As mandates became more diverse, so did the mechanisms through which peacekeepers exerted power. Based on Howard's (2019b) classification scheme, we distinguish three mechanisms of power in UN peacekeeping: *persuasion, inducement, and coercion*. While UN multidimensional operations rely on all three, non-UN missions, in contrast, rely primarily on *coercion* to achieve their mission objectives. However, *coercion* means different things for UN and non-UN operations. While non-UN operations often feature COIN elements and regularly engage conflict parties in combat, UN peacekeepers limit the opportunities for battle by establishing security zones, patrolling front lines, and protecting factions that cease fire. We argue that if UN and non-UN PKOs are deployed together, a division of labor between them makes it possible for these power mechanisms to unfold simultaneously and bring down battlefield violence more effectively.

UN peacekeepers can apply a broad toolbox to curb violence between combatants. *Persuasion and inducement* might be associated with the civilian and police components of UN operations at first glance. However, UN operations on average still consist of over 80 percent of uniformed troops (Bara and Hultman 2020). We argue that UN military persuade and induce as well. *Persuasion* is an interaction between actors where behavior is changed without the use of material inducement or physical force (Howard 2019b, 2). This can take many forms, of which mediation is a key one. UN troops mediate all the time: when encountering rebels on patrols, in low-level disputes, or when engaging with locals (Howard 2019b, 28). For example, when police officers were surrounded by an armed self-defence group in the CAR city of Bangui in June 2016, mediation efforts by MINUSCA troops helped to contain the outbreak of violence. This led to the peaceful release of the officers a few days later (United Nations 2016).

Inducement describes the use of material benefits to change behavior (Howard 2019b, 2). The carrots and sticks of trust funds, market restrictions, and providing

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[2] Some speak of a "regionalization" of peacekeeping, referring to regional organizations replacing the UN as peacekeepers in their own region. However, peacekeeping is also conducted by coalitions of states and even single states, sometimes well beyond their neighborhood (Bellamy and Williams 2005; Bara 2022). We use the more general term non-UN peacekeeping instead.

[3] We discuss our inclusion criteria for non-UN missions in the research design.

Table 1. UN and non-UN missions in Africa

Country	UN	Non-UN	Year
Angola	UNAVEM II		1993–1995
	UNAVEM III		1995–1997
	MONUA		1997–2018
Burundi		MIOB	1994–2001
		SAPD	2001–2003
		AMIB	2003–2004
	ONUB		2004–2008
CAR		CEMAC	2003–2008
		MICOPAX	2008–2013
		MISCA, Op. Sangaris	2013–2014
	MINUSCA	Op. Sangaris, EUFOR RCA	2014–2015
	MINUSCA	Op. Sangaris, EUNAM RCA	2015–2016
	MINUSCA	EUTM RCA	2016–2018
Chad	MINURCAT		2007–2008
	MINURCAT	EUFOR	2008–2009
	MINURCAT		2009–2018
Comoros		OMIC I	1997–2001
		OMIC II	2001–2004
		MIOC	2004–2006
		AMISEC	2006–2007
		MAES	2007–2018
DR Congo	MONUC	OAU JMC	1999–2000
	MONUC		2000–2003
	MONUC	EU ARTEMIS	2003
	MONUC		2004–2006
	MONUC	EUFOR	2006
	MONUC		2006–2010
	MONUSCO		2010–2018
Guinea-Bissau		ECOMOG	1998–2012
		ECOMIB	2012–2018
Ivory Coast	MINUCI	ECOWAS, Op. Licorne	2003–2004
	UNOCI	Op. Licorne	2004–2015
	UNOCI		2015–2018
Lesotho		SAPMIL	2017–2018
Liberia	UNMIL	ECOMIL	2003
	UNMIL		2003–2018
Mali		AFISMA, Op. Serval, EUTM	2013
	MINUSMA	Op. Serval, EUTM	2013–2014
	MINUSMA	EUTM	2014–2018
Rwanda	UNOMUR	NMOG	1993
	UNOMUR, UNAMIR		1993–1994
	UNAMIR	Turquoise	1994
	UNAMIR		1994–1996
Sierra Leone		ECOWAS	1997–1998
	UNOMSIL	ECOWAS	1998–1999
	UNAMSIL	ECOWAS	1999–2000
	UNAMSIL		2000–2018
Somalia	UNOSOM	UNITAF	1993
	UNOSOM II		1993–2001
		AMISOM	2007–2010
		AMISOM, EUTM	2010–2013
	UNSOM	AMISOM, EUTM	2013–2018
South Sudan	UNMISS		2011–2018
Sudan		AMIS	2004–2005
	UNMIS	AMIS	2005–2007
	UNMIS, UNAMID		2007–2011
	UNAMID, UNISFA		2011–2018

Source: Data from Bara and Hultman (2020).

administrative services are usually not managed by military personnel. Nonetheless, the UN military is needed to make sure aid gets where it is supposed to be, enforce market restrictions, and protect civilian UN personnel providing administrative or health services. In the case of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), peacekeepers provided health services and municipal functions to the southern part of the country. This decreased violence in the respective regions for some time, despite the extremely complex setting (Howard 2019b, 127).

Coercion is the ability to limit others' choice or force actors into "doing something [they] would not otherwise do" (Dahl 1957, 202–03). In active conflicts, UN mandates often include objectives that demand using coercion. For instance, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Mali, mandating resolutions featured language like "neutralizing armed actors" or "[using] counterinsurgency measures" (Howard 2019b, 136). This is where questions about the UN's capacity and right to use force resurface. These missions are meant to be impartial and act under the consent of all conflict parties, while their objective is to enforce peace (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2014, 738). We propose that there are three main mechanisms by which UN peacekeepers can coerce combatants into reducing fighting, even if this is something they would not otherwise do.

First, UN peacekeepers coerce through their most traditional function: making sure agreements to stop violence are kept, and offering *protection* to combatants willing to cease fire. UN troops on the ground offering protection to combatants who lay down their arms, even for a limited time, can help to reduce the commitment problems of belligerents, thereby decreasing the likelihood of battles (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2014). MINUSCA mission reports list several occasions of rebels in the CAR seeking security provisions from UN troops. In one, rebels sought shelter in a MINUSCA camp and agreed to enter into the pre-disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programme in exchange for protection (United Nations 2016). This shows that UN peacekeepers do not always need to be able to offer protection to combatants all over the conflict zone to curb battlefield violence. Enabling local ceasefires or creating demilitarized zones can also help decrease violence between combatants.

The second mechanism of coercion in UN missions is *deterrence*. By limiting opportunities for battle in certain areas, peacekeepers force conflict parties to reconsider the costs of violence. Attacking UN troops comes with audience costs and related repercussions. Militarily, attacking territory held or patrolled by UN troops is harder, as opportunities for surprise attacks and covert troop movements are limited (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2014; Beardsley and Gleditsch 2015). Two deterrence strategies are commonly employed by UN troops. One is the creation of demilitarized zones around regions, cities, or refugee camps. For instance, in 2009, MONUC disarmed fighters in the city of Bunia and disrupted troop reinforcements for the rebels later on (United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2003). Another strategy is to separate belligerents by patrolling front lines to create buffer zones (Fortna 2004; Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2014). To deter effectively with this strategy, UN troops must be able to fight back if combatants do not respect these zones. In the CAR in 2017, for instance, MINUSCA repeatedly warned rebels that any further advance toward the town of Ippy would be considered a threat. When approximately 300 members of a coalition crossed the line demarcated by the UN, an MINUSCA-armed helicopter

engaged the fighters, deterring future advances of rebels in this area (United Nations 2017).

The third coercion mechanism is *surveillance*. Due to their presence at front lines and through interactions with locals on patrol, UN peacekeepers are well positioned to collect information and monitor conflict dynamics. Surveillance itself can be used to coerce, for instance, when using information on troop movements to convince civil war factions to change course. Additionally, information from surveillance can be used to make other forms of coercion more effective, since solid intelligence is a prerequisite for all military action (Howard 2019b, 141). Apart from physical patrols, a key tool for intelligence gathering in peace operations are community liaison offices. For example, in 2019, MINUSCA recruited a total of seventy-eight community liaison assistants to improve the mission's situational awareness and early-warning systems (United Nations 2019).

The above showcases that UN peacekeepers have a diverse toolkit to separate fighting forces and reduce violence between combatants. Previous research has underscored the UN's effectiveness in this regard (e.g., Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2014; Beardsley, Cunningham, and White 2019). Nonetheless, UN forces were never meant to be fighting wars. While UN troops, if equipped adequately, have the short-term possibility to actively fight and push back rebels, they can usually not keep up fighting in the long run. MINUSCA mission reports after 2016 show that UN troops engaged rebels on several occasions with infantry or armed helicopters (see, e.g., United Nations 2016, 2017, 2020). However, such offensive maneuvers need a lot more manpower than defensive ones (Clausewitz 1968; Howard 2019b), and the same reports indicate that MINUSCA was constantly lacking the capacity to perform these enforcement tasks in one region while at the same time fulfilling its mandate in other parts of the country.

This is where the potential of partnership peacekeeping lies. MINUSCA deployed in 2014 after the French operation Sangaris was authorized by the UNSC to counter the raging violence in the CAR. For two years, Sangaris forces and UN blue helmets were deployed in parallel. Mission reports show that Sangaris forces actively fought rebels, sometimes with operational or intelligence support of UN troops, while the UN patrolled buffer zones, protected humanitarian convoys, and arrested war criminals to provide security (see, e.g., United Nations 2015b,c). During this time of partnership peacekeeping, levels of battlefield violence decreased significantly (Howard 2019b, 179). This suggests that in conflict settings where there is no peace to keep, UN peacekeepers might be more effective when deployed together with a non-UN peace operation.

As a partner to UN missions, the non-UN counterpart may deploy to kick-start the crisis response, reinforce existing UN missions in deteriorating security situations, or provide an exit strategy for the UN (Avezov 2021). At the request of the UN secretariat, the UNSC, or the host government, this usually occurs in contexts where the UN is either too slow to respond or does not have the capacity to react adequately to an unfolding crisis (Novosseloff and Sharland 2019, 11). Due to these situational contexts, mandate fulfillment for non-UN operations *requires the use of coercive force* in most cases. We are thus explicitly focusing our attention on non-UN PKOs with a security-related objective, and ignoring missions with purely civilian personnel.

Though non-UN PKOs can use *coercive power* through different mechanisms than UN troops, some tools are similar. *Defense and protection,* for instance, were key in crisis response when the EU's Operation Artemis reinforced MONUC

in the DRC to protect critical infrastructure and civilians (Novosseloff and Sharland 2019, 12). Another coercion mechanism through which non-UN troops wield power is *deterrence*. In contrast to UN operations, deterrence by non-UN PKOs can also be effective if they are deployed in a neighboring country as a standby or "over the horizon" force that can deploy rapidly at critical times. Examples are the French Operation Licorne in Côte d'Ivoire or the EU standby force in the DRC (Novosseloff and Sharland 2019, 12). Non-UN troops also engage in *surveillance*, or create an impression of constant surveillance, to change the behavior of conflict parties. Through high mobility and air superiority, Operation Sangaris, for instance, could monitor a lot more ground than they could cover with personnel (Howard 2019b, 60).

A few non-UN PKOs work through other mechanisms of power besides coercion. The International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF), for instance, also used so-called "good governance" approaches (see Howard 2019b, 6). In these missions, *persuasion and inducement* are used to reform institutions, assuming that good institutions pull the rug from under the insurgents' cause. However, the success of these missions is disputed, with the failure of ISAF giving new ammunition to critics (see Hazelton 2017).

Most non-UN missions though are military-focused and differ most notably from their UN counterparts by the frequency in which they engage belligerents in offensive military maneuvers, using *compellent force*. Military peace operations often exercise *coercion* through the same mechanisms as COIN operations. They apply military force to change the behavior of insurgents and are especially effective if coercion is applied to control civilians and create a stable security situation (e.g., Hazelton 2017; Howard 2019a). Examples of operations that apply power through these mechanisms are manifold, including AMISOM in Somalia, the above-mentioned Operation Sangaris in the CAR, and Operation Barkhane in Mali. These missions are designed to fight wars or undertake counterterrorism operations beyond the mandate or capabilities of the UN PKOs (Novosseloff and Sharland 2019). They reduce the fighting capacity of armed actors by actively engaging them in battle. We argue that when deployed alongside UN missions, such non-UN peace operations can act as a reinforcement, and provide offensive military capacity in support of UN missions.

Observable Implications

As described in the previous section, UN and non-UN peacekeepers apply power in different ways. This is the key lesson from the discussion so far. While both have the ability to use coercive force in active conflicts—when equipped with the necessary capacity—non-UN PKOs are by mandate and design better suited to use offensive military force. UN PKOs, on the other hand, have a much broader toolbox to affect violent actors' behavior. This suggests a possible division of labor between UN and non-UN PKOs, whereby the non-UN mission takes a more military and the UN operation a more multidimensional approach. Moreover, UN peacekeeping also interacts with other forms of international action, such as mediation (Beardsley, Cunningham, and White 2019).

We are not the first to suggest that peacekeeping effectiveness increases when missions have complementary capacities and employ different mechanisms of keeping the peace. In a recent monograph, Bove, Ruffa, and Ruggeri (2020) show that UN missions with higher internal diversity, i.e., with more troop-contributing countries, reduce battle violence and violence against civilians more effectively. The challenges this brings in terms of coordination problems

are outweighed by these missions' complementary practices and approaches to peacekeeping. We extend this argument from UN missions to partnership peacekeeping between UN and non-UN missions.

Partnership peacekeeping does not necessarily mean that UN and non-UN PKOs deploy simultaneously. They can also succeed each other. Non-UN missions are sometimes deployed as rapid response forces to stabilize the security situation before an UN operation can be mounted (Bara and Hultman 2020; Avezov 2021). An example where the effect of a prior non-UN deployment carried over to the UN mission is Timor-Leste. Following a referendum in 1999, the political UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was not positioned to respond to an outbreak of violence. To fill the gap, the UNSC authorized a multinational force of approximately 11,000 troops led by Australia (INTERFET). INTERFET was effective in curbing the violence, which provided the UN with breathing space to organize and deploy a comprehensive PKO later that year. INTERFET was disbanded and most of its troops integrated into the UN mission (MacQueen 2015).

While the early deployment of non-UN troops to crises is a common pattern, so is the simultaneous presence of a UN and a non-UN PKO. In such situations, military non-UN operations can bolster UN PKOs by taking over peace enforcement tasks. This frees up the UN's capacity to focus on a multitude of other strategies for addressing violence. Non-UN peacekeepers use offensive military power, *compellence*, in fragmented states where no actor has the monopoly over the use of force to create a context where UN missions can operate, or they provide coercive power where the UN's capacity might be overstretched. Descriptive statistics analyzed by other scholars underline this argument (e.g., Howard 2019b; Novosseloff and Sharland 2019). We do not dispute that UN troops are often able to bring down battlefield fighting on their own, as several previous studies concluded (e.g., Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2014; Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2017; Cil et al. 2020). However, we argue that parallel non-UN operations have a positive reinforcing effect on UN troops' ability to reduce battlefield violence. This leads to our first hypothesis:

H1: *UN troops are more effective in reducing battlefield violence, when supported by a non-UN mission.*

This hypothesis is in line with scholars' and policymakers' focus on how non-UN missions support the UN in its tasks. However, there is no reason to expect a one-sided effect of this collaboration. Instead, UN and non-UN PKOs can *mutually reinforce* each other.

Even if non-UN missions can react quickly and use force in ways that the UN cannot, an offensive militarized approach may not suffice in complex conflict contexts. As Howard (2019b) has convincingly demonstrated, UN peacekeepers' power comes in many shapes. Non-UN missions can profit from this. For one, UN personnel is frequently perceived as trustworthy by local populations (Nomikos 2022). In the CAR, for instance, UN peacekeepers shared intelligence gathered on patrols with non-UN troops, allowing those to apply force against rebel groups in the region in a more targeted manner (Howard 2019b, 168–69). However, the role of the UN in supporting non-UN operations goes beyond mere intelligence gathering, patrolling, and non-coercive power. As mentioned before, in 2015, MINUSCA and French Sangaris forces also conducted military maneuvers together to compel and deter rebel groups. While Sangaris forces took the lead in the offensive military

maneuvers, MINUSCA troops made sure that law and order in the previously rebel-held territories were restored and rebels would not retake the positions promptly (United Nations 2015b,c).

Moreover, the predominantly military approach of many non-UN missions (Bara and Hultman 2020) may have negative consequences. A perception of peacekeepers being biased, a lack or loss of legitimacy, collateral civilian damage, and retaliation by armed groups against peacekeepers or groups who cooperate with them may all feed cycles of violence rather than break them (Karlsrud 2015; Hunt 2017). These risks are much more severe if the military approach is not complemented with conflict resolution and state-building efforts. In fact, peace enforcement that just contains violence militarily may disincentivize host governments to build inclusive and accountable state institutions and address drivers of violence, possibly leading to more violence down the road (Tull 2018). A multidimensional UN mission alongside a non-UN PKO can mitigate these risks. These considerations inform our second hypothesis on the interplay of UN and non-UN peacekeeping:

H2: *Non-UN troops are more effective in reducing battlefield violence, when supported by a UN mission.*

Empirical Strategy

We test our hypotheses in intrastate conflicts in Africa between 1993 and 2018. While we have data for a global analysis, the bulk of partnership peacekeeping (78 percent of our observations) takes place in Africa. Limiting the main analysis to Africa also makes our results directly comparable to two impactful previous studies of peacekeeping and battle violence by Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon (2014, hereafter HKS) and Beardsley, Cunningham, and White (2019, hereafter BCW).[4]

The unit of analysis is a conflict-month, or more exactly, conflict-episode-month. Conflict episodes are derived from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v21.1 (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Pettersson et al. 2021). In the UCDP/PRIO data, a conflict episode is a period of continuous conflict activity, and conflicts can have multiple episodes separated by at least one year of inactivity. We observe these episodes during their active period, and for 12 months after the episode end date.[5] This gives us 104 distinct episodes in 54 conflicts across 33 African countries.

Our dependent variable is a monthly count of battle-related deaths, taken from the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) v21.1. (Pettersson et al. 2021; Sundberg and Melander 2013). These range from 0 to almost 10,000 in a single month, with an average of 50. Almost half (48 percent) of our observations have zero battle deaths. BCW use this as a justification for a zero-inflated negative binomial model (ZINB). We use a (non-inflated) negative binomial instead. A ZINB model, besides excess zeroes, requires a theoretical assumption that the zeroes arise from a different data-generating process, i.e., that battle deaths in a subset of the data are impossible or unlikely. We argue that this is not given when studying active conflict, which causes twenty-five battle deaths every year by (UCDP) definition, hence non-zero counts are always possible.

Partnership Peacekeeping

This study focuses on the effects of UN and non-UN peacekeeping. For our independent variables, we use the UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping Dataset by Bara and Hultman (2020). This is the first dataset offering approximate monthly numbers of troops for both UN *and* non-UN missions. We have extended this data to 2018 using the authors' procedure, with source data from the International Peace Institute (IPI) for UN missions, and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) for non-UN missions (International Peace Institute 2021; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2020).

Non-UN missions are peace operations that are conducted by regional organizations, ad hoc coalitions of states, and even single states. The majority of them is authorized or at least recognized by the UN (see Bellamy and Williams 2015), and most have an unambiguous peacekeeping character, i.e., they are distinguishable from one-sided military interventions that support one of the conflict parties.[6] However, there are ambiguous cases: When there is no UN mandate and when peace operations are conducted or dominated by single states, it is occasionally harder to ascertain whether a state or group of states militarily intervenes in a country under the guise of peacekeeping. As a result, lists of non-UN missions tend to differ more between sources than lists of UN operations (Bara 2022).

The data by Bara and Hultman (2020) include non-UN missions from the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database that also fulfill a more narrow definition of peacekeeping by Bellamy and Williams (2015, 14), hereafter referred to as BW. Missions without uniformed personnel (troops, military observers and experts, or police) are excluded, as are what BW call "regime support operations". The latter are missions invited by the host state to help quell a challenge to the regime without any mandate to support a peace process. After these exclusions, the lists by SIPRI and BW differ primarily with regard to single-state PKOs. These are operations such as the British "Operation Palliser" in Sierra Leone or the French operations "Serval" in Mali and "Turquoise" in Rwanda. Because the peacekeeping character of some (though not all) of these single-state missions is disputed, we conduct robustness tests of our main results after excluding all operations conducted by single states. We also test our main models after excluding all missions that, according to BW, were neither authorized nor recognized by the UN.[7]

HKS distinguish between (UN) troops, police, and observers but find that only troops are associated with reduced battlefield violence. BCW focus on troops only. We have a slightly different category, "military", which combines troops and observers. As Bara and Hultman (2020, 351) note, SIPRI stopped reporting troops and observers separately in 2015, as the distinction is not always as clear for non-UN PKOs as it is for UN PKOs. For larger missions with mostly troops, counting in observers does not make a big difference, and we call the variable "troops" hereafter.

We have four primary independent variables. *UN mission* and *Non-UN mission* are binary and record whether a peace operation by the UN or a non-UN organization was present in the respective month. The two continuous variables *UN Troops* and *Non-UN Troops* measure the monthly number of

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[4] We discuss the findings of a global analysis in the robustness tests.

[5] This is identical to BCW, whereas HKS use 24 months. We run robustness tests with only active months and with a 24-month "postwar" period.

[6] In our main analyses, we also include non-UN missions that are neither authorized nor endorsed or recognized by the UN.

[7] Results are presented in the online appendix. Our findings hold even with these more restrictive definitions of non-UN peacekeeping.

deployed troops in UN and non-UN missions in 1,000s. All peacekeeping variables are lagged by 1 month.

Troop numbers are arguably a simplistic proxy for a mission's capacity. Besides the number of boots on the ground, the military capabilities available to these troops in the form of training, equipment, and logistical support also influence the mission's ability to respond to violence (Bara and Hultman 2020, 362). As Howard (2019b, 159) observed in the CAR, for instance, French Sangaris forces, while not particularly numerous, had surveillance capacities that were superior to the more numerous UN troops in the area. Capabilities vary also between UN missions, but the differences across different regional organizations and coalitions of states are most likely much larger (Bara and Hultman 2020, 362). Possible alternative measures to account for mission capability would be the mandate, mission budget, and/or multidimensional indices of the military capacity of leading troop contributor(s). These, however, are much more easily available for UN missions than non-UN missions.

Across all our conflict-months, 28 percent have either a UN or non-UN presence. In these peacekeeping months, the UN is deployed alone in half of the cases. In another quarter of cases, a non-UN mission is deployed alone, and the final quarter of observations has partnership peacekeeping with UN and non-UN missions deployed at the same time. From the perspective of the UN, this means that when it deploys in Africa, it can count on a non-UN partner in about a third (34 percent) of observations. When we also consider sequential partnership peacekeeping, i.e., situations in which a UN mission is deployed within 12 months after a non-UN mission has departed, this number increases to 44 percent.[8] As shown in Table 1, at least in Africa, partnership peacekeeping is a common scenario.

Control Variables and Endogeneity

We control for a number of factors that make peacekeeping more likely *and* influence violence dynamics. First, we account for whether a conflict was over territory using the UCDP/PRIO "incompatibility" variable. Territorial conflicts often last long but with lower intensity than conflicts over government. We also consistently find that both the UN and other organizations are less likely to deploy to secessionist conflicts.

Second, in line with both HKS and BCW, we include ceasefires, population, the number of rebel groups, and episode duration in our models. We expect peacekeeping to be more likely when a ceasefire is in place, and ceasefires influence the dynamics of violence—for better or worse (Bara, Clayton, and Aas Rustad 2021; Clayton and Sticher 2021). We use the new ETH/PRIO Civil Conflict Ceasefire Dataset (Clayton et al. 2022) to account for ceasefires concluded in the conflict in the past 3 months.[9] Data for population is from the World Bank (2021). The number of rebel groups active in a conflict is taken from the UCDP/PRIO data, with the expectation that multiparty conflicts are more intractable (Cunningham 2006) and thus more likely to receive a peacekeeping mission. Episode duration is measured as the (logged) number of months since the beginning of a conflict episode in our data.

Table 2. Variable summary

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Battle deaths	4,533	50.12	228.02	0	9,793
UN mission (binary)	4,479	0.21	0.41	0	1
Non-UN mission (binary)	4,479	0.14	0.35	0	1
UN troops (1,000s)	4,479	2.20	5.35	0.00	28.56
Non-UN troops (1,000s)	4,479	0.74	3.26	0.00	37.00
Incompatibility	4,533	0.31	0.46	0	1
Ceasefire	4,533	0.17	0.37	0	1
Population (ln)	4,533	16.75	1.12	13.13	19.09
Number of rebel groups	4,533	1.26	0.57	1	6
External military support	4,533	0.28	0.45	0	1
Episode duration (ln)	4,533	3.33	1.32	0	5.74

In line with HKS, we also control for external military support. By this, we mean whether outside states were involved with troops to actively fight for one side in the conflict. We use data on secondary warring parties from UCDP/PRIO for this variable. Such support, displaying the interests of powerful states and neighbors, may influence the likelihood that the international community steps in with peacekeeping (Mullenbach 2005; Allen and Yuen 2014), and has been found to influence violence dynamics (Regan 2002). Table 2 summarizes the main independent and control variables as well as the dependent variable.

Control variables can only partially address selection bias in peacekeeping research. Selection bias exists because PKOs are not deployed randomly. Instead, they go into more intractable conflicts (Fortna 2004; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008). This implies that we are likely underestimating the effectiveness of peacekeeping. In addition to our main models, we thus employ three modelling strategies that address this problem.

First, we restrict our analyses to observations with a peacekeeping presence, either UN or non-UN. This removes bias from selection *into* peacekeeping and ensures that the results are not due to unobserved differences between conflicts with and without peacekeeping. Secondly, we use one-to-one propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983), assigning peacekeeping observations to control cases that had a similar likelihood of receiving a mission, but did not. To estimate the likelihood of receiving a PKO, we use our control variables, plus two measures of conflict intensity not included in the regular models due to post-treatment bias. One is the logged average battle deaths in the past 6 months; the other records whether violence increased in the past 3 months compared to the 3 months before that. For peacekeeping cases, these variables are fixed at the value right before deployment. Thirdly, we run models with fixed effects on conflict episodes. Fixed effects models control for any time-constant differences between conflicts and refocus the analyses on variation over time. While we believe that partnership peacekeeping can explain variation in violence both between conflicts and within conflicts over time, the fixed effects model is used here to address endogeneity from *unobserved* differences between conflicts, given that matching can only address observed differences.

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[8] Our main analyses test the impact of contemporaneous partnership peacekeeping, but we present results for both contemporaneous and sequential partnership peacekeeping in the online appendix.

[9] We also test our models with peace agreements instead of ceasefires, as the former may be even more strongly correlated with peacekeeping and battle violence. Using data from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Davies, Pettersson and Öberg 2022), our results are robust to this change.

Results

We first run our models without an interaction term. This allows us to assess whether previous findings on the effectiveness of UN troops in mitigating battle violence hold when controlling for non-UN troops. They do. More UN troops

Table 3. UN and non-UN peacekeeping and battle deaths

	(1) Standard	(2) PKO-only	(3) Matched	(4) FE
UN troops (1,000s)	−0.04***	−0.06*	−0.03**	−0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.00)
Non-UN troops (1,000s)	0.03	0.03	0.06***	0.04***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Territorial conflict	−1.87***	−2.49***	−1.91***	−1.01***
	(0.29)	(0.49)	(0.31)	(0.08)
Ceasefire	0.56***	0.34*	0.78***	0.06
	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.05)
Population (ln)	0.34***	0.61***	0.34***	0.28***
	(0.13)	(0.24)	(0.13)	(0.03)
Number of rebel groups	0.55***	0.28*	0.43***	0.30***
	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.03)
External military support	0.79***	0.27	0.38	0.32***
	(0.26)	(0.31)	(0.26)	(0.05)
Episode duration (ln)	−0.19**	−0.07	−0.19	−0.03
	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.02)
Constant	−1.92	−5.97	−1.95	−6.55***
	(2.02)	(3.72)	(2.00)	(0.43)
α (ln)	1.90***	1.62***	1.86***	
	(0.17)	(0.25)	(0.17)	
Observations	4,479	1,254	2,511	4,387
AIC	30,112.34	9,837.03	17,910.03	27,778.55

*$p < 0.1$, **$p < 0.05$, ***$p < 0.01$. Episodes-clustered SEs in parentheses.

are correlated with a significant reduction in fighting across all models of Table 3.[10] Previous findings by HKS, and later BCW, on the effectiveness of UN troops thus hold up when accounting for non-UN peacekeeping. The estimated effect is strong. Model 1 predicts an average of sixty battle deaths a month when no UN troops are present. With 10,000 UN troops, this reduces by a third, and more than half of our UN mission months have contingents that are at least this large. A total of 17,000 UN troops can cut this violence in half.[11]

For non-UN peacekeeping, the results look less encouraging. In all models, more non-UN troops are associated with more—not less—battle violence, and in the matched and fixed effects models, this effect is statistically significant. At best, this is the result of endogeneity bias. The matched models address *observed* differences between conflicts, while the fixed effects models address *unobserved* differences between conflicts. None of these models are able to address unobserved differences *over time* within a conflict.[12] If non-UN troops respond to conflicts when they are at their worst (as the first-responder idea would suggest), we could accordingly see such results. However, Bara and Hultman (2020, 355–56) find that UN missions on average enter into much more violent contexts than non-UN missions, and yet we find a violence-reducing effect for the UN. The results thus do suggest that more non-UN troops are associated with more violence compared to cases that were similarly severe but to which no peace operation was deployed.

The results so far do not clarify whether the estimated effects pertain to peacekeeping alone, or peacekeeping in

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[10] Models 2–4 re-test Model 1 with a PKO-only sample, a matched sample, and a fixed effects model.

[11] Margins plot in the online appendix.

[12] As Kim and Sandler (2022) argue, matching also does not account for reverse causality, i.e., the fact that changing casualty numbers over time influence the number of peacekeepers deployed at any time. In their analysis of the impact of non-UN peacekeepers on civilian targeting, for instance, a failure to account for reverse causality underestimated the effectiveness of non-UN peacekeepers in some cases. Future research should explore this further, exploring instrumental variable designs as suggested in that study.

Table 4. Interaction between UN and non-UN missions and battle deaths

	(1) Non-UN binary	(2) UN binary	(3) continuous
UN troops (1,000s)	−0.03***		−0.04***
	(0.01)		(0.01)
Non-UN mission	−0.11		
	(0.38)		
UN troops × non-UN mission	−0.08**		
	(0.04)		
Non-UN troops (1,000s)		0.04**	0.04*
		(0.02)	(0.02)
UN mission		−0.14	
		(0.29)	
Non-UN troops × UN mission		−0.00	
		(0.02)	
UN troops × non-UN troops			−0.01***
			(0.00)
Territorial conflict	−1.89***	−1.88***	−1.87***
	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.29)
Ceasefire	0.52***	0.49***	0.56***
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Population (ln)	0.31**	0.31**	0.33***
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Number of rebel groups	0.54***	0.52***	0.55***
	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.14)
External military support	0.95***	0.78***	0.78***
	(0.25)	(0.28)	(0.26)
Episode duration (ln)	−0.17*	−0.22**	−0.20**
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Constant	−1.48	−1.43	−1.90
	(1.96)	(2.06)	(2.02)
α (ln)	1.89***	1.90***	1.89***
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Observations	4,479	4,479	4,479
AIC	30,103.89	30,137.48	30,109.65

*$p < 0.1$, **$p < 0.05$, ***$p < 0.01$. Episode-clustered SEs in parentheses.

partnership. That is, we cannot conclude that *even without a non-UN partner*, the UN appears to be effective, or that non-UN missions *alone* are associated with increased violence. To get a better sense of how peacekeeping alone versus partnership peacekeeping addresses conflict intensity, we must look at the interactions.

Table 4 reports the interactions between UN and non-UN missions. Model 1 interacts UN troops with a binary non-UN presence. Model 2 does the inverse and interacts non-UN troops with a binary UN presence. Finally, Model 3 interacts UN with non-UN troops.

We cannot interpret the partnership effect from the table directly, but from the estimates on the constituent terms, we can now see how well UN and non-UN troops do on their own, i.e., outside of partnership peacekeeping. The UN does well and is associated with violence reduction when no non-UN partner is present (Models 1 and 3). This is not true for non-UN missions, on the contrary. There is again evidence in Models 2 and 3 that larger numbers of non-UN troops are associated with more conflict violence *if* they have no UN mission alongside.

Clearly, the coercive power applied by many non-UN operations does not curb battlefield violence. While few would expect military force alone to *resolve* conflicts, the results here indicate that it may not even be sufficient to manage violence in the short run. A good example is the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which did not manage to decrease violence against civilians and between conflict

Figure 1. UN effect on battle deaths conditional on non-UN presence (left) and strength (right).

parties, even though its troop contingent was increased significantly. As a response, the robust AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was deployed. While the success of UNAMID was limited, it was able to protect refugees through regular patrols around camps and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid (Lanz 2015). This shows that an operation that can apply a number of mechanisms of power is likely more successful than an operation focused on coercion.

This also suggests that the effectiveness of UN troops does not stem from their military power alone, even if their ability to curb battle violence is stronger with increasing troop deployments. Instead, the success of UN missions in reducing violence even without a non-UN partner appears to stem from their ability to impose military *and* political costs on the combatants, and to apply coercion in combination with inducement and persuasion (Fjelde, Hultman, and Nilsson 2019; Howard 2019b). UN missions are also more internally diverse than non-UN missions. Data by Mullenbach (2013) show that the average UN mission has personnel from thirty-three contributing countries, while the average non-UN mission has eleven. Thus, even without a non-UN partner, UN missions are more likely to have complementary capacities and peacekeeping practices in their ranks (Bove, Ruffa, and Ruggeri 2020). Finally, even in the absence of a non-UN mission, UN PKOs rarely come alone. As Bara and Hultman (2020, 363) write: "[b]ehind any UN deployment is the consensus of the P5 members that the conflict poses a threat to global or regional peace and security. This may trigger additional efforts by the international community, such as political negotiations, aid, and SSR (...)".

All of this points to a possible benefit of partnership peacekeeping where the UN complements the militarized approach of most non-UN PKOs with its multidimensional toolbox and where the non-UN mission—even if not ef-

fective alone—further strengthens the UN with its unique coercive capacities.

The interaction between UN and non-UN missions illustrated in Figure 1 offers evidence in support of this partnership benefit. The graph on the left is based on the non-UN binary in Model 1. With a non-UN mission as a partner, UN missions can much more effectively, that is, with fewer troops, reduce violence. At mission sizes above 8,000 (about 62 percent of UN mission months), there is a statistically significant difference between solo and partnership peacekeeping: UN missions with a contemporaneous non-UN partner reduce violence more drastically. Specifically, it takes about 21,000 UN troops acting alone to cut deaths from fighting in half, and missions of that size are rare. However, it takes only about a third as many UN troops to achieve the same in partnership with a non-UN mission.

Taking into account the size of non-UN missions (Model 3) further supports this idea of a partnership benefit. The graph on the right-hand side of Figure 1 shows that as more non-UN troops are deployed alongside the UN, the violence-mitigating effect of the UN gets stronger.[13] The results of the interaction models therefore lend support to Hypothesis 1. While non-UN missions may not seem to mitigate violence alone, and are actually associated with increased violence in some of our models, they do make the UN more effective, as we theorized.

A critical reader may surmise that this has nothing to do with partnership peacekeeping, and that two missions are simply better than one because they have more peacekeepers. If that were true, then our theory would miss the point, i.e., UN and non-UN missions would not complement each other with their respective strengths. Instead,

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[13] We only show the effect up to 15,000 non-UN troops, as any numbers above that concern only one outlier (Somalia).

Figure 2. Non-UN effect on deaths conditional on UN presence (left) and strength (right).

we would be looking at a mere numbers game—the more boots on the ground, the better. While we hope that our results on non-UN peacekeeping have already dispelled this notion grounded in rationalist frameworks and COIN theory (Walter 2002, 23; Hazelton 2017), there is also statistical evidence to counter this "boots on the ground" idea. We have compared the model fit (AIC) statistics for our interacted Model 3 with a model that simply adds up all troops deployed by the UN and non-UN organizations together. The boots on the ground model not only has a worse model fit but also produces a peacekeeping estimate that is not statistically significant, probably because of the UN and non-UN effects pulling in different directions.

If the UN gets more effective with a non-UN partner, could it also be that a UN partner makes non-UN missions better at achieving their mandate? Can a UN partner offset the violence-increasing effect we estimate for solo non-UN deployments? We find they actually may, if the UN partner has sufficiently many troops. Figure 2 is the analogue to Figure 1, but with a focus on how the UN can support non-UN missions. The graph on the left shows that the simple presence of a UN mission, independent of size, has no impact on the apparent violence-exacerbating effect of larger non-UN missions. The graph on the right, however, shows that larger UN deployments alongside non-UN missions manage to turn this effect around. With no UN partner, the average effect of non-UN missions on violence is positive, which we already know from Table 4. This also holds for small UN partners, though the relationship is not significant in this section of the graph. However, the effect reverses, and as UN missions become larger than around 10,000 troops, we see a statistically significant violence-mitigating effect of non-UN peacekeeping.

This is perhaps the most striking result of this study. Thus far, the discussion in partnership peacekeeping has often revolved around how regional organizations and coalitions

of states can support the UN in its peacekeeping mandate. The same applies to research. We were not able to locate case studies specifically discussing the role of the UN in non-UN peacekeeping success. Instead, the focus often lies on non-UN missions as a precursor to or force multiplier for UN peacekeeping. While we provide evidence that they have this role, this is not the whole story. Instead, the results suggest that for non-UN missions to be effective, having a UN partner is not just beneficial, but crucial. UN partners are needed to offset what we believe are perhaps the negative effects of a purely military-focused intervention that characterizes most non-UN peace operations.

Robustness Tests

We have conducted a number of additional tests of our main model (Model 3 in Table 4) to assess the robustness of the results. This section summarizes our findings.[14] First, we tested the model with a PKO-only sample, a matched sample, and fixed effects. The results are fully robust, suggesting that selection bias is not what is driving our results.

Second, we tested for "legacy" effects of non-UN missions deployed before a UN mission arrives.[15] As we have written above, partnership peacekeeping is often sequential rather than parallel, with the typical pattern being that a non-UN mission deploys first. Our non-UN legacy variables record whether a non-UN mission is currently present *or* was present at any time in the past 12 months. The results suggest that the benefit of partnership peacekeeping primarily stems from parallel deployments, not sequential ones. When we include both current and past non-UN missions, the pattern in Figure 1 stays the same (the UN is

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[14] Tables and Figures are in the online appendix.

[15] The wording is from BCW, who test the interaction between peacekeeping and a legacy of mediation.

more effective with a non-UN partner), but the difference is no longer statistically significant.

Next, we ran the models with a sample that included only active conflict months and with a sample that observed conflicts up to 24 months into the postwar period, as in the HKS study. The results are robust to these adjustments, with one exception: The finding that more non-UN troops are associated with more violence still holds, but there is more uncertainty over whether UN troops can offset this violence-exacerbating relationship.

Since it is common to distinguish between UN personnel types in quantitative peacekeeping research, we also conducted additional tests, including UN police. First, we *controlled* for UN police, which does not change what we find about the effectiveness of UN troops or the interaction between UN and non-UN troops. Second, we *interacted* UN police with non-UN troops (while controlling for UN troops) to assess whether more UN police also helped offset the violence-exacerbating effect of non-UN troops. They do indeed, suggesting once again that a key asset that UN missions bring to partnership peacekeeping is their multidimensional approach to violence reduction, and their more diverse composition in terms of personnel.

To account for temporal dynamics, we follow HKS and run a model with a lagged dependent variable. With regards to how non-UN missions support the UN, the results are fully robust. With regards to how UN missions support non-UN PKO, the statistical significance of the results changes. Specifically, we are less certain that non-UN PKO alone has a violence-exacerbating effect and, if yes, whether a UN partner can offset this effect and turn it around. While accounting for time trends is important, it is also important to note that this test only reduces the certainty around our estimates of non-UN PKO, while the pattern of the interaction looks the same as in our main models.

Lastly, we conducted the analysis with a *global* dataset. While partnership peacekeeping really is the norm in Africa (see Table 1), only 22 percent of all instances of partnership peacekeeping (parallel or sequential) are outside Africa. These, moreover, are a thing of the past. Since the turn of the millennium, the UN has had only three missions in active civil wars outside Africa.[16] Hence, 97 percent of partnership peacekeeping after 2000 and 100 percent of partnership peacekeeping after 2010 took place in Africa. Still, our findings hold in a global sample: UN troops alone are associated with fewer battle deaths, but even more so with a non-UN partner. Non-UN troops alone are associated with more battle deaths, but a UN partner can offset this effect and help non-UN missions achieve their violence reduction mandate. The conclusion we draw is that UN missions help missions by regional organizations and coalitions of states, and vice versa. Partnership peacekeeping works.

Conclusion

UN and non-UN PKOs apply different mechanisms of power to reduce violence. If both are deployed contemporaneously, then these mechanisms reinforce each other. Our results show that partnership peacekeeping saves lives. With a non-UN mission as partner, UN troops can reduce more violence with fewer blue helmets. We do not find evidence that non-UN missions curb battlefield violence, on the contrary. However, they do make the UN more effective. Larger UN deployments, in return, can offset the apparent violence-exacerbating effect of non-UN PKOs' military approach. This shows that partnership peacekeeping works and highlights that the UN, with its broad toolbox for applying power, is still vital for reducing violence in our era's civil wars. It is as Howard (2019b, 31) has argued: in an ideal division of labor, compellent force by non-UN troops, in tandem with other coercive mechanisms of power as well as inducement and persuasion applied by UN peacekeepers, helps convince combatants to stop killing each other.

Our findings have important implications for research on international action. First, in line with research by Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon (2014) and others, we provide evidence that UN peacekeeping works, with or without a non-UN partner. Second, like Beardsley, Cunningham, and White (2019), our results show that the beneficial interaction of UN peacekeeping with other forms of international action is worth investigating further. Third, we demonstrate that our understanding of non-UN operations has been incomplete. While the offensive military capacity of non-UN interventions supports blue helmets as expected, coercion alone is not enough. Non-UN peacekeeping missions need UN operations to successfully curb violence. This is an interesting avenue for future qualitative research that has so far often focused on how non-UN missions can support UN operations. We need to know more about the mechanisms through which UN troops make non-UN missions more effective.

More generally, our results show that the international community cannot solve conflicts just by putting boots on the ground. In light of the current dysfunction of the UNSC, it is more likely that the world will see more military deployments by regional organizations and multilateral coalitions. But these tools of international action need to be used with caution. Our research suggests that non-UN operations on average are not enough. It remains to be seen whether equipping non-UN PKOs with a broader toolbox of non-military peacekeeping measures (e.g., Akpasom 2016) changes this.

In this era of partnership peacekeeping thus far, UN blue helmets are still key to reducing violence in civil wars. Non-UN PKOs can *support, but not replace*, the UN. This is often overlooked when policymakers and scholars weigh up the advantages and shortcomings of UN and non-UN peace operations. This article highlights the benefits of deploying partnership PKOs and suggests that future research should focus on evaluating which accompanying international action makes UN peacekeepers most efficient instead of looking for avenues to replace them.

Supplementary Information

Supplementary information is available at the *International Studies Quarterly* data archive.

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[16] MINUSTAH in Haiti, UNIFIL in the Southern Lebanon conflict in Israel, and UNSMIS in Syria.

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