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CAREERS, CANDIDACY STRATEGY & GENDER:
INDIVIDUAL LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOUR IN THE BUNDESTAG

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Summary

This thesis explains legislative behaviour from four different perspectives in four papers. The first paper generates a typology of career paths, integrating all obtained pre-parliamentary party and political posts in a sequence and cluster analysis. It goes on to investigate these MPs' success rates at attaining higher positions within parliament and their party groups. Once an assessment has been made, on what kind of politicians enter parliament, their behaviour within the legislature is of interest. Therefore, the second paper examines the effects of the German mixed member proportional (MMP) electoral system on the individuals' legislative voting behaviour using an approach in the tradition of rational-choice institutionalism. In contrast to the established literature, the candidacy strategy (pure list, pure district, or dual) is sought to explain behaviour rather than the type of mandate (district or list mandate) obtained at the last election. The third paper opens a perspective beyond the institutional boundaries and into the personal motivation and career objectives of elected representatives. It assesses MPs' activity levels in parliamentary questions, rapporteurships, and voting attendance according to their career stage and age. This gives insight to their learning process as well as their disengagement from legislative work before retirement. Finally, the fourth paper seeks to answer the question, whether MPs represent the interests of specific groups in society according to their own personal characteristics. In this case, the gender of an MP is investigated as an explanatory factor beyond her party identity in representing the interests of women in plenary debates and legislative votes.

For the analysis of legislative behaviour, the German Bundestag was chosen due to its so-called personalised proportional electoral system. Relative to pure forms of electoral systems, such as list-proportional and plurality vote, the effects of complex electoral systems have remained understudied. This is especially problematic considering the spread of complex electoral systems in democracies around the globe which has occurred over the past decades. Regarding individual level behaviour within the parliament, the dominance of the Bundestag's party groups in the legislative process, giving the legislative body the designation "Fraktionenparlament", served as a suitable antipode to the US-centric literature.

This thesis illustrates the insights that are to be gained by studying MPs at the individual level, even when they are active in a highly regulated institutional and party group dominated setting such as the German Bundestag. In this effect, it aims to explain legislative behaviour from an institutional, a career driven, and personal identity perspective.

Zusammenfassung

Die vorliegende Dissertation erklärt parlamentarisches Verhalten aus vier verschiedenen Perspektiven. Zunächst werden die parlamentarischen Karrierewege, welche zu einem gewählten Mandat im Parlament führen, mittels Sequenz- und Clusteranalyse typologisiert. Basierend auf dieser Typologie, werden die Erfolgsraten der Parlamentarier in Bezug auf das Erreichen von höheren Positionen innerhalb des Parlaments und der Fraktionen untersucht. Nach dieser ersten Frage, welche sich in erster Linie mit der Zusammensetzung des Parlaments beschäftigt, fokussieren die drei darauffolgenden Artikel auf das tatsächliche individuelle Handeln im Parlament. Der zweite Artikel nutzt einen neo-institutionalistischen Rational-Choice-Ansatz um die Effekte des Deutschen personalisierten Verhältniswahlsystems auf das namentliche Abstimmungsverhalten der Abgeordneten zu erklären. Dabei steht im Gegensatz zur etablierten Literatur, die Wahlstrategie (pure Wahlkreis-, pure Listen- oder Doppelstrategie) und nicht die Mandatsart (Wahlkreis- oder Listemandat) im Vordergrund. Der dritte Artikel öffnet die Perspektive auf das parlamentarische Verhalten über die Grenzen der institutionellen Erklärung hinaus auf die Motivation und die Karriereambitionen der gewählten Repräsentanten. Aus der Untersuchung der Aktivitätsniveaus in parlamentarischen Fragen, Berichterstattungen und Anwesenheit bei Abstimmungen können Schlüsse über den Lernprozess sowie über den Ablösungsprozess vor dem Ruhestand gezogen werden. Schliesslich befasst sich der letzte Artikel mit der Frage, ob Parlamentarier spezifische Gesellschaftsgruppen als Folge ihrer eigenen Identität repräsentieren. Im vorliegenden Fall wird das Geschlecht des Parlamentariers als Erklärungsfaktor nebst der Parteiidentität in der Vertretung von Fraueninteressen untersucht.

Der Deutsche Bundestag eignet sich besonders für die Analyse von parlamentarischem Verhalten aufgrund seines personalisierten Verhältniswahlsystems. Im Vergleich zu den traditionellen Formen von Wahlsystemen, so wie das Mehrheits- und das Verhältniswahlsystem, sind die Effekte von sogenannten komplexen Wahlsystemen weitgehend unerforscht. Bedenkt man die Ausweitung von komplexen Wahlsystemen in Demokratien weltweit, ist dies als Forschungslücke besonders problematisch. Die Fallauswahl bietet auch in Bezug auf die US-zentrische Literatur zu individuellem Verhalten einen passenden Gegenpol, da es Aufschluss zu Individualverhalten in einem parteiendominierten Umfeld bietet. Damit zeigt die Dissertation auf, welche Erkenntnisse durch die Analyse von Individualverhalten in einem stark institutionell regulierten und parteidominierten Umfeld gewonnen werden können.

Introduction

Why study individual level behaviour in Parliaments?

The democratic state of the 21st century is clearly one of representative democracy. Legislatures are at the heart of democratic systems and the manner by which they are organized and function has great impact on the laws that govern society (Loewenberg 1971). The concept of a legislature as an entity is quite hard to grasp and seems almost abstract, as there is no such thing as a single identifiable actor. Legislatures as a whole can be compared in terms of their institutional setup and the relative power these institutions lend them, as has been done by Fish and Kroenig (2009). They can also be categorised by the degree of mutual dependence or separation between the legislative body and the executive, otherwise known as fused-powers or separation-of-powers systems respectively (Kreppel 2008; 2014). Or they can be distinguished by the amount of influence they have over the legislative process and the quality of the output produced as a result of legislation (Lijphart 1999; Roller 2005). These purely institutional arguments are clearly compelling, as they manage to explain a great deal about the role and the influence of legislatures and can be easily generalized to a broader selection of cases. However, they do not explain what role individual MPs play in producing legislation that governs society.

In order to understand the process in and by which legislation is produced, a broad literature has developed that looks beyond the institutional framework and into the organisation of one of its main components, the parliamentary party groups (for an overview, see Heidar and Koole 2000). A detailed examination of parliamentary party groups and their influence is essential for the study of parliaments, because they decisively structure and influence the actions of the members of parliament (MPs) (Müller 2000). Contrary to common perception, the influence the party group holds over its members does not derogate the democratic imperative of parliaments. Rather, by organizing the individual behaviour of its members the party group actually ensures accountability vis-à-vis its voters (Mitchell 1999). Passing laws and thus delivering on campaign promises or election pledges requires coordinated voting behaviour within party groups (Cox and McCubbins 1994; Cox 2005; Depauw and Martin 2009). Coordinated behaviour can be understood as the good the party group produces. In the European context party groups have coordinated behaviour so successfully, that they have been conceptualized as unitary actors by a broad part of the literature (Laver and Shepsle 1999; Tsebelis 2009).

By focusing mainly on institutions and party organisation, the literature has neglected to give enough attention to the individual actors within parliaments, namely the elected representatives. It is especially the unitary actor assumption that neglects any notion of individual actors with a given set of preferences, ambitions, and strategies as being involved in the decision-making process which culminates in the passing of a piece of legislation (Kam 2009). In view of this, the focus of this thesis is to explain what influences MPs in their legislative behaviour, be as a function of strategy to secure re-election, a function of career ambitions and opportunities, or as a function of an MP's personal identity.

As party politics dominate the German political sphere, much of the analysis of legislative behaviour has focused on the party group level (for the most comprehensive study in this tradition, see Saalfeld 1995). Accordingly, the popular perception of an MP is not based on his individual competences, performance, and representation efforts, as there is little known about these factors. A widespread conception is rather one of a politician, estranged from his voters, adapted to his party's hierarchy, and primarily seeking re-election (Bailer et al. 2013). Küpper (2013) exemplified this disenchantment of the voters with the popular phenomena of Horst Schlämmer, a fictional character played by the comedian Hape Kerkeling. His positions included "being left, liberal, but also conservative", "everything is too little, it should be more" and "children are the future".¹ According to a media poll, nearly 20 percent of the population would have considered voting for the fake Horst Schlämmer Party in the 2009 election. This is a simplified and extreme example but it does tell us that many voters do not have a high esteem for their elected politicians and do not ascribe a high level of competence and industriousness to them. This thesis therefore also seeks to understand where MPs come from and how they work within the confines of their parties, the political institutions as well as their personal career ambitions.

Structure of the Thesis

This thesis explains legislative behaviour from four different perspectives in four papers. The first paper studies which individuals make it into parliament by tracking their full pre-parliamentary career paths. It goes on to investigate these MPs' success rates at attaining higher positions within parliament and their party groups. Once an assessment has been made, on what kind of politicians enter parliament, their behaviour within the legislature is of interest. Therefore, the second paper examines the effects of the German mixed member proportional (MMP) electoral system on the individuals' legislative voting behaviour using an

approach in the tradition of rational-choice institutionalism. The third paper also focuses on MPs' behaviour within parliament by studying their legislative activity according to their career stages. This opens a perspective beyond the institutional boundaries and into the personal motivation and career objectives of elected representatives. Finally, the fourth paper seeks to answer the question, whether MPs seek to represent the interests of specific groups in society according to their personal characteristics. In this case, gender is investigated as an explanatory factor in representing the interests of women.

For the analysis of legislative behaviour, the German Bundestag was initially chosen due to its so-called personalised proportional electoral system. Relative to pure forms of electoral systems, such as list-proportional and plurality vote, the effects of complex electoral systems have remained understudied (Bochsler and Bernauer 2014). During the past decades, however, the use of such electoral systems has become more widespread (Shugart and Wattenberg 1999; Bormann and Golder 2013). The case of Germany also serves as a promising for the application of the study of pre-parliamentary career sequences, due to its federal structure and due to the variation in the strength of its parties' local and land-level organisations. This allowed us to compare extensive pre-parliamentary careers beginning at the local level, then rising through the state levels and the party's hierarchies, to very short pre-parliamentary careers. Regarding individual level behaviour within the parliament, the dominance of the Bundestag's party groups in the legislative process, giving the legislative body the designation "Fraktionenparlament" (Ismayr 1992, p. 37), served as a suitable antipode to the US centred literature. Most of the research on career-effects as well as gendered representation has been conducted in the context of the US Congress. The thesis contains the following articles, which are discussed in more detail subsequently:

- Article 1: *Pathways into Parliament: Party Animals, Parachutists, and other Career Patterns* (co-authored with Stefanie Bailer, Peter Meissner, and Peter Selb)
- Article 2: *Explaining Voting Behaviour in the German Bundestag (1961-2013): Candidacy Strategy and Re-election Certainty in Mixed-Member Systems*
- Article 3: *Exploring, Maintaining, and Disengaging: on the three phases in a legislator's life* (co-authored with Stefanie Bailer)
- Article 4: *Do Women Matter? Female Representation in the German Bundestag*

Article 1

“Pathways into Parliament: Party Animals, Parachutists, and other Patterns” was developed within a project which was meant to assess the chances for career changers of entering the political arena at the national level. In cooperation with Stefanie Bailer from ETH Zurich, Peter Selb and Peter Meissner from the University of Konstanz, and students from the Studentenforum im Tönissteinerkreis, this project gave us the opportunity to study per-parliamentary career structures of German MPs. The cooperation, financed by the BMW-Foundation Herbert Quandt, lead to the publication of a study focusing on career changers (Bailer et al. 2013). Based on the ideas built within the initial project, I extended the data from MPs belonging to one (2009 – 2013) to MPs belonging to five legislative periods (1998 – 2013). The extended data yielded 1450 career sequences that could be analysed and classified according to the party and political posts that MPs have held during the course of their pre-parliamentary careers. I then followed the empirical strategy of our original study, using sequence and cluster analysis, to determine 6 internally rather consistent and externally distinguishable career types. The data was extended to its current range to include different government coalition compositions which allows for a more justified analysis of the allocation of higher posts within parliament according to career type. Higher offices within parliament that were reached by the end of 2014 were considered in order to include MPs elected into the current 18th legislative period in analysis.

The paper was motivated by the public debate of career politicians in the context of the German Bundestag. Career politicians are confronted with much scepticism from the general public, as they are assumed to lack knowledge on important business and societal challenges (Shabad and Slomczynski 2002). Especially in the context of strong party structures, the path into parliament seems limited to those politicians who hold a long record of service to the party (Busch et al. 1988, p. 276; Gallagher and Marsh 1988). We actually know little about MPs who chose a lateral entry into national politics and to what extent this career path is feasible. Assessing the role to the party in nurturing and promoting a politician’s career requires much information and specifically individual level career data of MPs (MacKenzie and Kousser 2014).

Using an explorative approach, the paper identifies the six most common career paths that eventually lead to a mandate in the Bundestag. While clearly dominant and traditional career types exists, which we identify as “Party Animals”, “Local Heroes”, and “Land Legislators”, the system does appear to allow for entries of candidates deviating from the

traditional path. Both so-called “Career Changers” who pursue a political career only later in life and “Parachutists”, who enter parliament without completing an extensive chain of party or political posts, are present in the German legislature. As the data spans MPs belonging to five legislative periods (1998 – 2013), we can also assess the development of the composition of the legislative body, according to career type.

Article 2

The following paper turns its attention into the activities pursued in parliament, specifically, legislative voting behaviour. “Explaining Voting Behaviour in the German Bundestag (1961-2013): Candidacy Strategy and Re-election Certainty in Mixed-Member Systems”, is based on a paper published in a special issue which resulted from a ECPR Joint Session Workshop in 2012 (Ohmura 2014). For the purpose of this thesis, I have extended the analysis from three legislative periods (2002 – 2013) to thirteen legislative periods (1961 – 2013). The data for all legislative periods of the German Bundestag was collected in cooperation with Stefanie Bailer (ETH Zurich), Ulrich Sieberer (University of Konstanz), Henning Bergmann and Thomas Saalfeld (both from the University of Bamberg) on the project “Parliamentary Voting Behaviour in the German Bundestag” funded by the Thyssen Foundation. The data will be made available to the public in due time on the project website (<http://www.german-roll-calls.info/>).

The paper seeks to understand the effects of the mixed member proportional (MMP) electoral system employed to elect the members of the Bundestag on their parliamentary voting behaviour. The primary motivation is the existing literature’s use of a dichotomous categorisation of MPs according to the mandate divide. Under the mandate divide assumption, MPs with a district mandate focus their representational efforts toward the constituency, while MPs elected via their party’s list focus their efforts in service of the national party (Thames 2005; Sieberer 2010). Securing local representation in a proportional system was the intention behind implementing this electoral system in post-war West Germany (Roberts 2002). The theoretical argument assuming a mandate divide caused by the MMP system, however, is flawed. Since the German electoral system allows for dual candidacies, meaning candidates may run both in a single member district race and on the party’s land-level lists, contamination effects between the two electoral tiers are highly plausible (Ferrara et al. 2005; Hainmueller and Kern 2008). This implication is even more severe, considering that the vast majority of MPs seek to be elected using a dual candidacy strategy (Manow 2013). The

effects of the electoral system should not produce district and list mandates understood as roles which MPs assume depending on which tier they have been elected in. If it affects their legislative behaviour, this should depend on their re-election strategy and their prospects for re-election in each tier. The paper therefore, suggests a tripartite categorisation according to the candidacy strategy (pure list, pure district, or dual) of an MP in research aiming to explain legislative behaviour.

Article 3

The third paper, “Exploring, Maintaining, and Disengaging: on the three phases in a legislator’s life”, seeks to explain legislative activity as a function of an MP’s career stage and age. It argues that these two easily and widely available variables are useful in the explanation of individual level activities, such as attending legislative votes, asking questions in parliament, and pursuing rapporteurships of committees decisions. The paper was motivated by the shortcomings of existing literature, which either employed survey data that has the drawback of low response rates leading to unresolvable issues of selection bias, as well as the deterministic and static use of concepts of ambition in explaining legislative behaviour. Career stage and age variables have the advantage that they are available for the population on MPs, that they do not force a deterministic typology on to individuals, and that they produce ex-ante measures of ambition (Matthews 1984). The data used in this paper spans three legislative periods, from (2002 – 2013) and includes the individual level activities of MPs as mentioned above, as well as details on the length of their career and the specific reason for ending their parliamentary career.

Moving away from ambition theory which ascribes a certain level of ambition to MPs, such as progressive, static, and discrete (Schlesinger 1966), this paper assumes that the level of ambition varies within the course of a career, according to an MP’s career stage and age after entering parliament. Borrowing a marketing theoretical approach, MPs careers are divided into three stages: the exploration phase, the establishment phase, and the disengagement phase (Cron and Slocum Jr. 1986). In the first phase an MP focuses on learning the rules of the game, and investing efforts in so-called low-cost activities that require little experience and expertise, such as attending legislative votes and asking parliamentary questions. In the next stage, the establishment phase, he is expected to use the tools learned during the exploration phase to pursue more challenging activities, such as rapporteurships. Finally, in the disengagement phase, he is expected to reduce his activities,

as he no longer seeks to further his career within parliament. This is the most consequential implication of our study, since it raises the question of a last-period problem, whereby MPs are no longer accountable to their voters or their party.

Article 4

The final paper of this thesis, “Do Women Matter? Female Representation in the German Bundestag”, moves beyond MPs activities which are generally explained in a rational-choice framework, either to secure re-election or further one’s career, to the substantive representation of women’s interests by female MPs. The paper developed as a result of extensive examination of laws that affected women disproportionately and the notion that MPs behaviour is not detached from their personal identity (Burden 2007). Whether women in parliament represent the interests of women in society is considered of high importance in the justification of promoting higher levels of female representation in legislative bodies (Lovenduski 1993; Thomas 1994). While both high levels of descriptive representation, as well as a personalized electoral system are considered conducive to substantive representation of women by women (Dahlerup 1988; Phillips 1995; 1998), the existence of substantive representation remains very unclear in the context of strong parties that function as gatekeepers elected office (Norris 1993) and determined nearly all legislative behaviour (Beyme 1982; Ismayr 1992). The German case, especially with its low levels of representation in the first several decades of its existence, therefore, represents a hard case for the establishment of gendered legislative behaviour (Hoecker 1998).

To study the representation of women by women, several legislative activities are investigated: Parliamentary debates on so-called “women’s issues” are analysed in terms of participation and positioning of MPs. Roll-call votes are used to investigate whether there is a gender voting pattern beyond party line voting behaviour. While having female MPs represent women’s interests in a plenary debate can send a signal to voters, a rather different logic applies to MPs’ voting behaviour where the main goal is to pass legislation. As a result of having most resources allocated to the party group, the Bundestag is characterised as a parliament with high party group voting discipline (Saalfeld 1995; Sieberer 2006). In this context, a higher participation rate of women at votes as well as promoting legislation to improve women’s position in society by voting distinctively differently than their male party colleagues can be considered substantive representation as a result of descriptive

representation. The policies analysed cover four broader categories of issues: equality issues, abortion, maternity related labour issues, as well as the penalization of spousal rape.

Summary

The four papers in this thesis aim to explain the composition of a parliament, as well as individual level legislative behaviour but from four different perspectives. These are thought to complement rather than to exclude each other. Starting with an analysis of access to parliament and the career opportunities within it, the thesis moves on to explore how legislators are restricted by the institutional setting in which they act, the career ambitions they wish to pursue, and finally their personal identity along with the groups in society they are thought to represent. The papers hope to make a contribution to a more founded understanding of representation beyond aggregate level of party groups. In doing so it makes use of comprehensive data on MPs biographies, and their legislative activity and voting behaviour which have all been collected in collaboration on projects or individually for the purpose of this thesis.

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Endnotes

¹ Statements made at the Horst Schlämmer Partei press conference, 4 August 2009 and reported online: <http://www.stern.de/kultur/film/film--isch-kandidiere--schlaemmer-spielt-kanzler--und-alle-machen-mit-3804770.html> [Accessed on 17 August 2015]

Pathways into Parliament: Party Animals, Parachutists, and other Career Patterns

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Abstract:

Research on parliamentary careers has so far paid little attention to pre-parliamentary career tracks and their value in explaining legislators' work and behaviour. Using an exploratory approach, we identify typical career tracks taken by “Party Animals”, “Local Heroes”, “East Germans”, “Land Legislators”, “Parachutists” and “Career Changers” based on a dataset of the biographies of German parliamentarians (1998 – 2014) using sequence analysis. In a subsequent step, we investigate the influence of these career tracks on the allocation of committee seats, and on the achievement of parliamentary posts. In this way, we demonstrate the potential of pre-parliamentary career tracks as a variable by which the career development in parliament can be explained, but should also lend itself to further applications on the understanding of legislative behaviour and representational foci.

Introduction¹

The 2012 election of Joachim Gauck, a former pastor, as President of Germany and the preceding scandals surrounding his predecessor Christian Wulff, a professional career politician, brought to the fore once more the discussion on the drawbacks of professional politicians and the advantage of so-called Parachutists or Career Changers, who enter politics without years of pre-parliamentary political exposure. It is another example of an on-going debate taking place in the media and amongst the public on whether the pre-parliamentary career track of a politician matters. Although this discussion has been going on since Max Weber's (1926) famous lecture about professional party politicians, the content of the debate has remained the same in that these professional party politicians are criticized for having lost touch with the voters and are lacking important knowledge and expertise regarding societal and business challenges (Shabad and Slomczynski 2002). While this debate is rather lively in the media, parliamentary studies have so far not very extensively studied the pre-parliamentary experiences of professional parliamentarians.

Recruitment trends – particularly in Western European parliamentary settings – suggest that the pathways into parliament have become more narrow and that well-established roots in the party and a record of party service are necessary to be selected for candidacy (Gallagher and Marsh 1987; Fiers and Secker 2007). The result is a parliament filled with representatives who are characterized by “a sheltered occupation in non-political life, a university education, an age above forty, and political experience” (Wessels 1997). Likewise, the decreasing mean age of newcomers in parliament (early 40s) and the decreasing rates of parliamentary turnover have led to the belief that younger people, people who have already advanced in another career, and non-incumbents have distinctly lower chances of entering parliament (Cotta and Best 2000).

Previous parliamentary career research (e.g. Matthews 1984; Patzelt 1999; Best and Cotta 2000) has analysed pre-parliamentary experience rather crudely by identifying the various professional as well as political, social and religious backgrounds of parliamentarians over time. Mostly, these career variables are measured using binary variables (e.g. having held a certain office or not) or simply using the length of party membership. Although there have been discussions about “Party Animals” and “Parachutists”, and their respective values for parliamentary life (Pedersen et al. 2007; Narud and Valen 2008), not many systematic attempts have been made to clearly identify and analyse pre-parliamentary career paths.

The objective of this paper is to fill this gap with a more elaborate concept of pre-parliamentary experience. Thus, our first goal is to systematically and empirically identify the various career types leading to the election into the German Bundestag using sequence analysis, which takes the order and length of each career step into account. Depending on the different pre-parliamentary experiences, we expect parliamentarians to have access to different career opportunities once they enter the legislature. Therefore, in a second step, we investigate the allocation of higher parliamentary, party group, and committee chairs according to our pre-parliamentary career types. This second step on the differences between pre-parliamentary career tracks functions as an assessment of whether the career path typology is a promising alternative for studying the career development. Lastly, the data allows us to observe whether the distribution of MPs according to their career tracks has changed over the course of the five most recent legislative periods (1998 – 2013). Our typology of MPs can likely be extended to further areas of legislative research, such as the study of parliamentary behaviour and representation. In this manner, we use a rather explorative approach to identify political career types and not a deductive one where we would have started with firm theoretical expectations as to which types exist. However, this approach is in our opinion justified since there is to-date little systematic research on the different career types in parliaments.

Previous Research

A comprehensive measure for the various types of parliamentarians was attempted through the formulation of role theories (Eulau et al. 1959; Searing 1994; Andeweg 1997), of which the most parsimonious describes a deputy either as a “trustee”, a representative who decides what position to take on an issue on its merits and acts rather independently from the wishes of the voters, or as a “delegate”, who follows his voters’ wishes more closely (Burke 1770/1889). The main problem of parliamentary roles lies their endogenous measurement by assessing them from MPs’ behaviour or their motivation (Andeweg 2014). This confuses measure and effect: by classifying parliamentarians’ roles on the basis of their attitudes we do not know whether they have a particular attitude due to their role or vice versa. An equally problematic feature of Searing’s (1994) role theory, lies in its neglect to adequately consider career motivation understood in a rational-choice context (Strøm 1997). In our opinion, a more exogenous concept for measuring types of parliamentarians, such as one based on the pre-parliamentary career path, might be more helpful. While the literature on US legislatures

has explained much of MPs' motivation and behaviour as a function of seeking re-election (Mayhew 1974) and reaching higher offices within the legislature in the context of its institutional and party organizational environment, it rarely accounts for the pre-parliamentary aspects of a career (Hibbing 1999; MacKenzie 2011), although earlier studies investigated recruitment to US legislatures quite thoroughly (for an early overview see Schlesinger 1966; Moncrief 1999). Such aspects include the political experience and expertise a prospective MP gathered in subnational legislative or executive office, as well as the network an MP built within his party by holding various party positions.

The “Career Variable”

A large part of the career research has focused on the socio-economic backgrounds of parliamentarians, such as rising education levels and the overrepresentation of specific professions (Norris 1997; Cotta and Best 2000). Inside parliament, the length of service, the increasing professionalization (careerism), and the decision to stand for re-election once candidates are in office or to retire are much more thoroughly analysed (Schlesinger 1966; Hibbing 1991; Kiewiet and Zeng 1993; Brady et al. 1999). Regarding recruitment, research has focused on whether parliamentarians actually represent the interests of citizens and whether new candidates have a chance of entering parliament. It was found that the recruitment process depends mostly on the legal, electoral, and party systems that define the institutions regulating which citizens can enter the political game through which channels (Norris 1997). While parties are recognized as the dominant gatekeepers to electoral office, it remains unclear whether all parliamentarians' career paths are influenced by parties or whether non-party dominated candidates stand a chance of entering parliament (Panebianco 1988).

Few efforts have been made to investigate the complete pre-parliamentary political career path from adulthood up to the entrance into parliament (Borchert and Stolz 2003; MacKenzie 2011). Parliamentarians do, however, have quite different career paths, varying according to the sequence of and the time spent in public and political offices. The typical criticism of established party politics is that politicians only succeed if they follow the typical sequence of local and regional party offices, as in the case of the career path of the so-called “Party Animal”. Parties are pivotal in selecting political personnel to the extent that a political career without firm party roots is difficult to achieve (Borchert 2010). The dominance of the “Party Animal” career type might impede the influx of newcomers to the party system, who

may bring new ideas with them (Borchert and Stolz 2003), but who are at the same time less skilled in legislative affairs (Erickson 1997). Previous research has found that 57 percent of German parliamentarians have held local public offices and that 26 percent have held local party functions, however, these studies neglect at which stage and for how long the respective positions were held (Best and Jahr 2006). Since party functions are found to be particularly helpful for a parliamentary career (Best and Jahr 2006), also in regional parliaments (Borchert and Stolz 2003), we focus on party and public offices at the different levels of the federal state to identify various paths into parliament and to establish whether a certain track is dominant.

It is far from clear which career paths besides the “Party Animal” route exist. Understanding who has access to legislative office is highly relevant to the question of who represents the voters in parliament. The traditional “Ochsentour” (as Germans call the “Party Animal” career path) has for example been more difficult for women to complete, therefore limiting their access to public offices (Kolinsky 1991). In the German case this situation is also described as the career merry-go-round, where established politicians rotate positions between each other rather than enabling access to newcomers (Busch et al. 1988, p. 276). The implementation of women’s candidacy quotas by parties during the 1990’s, was thought to have a negative impact on the number of “Party Animals” elected into parliament, making space for MPs with different life and career tracks, especially for women (Kolinsky 1993). There is, however, to date no empirical analysis that confirms this expectation.

We thus consider it worthwhile to use the less-established method of sequence analysis to explore which percentage of parliamentarians chooses the “Party Animal” path and which other career paths are feasible to receive an elected mandate in parliament. Studying the different paths parliamentarians take before entering the national legislature sheds light on additional facets of parliamentarians’ lives and political careers, which is undoubtedly more precise and realistic than simply controlling for their profession or their level of education. Our typology according to the pre-parliamentary career path of an MP can be understood as the opportunity structure built over the course of a career, defined by the experience gathered and the networks formed.

Identifying Parliamentary Career Paths with Sequence Analysis

Sequence analysis facilitates the identification of career paths by taking both the length and the order of different positions held into account. So far, parliamentary research has however made little use of this tool. In the US case, MacKenzie (2009) analysed the careers of 676 US

Mayors from 1820-1980. Manow (2013) analysed the candidacy sequences of direct and list candidacies of all German parliamentarians from 1949 – 2009 to identify which candidacy paths are most common, and Jahr (2011) studied parliamentary career moves between the state, national and European levels of German parliamentarians.

Careers are more than the mere aggregate number of positions held or whether or not a position of a certain level was attained. Careers, including political careers, are paths leading from position to position; a sequence of positions in which each position is characterized by the type, level, duration, and timing it was held. To investigate political careers in Germany, we think the most important information on the type of political position is whether a position or office is party-related or a public office which required an election by citizens (and not only party members). Positions can also vary according to their level, being at the local, state, national, or supranational level. Concerning timing and duration, we want to know at which age an MP entered a position as well as the order and the length for which each positions was held.

This information was gathered from the short biographies published on the homepage of the German Bundestag and data provided by the NDV, the publisher of the “Kürschners Volkshandbuch” (Holzapfel and Holzapfel 2010). Using the short biographies of members of the 14th to the current 18th German Bundestag and supplementing these with information from personal and party websites, we extracted the start, end, type, and level of each position. In this way we were able to collect 9228 spells – positions specified with a start and end time – for 1450 of the 1502 individuals who served as members of the German Bundestag during this period. For some members no information was given at all, for others it was impossible to reconstruct the time span in which they held their positions. Table 1 summarizes these career spells. Positions held before the age of 18 were not considered. The timeframe of investigation was chosen as it covers different governing coalitions, whereby each party (excluding The Left, which has never been a member of government) has been in government at least once. This was deemed necessary as the access to several higher offices is dependent on government status.

Table 1: Pre-Parliamentary Career Spells of German Parliamentarians

	Party positions	Legislative positions	Executive positions	Total
Local/regional	4764	269	1420	6453
Land level	1421	414	91	1926
National level	685	84	21	790
EU level	28	31	0	59
Total	6898	798	1532	9228

The codes used to assign type and level to a career spell are summarized in table 2. The spell data was then transformed into panel data format with each member's career years starting at the age of 18 and finishing the year they joined the German Bundestag for the first time. When two positions were held within the same year we assigned the highest coding value. Imagine for example a politician who has a local party position with a coding of 2 (see table 2) and a state land level legislative position with a coding value of 6 in the same year. The resulting code for this particular year would be a 6 because it is the highest coding value among all positions held within that year. Since prospective MPs often hold many positions simultaneously, many of the coded spells are in fact overwritten by higher ranking spells.

Table 2: Order of Analysed Career Spells²

Code	Career step	Example
0	Not active/ Party member	
1	Youth party position	Head of a regional youth party branch
2	Party position (local level)	Party council member or chair at county or district level
3	Legislative public position (local level)	Member of the local, district or city council
4	Executive public position (local level)	Mayor
5	Party position (land level)	Party council member or chairman at state level
6	Legislative public position (land level)	Member of the state parliament
7	Executive public position (land level)	State minister
8	Party position (national level)	Party council member or chairman at national level
9	Legislative public position (national level)	Member of the People's Chamber of the GDR
10	Executive public position (national level)	Federal minister
11	Party position (EU-level)	Party Council Member or Chairperson at EU level
12	Legislative position (EU-level)	MEP

To categorize the careers we made use of sequence and cluster analysis. An overview of research fields and studies using sequence analysis can be found in Abbott (1995), Abbott & Tsay (2000) and Brzinsky-Fay & Kohler (2010). Although this analytical technique originally stems from genetic research, it aptly corresponds to our dynamic conception of careers, namely that type, level, timing, and duration of positions jointly determine the character of a career. Sequence analysis incorporates two steps: First, the dissimilarity of sequences – in our case, careers – is measured, which then forms the basis of a cluster analysis. Let us give an example to illustrate the computation of dissimilarity: imagine two arbitrarily chosen members of parliament, Steve Smith and Johanna Johnson. Steve

entered parliament at the age of 25, Johanna at 24, at which point their sequence ends. Table 3 below represents their career sequences. The codes used for Steve and Johanna correspond to the codes in table 2.

Table 3: Career Sequence Examples

Age	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
Steve	0	0	0	1	2	4	5	5
Johanna	0	1	1	2	2	4	4	

In sequence analysis, the amount of steps needed to transform one sequence into the other – via insertion, deletion and substitution – serves as a measure of dissimilarity. In its most simple form, insertion and deletion are assigned a cost of 1, while substitution costs – which can be thought of as one deletion followed by one insertion – are doubled. To transform Johanna’s sequence to be identical to Steve’s we need four substitutions and one insertion, summing up to a cost of: $(4 * 2) + (1 * 1) = 9$ (see table 4).

Table 4: Substitution Example


Johanna:	0	1	1	2	2	4	4		
Transformation	0	1→0	1	2	2	4	4		Substitution
	0	0	1→0	2	2	4	4		Substitution
	0	0	0	2→1	2	4	4		Substitution
	0	0	0	1	2	4	→5	4	Insertion
	0	0	0	1	2	4	5	4→5	Substitution
Steve:	0	0	0	1	2	4	5	5	

Because we do not want a difference between positions on the same level to weigh as much as differences between positions on different levels, we set substitution costs to raw distances. This means that substitution costs equal the difference in coding values – see coding table above – and thereby ensure that careers which involve mainly positions on different levels are coded as more dissimilar than careers with positions on the same level, e.g. substituting a 0 with a 1 costs 1, while substituting a 2 with a 7 comes at a cost of 5.

In order to transform these dissimilarity measures into career types, we chose Ward's method as the appropriate cluster method (see, Ward 1963; Aldenderfer and Blashfield 1984; Everitt et al. 2001). Ward's method forms clusters that minimize within-cluster variance. This ensures that careers are grouped in such a way that the careers within each group are as homogeneous to each other as possible. Although deciding how many clusters form an optimal number to represent the data is always a somewhat arbitrary endeavour, we found a set of six groups to exhibit both parsimony and relevance.

A helpful guidance for deciding when an optimal number of clusters is reached, ensuring the need for homogeneity among a clusters' career sequences and heterogeneity between the career sequences of different clusters, are dendrograms. The dendrogram for our cluster analysis, based on Ward's Method and the distances between career sequences, is shown in figure 1 below. The solutions for the 50 largest clusters are presented. While clusters tend to be quite similar for solutions with more than 4 clusters, there is a sharp rise in the dissimilarity when going below 4. We inspected all solutions suggesting cluster numbers between 4 and 12 and found that 6 clusters provides a good balance between homogeneity of career paths within the clusters and the necessity to reduce information.


Figure 1: Dendrogram for the Cluster Analysis with 6 Clusters



Parliamentary Career Types

Our decision to identify six clusters that were sufficiently internally homogenous but sufficiently distinct from each other led to six career types, which are presented in figure 2. The coloured lines represent pre-parliamentary experiences in public and party offices; each line ends with a parliamentarian's entry into the German parliament. The scale on the x-axis represents the age of the parliamentarians and the scale of the y-axis represents the number of MPs in the clusters. In table 5, we list the information used for deriving the clusters as well as a number of characteristics for each career type, such as gender or election mode. Since the information in table 5 is based on the raw data, before enforcing a hierarchy of positions and before lower ranked positions were overwritten by simultaneously held higher positions, it gives us a more detailed picture of each career type.

Figure 2: The Six Identified Career Clusters



The first two clusters (top row in figure 2), the “Party Animals” and the “Local Heroes” can be considered the traditional career types. They both enter politics at a relatively young age and on average they have a long pre-parliamentary career with the first group occupying a series of youth party and party positions at all levels (Bülow 2010, p.28) and the second group spending most of this time in an executive position at the local level. The group of the “Party Animals” is also by far the largest group in our typology, constituting more than a quarter of the MPs of the last five legislative periods. The proportion of women is low compared to the other career types, which is in line with what Kolinsky (1991) observed. The distinctive feature of the “Local Heroes” is their high success rate in winning district mandates in the two tier electoral system. This aligns with our understanding of an MP who has spent many years building a personal reputation and with strong political ties at the local level.

Cluster 3 (middle left in figure 2) is a group which we call the “East Germans”. This may include MPs who are not literally East Germans; rather the typology describes a path very likely for MPs from the former East. For example, of the fourteen MPs that were elected to the former East’s Volkskammer in first free election in 1990, ten are allocated to the category we named “East Germans”. Due to their late access to West German party structures, they could not follow the usual political career steps, such as party entry and first public or party office. Therefore their political career only begins on average between ten and five years later in life than that of the “Party Animals” and of the “Local Heroes” respectively. The positions they follow very much reflect the overall distribution of the Bundestag (last column of table 5), with the exception that the pre-parliamentary career begins later, its length is shorter, and they tend to focus more on national than on local positions. This is again reflected by the fact that they are predominantly elected via party lists. This group includes the largest proportion of women.

The fourth cluster (middle right in figure 2) named “Land Legislators” describes MPs who have had a relatively extensive career in the land-level parliaments, rendering them the group with the longest pre-Bundestag career. This is a rather small group, probably due to the fact that MPs at the subnational level often chose to remain in these positions rather than striving for office at the national level. Similarly, they are less likely to hold party positions at the national level than the other career types.

Table 5: Characteristics of the Career Clusters

	C1: Party Animals	C2: Local Heroes	C3: East- Germans	C4: Land Legis- lators	C5: Career Changers	C6: Parachut- ists	Overall Averages
Average pre-Bundestag career length	14.6	16.2	7.8	17.5	4.8	3.3	11.3
Average age at first position	20.3	24.9	29.8	24.8	37.6	28.4	26.3
Average age at Bundestag entry	37.5	46.2	44.8	47.0	52.7	42.7	43.7
% with youth party office	59.35	18.79	8.06	23.78	2.78	11.59	25.86
% with local party office	98.50	97.87	98.53	97.20	94.44	97.58	97.72
% with land party office	69.33	30.14	42.49	67.83	43.75	18.84	46.76
% with national party position	36.41	12.77	30.77	18.18	22.22	11.59	24.00
% with local legislative office	4.74	7.45	7.69	2.80	9.72	3.38	5.93
% with land legislative office	7.73	2.84	6.23	71.33	6.94	1.93	11.86
% with national legislative office	1.00	1.77	7.69	0.70	5.56	2.42	3.03
% with local executive position	36.16	76.95	28.57	23.08	40.97	21.74	39.79
% with land executive position	2.24	1.42	2.93	2.80	2.08	0.48	2.00
% with national executive position	0.00	0.00	1.83	0.00	0.69	0.00	0.41
% women	25.4	30.1	42.1	30.1	40.3	39.10	33.4
% district mandate at first election	40.4	52.1	35.9	43.3	36.1	46.90	42.6
N	401	282	273	143	144	207	1450
%	27.7	19.4	18.8	9.9	9.9	14.3	100.0


The percentages listed are column percentages. They list the proportions within each career type, allowing a comparison of pre-parliamentary positions across career types.

In Cluster 5 (bottom left in figure 2), we identified a group of so-called “Career Changers”, to which 9.9 percent of the parliamentarians belong. The career path of these politicians is characterized by a very late start to their political career. They assume their first party or public office on average 11 years later than the overall average of the sample and predominantly hold legislative or executive offices at the local level. However, from table 5

we see that while nearly all “Career Changers” do hold a local party office (as these are held simultaneously to higher ranking offices they are overwritten and therefore cannot be detected visually for the graphs), they are slightly less likely to do so than MPs from all other clusters. The most striking feature of their pre-parliamentary political career track is its brevity: once they decide to engage in a political career, they tend to reach the Bundestag relatively quickly with an average career length of 4.8 years compared to the Bundestag average of 11.3 years. By the time these MPs decided to actively pursue a political career, they had already spent several years in a career outside of politics. This cluster also includes a high proportion of women. The fact that these MPs spend very little time in their pre-parliamentary career and therefore also have little time to build a public image and a political network is reflected in the low rates of election by winning a race in a single member district.

MPs in the last cluster (bottom right in figure 2) were defined as the “Parachutists”. Similar to the “Career Changers” these MPs stand out by their very short pre-parliamentary career. Many of the MPs belonging to this cluster actually have held no party or elected offices prior to their election to the Bundestag, which is exhibited by the blank lines (the gaps between the coloured lines) in the bottom-right graph of figure 2. Where there is any sort of pre-parliamentary career, this tends to be in a local party position which is probably the least intensive position with respect to time investment and by itself does not really constitute a career. The flatness of the curve also indicates that this group spans a wide age range at which politics and parliament is entered. A closer look at these MPs showed that after their election they did, pick-up several extra-parliamentary positions, especially party positions. One prominent example of a “Parachutist” is Frank-Walter Steinmeier, a current Federal Minister, a former party group leader, Vice Chancellor, and head of the German Chancellery, who entered the Bundestag without having held any party or elected positions. His pathway to parliament was paved by several high ranking civil service positions in ministries until he was appointed to the position of Federal Minister. Another example is the current Federal Minister Wolfgang Schäuble. Although he held many higher party positions during the course of his very long parliamentary career, they all followed only after his first election to the Bundestag in 1972. Prior to that date, he merely held a post in the youth party of the Christian Democrats.

Figures 3a and 3b: Distribution of Career Types by Parties for the 14th (1998 – 2002) and the 18th (2013 - ongoing) Legislative Period. ¹



¹ The FDP is not presented in Figure 3a, as it did not pass the 5% hurdle in the 2013 election and was therefore no longer represented in the Bundestag. The order of the career types follows that presented in the legend.

Figures 3a and 3b present the distribution of career types as defined in our preceding analysis over all parties. During the 14th legislative period all career types are present in all parties, whereby MPs with more traditional career paths, namely the “Party Animals” and the “Local Heroes” account for nearly half of the MPs in the large party groups, the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats. This can be attributed to the extensive regional and local party structures available to their party members. Interestingly all party groups also exhibit rather high rates of MPs with non-traditional career tracks such as the “Parachutists” and the “Career Changers”. Turning to the 18th legislative period, the largest difference lies in the increase of “Party Animals” (the proportion of this group consistently increases over the period studied, which is why only the first and last legislative periods are presented here). Much of this growth can likely be ascribed to the simultaneous decline in the proportion of the career type “East Germans”. This can be considered a natural development, as these MPs have had access to party and public positions for the last 25 year which they were denied under the former East regime. The increase of the “Party Animals”, however, is also accompanied by a decline of “Parachutists”, especially in the case of the left-wing parties. Apparently, as the new left-wing parties, the Greens and The Left, have matured, the access to parliament within them has become very similar to that of the established parties. This is especially surprising as the rise of these parties and the accompanying introduction of women’s quotas was expected to end the predominance of the “Party Animal” at the national level (Kolinsky 1993). More than ever the best chance of entering the Bundestag appears to be by slowly and steadily working one’s way up the party ladder. Overall, this is in line with expectations that politics has become more professionalized, allowing politicians to build a life-long career in this arena.

Career Development inside Parliament

Assuming that parliamentarians also seek higher offices once they are elected in parliament, we investigate the effect of pre-parliamentary careers on developing a promising career inside the Bundestag. Pre-parliamentary careers can affect the development of a parliamentary career in the sense that previous contacts and networks in the party facilitate the attainment of offices in the party group and parliament. On the one hand, the pre-parliamentary career reflects knowledge and expertise, e.g. in regional affairs, which are valuable for representing respective interests in the regional sub-groups of the party group. On the other hand, well-established party contacts can also help parliamentarians to be elected into attractive party

group positions by their party group peers and leaders. Next to that, additional factors such as quotas concerning women or geographical concerns, as well as charisma, sympathy and achievement play a role in these selection processes. Regarding our six identified career types - “Party Animals”, “Land Legislators”, “Local Heroes”, “East Germans”, “Career Changers” and “Parachutists” - we expect the following effects:

- *“Local heroes” benefit from their experience in local public offices and are well represented in offices that are connected to their regional experience.*
- *Similarly, “Land Legislators” benefit from their experience in regional public offices and are well represented in offices that are connected to their regional experience.*
- *“Party animals” benefit from their experience in party offices and are well represented in party group-related offices.*
- *“East Germans” represent very much the average MP in the Bundestag, with the exception of a later start to politics. They are therefore expected to mirror levels of representation reflecting the overall average.*
- *“Career Changers” suffer from a lack of connections in the party and are thus less well represented in party offices. They also suffer from a weak local or regional connection which is why they are less likely to be represented in offices connected to regional matters.*
- *“Parachutists” on the one hand suffer from a lack of connections in the party but their unusually fast career implies that they are able to succeed in their political career without these connections. It is therefore expected that they will continue to succeed in reaching higher offices once they reach parliament.*

Of the 1450 members of the Bundestag documented in our data, 565 neither held a position as chairperson, vice chairperson, or speaker of a party group, nor in a committee, regional group (“Ländergruppe”), neither have they held parliamentary positions such as ministerial positions or the presidency, vice-presidency, chancellorship, or vice-chancellorship. A total of 2084 of these positions were distributed among the remaining MPs, several of whom held multiple positions at the same time or multiple different positions across different legislative periods.

For the attainment of committee chairs, the logic of allocation is less tied to previous offices held and more to the representation of constituency interests. Committees in parliaments are specialized working fora in which deputies collect expertise and information concerning a policy and in turn offer this knowledge to the legislature and the party group. As

specialized, policy-oriented working groups, they are attractive options for parliamentarians to realize their political and ideological goals as well as the interests of their voters (Mattson and Strøm 1995). Often, parliamentarians work in those committees in which they or their constituency have the most intense interest (Weingast and Marshall 1988). In distributive legislative approaches, committees are considered instruments for providing support to constituencies, and thereby as a means for ensuring the re-election of deputies (Weingast and Marshall 1988; Shepsle and Weingast 1994). Particularly committees in which local interests are discussed offer the opportunity to apportion benefits to voters (Stratmann 2006; Heinz 2010). We therefore expect career types with strong ties to their constituency, such as the “Local Heroes” to be well represented in committee positions, while MPs with weak ties, such as the “Career Changers” and the “Parachutists” to be less well represented in these positions.

If we inspect the distribution according to different positions in terms of the ratio of observed and expected values, we can identify where specific career types are over- or underrepresented (see table 6). The numbers in the first six columns indicate the ratio of the proportion of positions within the respective career group and the proportions of position allocated across all MPs. Therefore, values larger than 1 indicate overrepresentation of a career group in a type of higher office and values under 1 indicate underrepresentation. The “Career Changers” are the most underrepresented group in the available offices, especially in those of ministerial positions, but generally also in all party positions and committees. Only in highest offices of the Bundestag, such as President and Chancellor they appear to have a rather high success rate. However, this last finding is based on very few observations, which is why it should not be over-interpreted. The general finding that “Career Changers” do not achieve higher offices in parliament very often is in line with our expectations based on their weak party connections. As expected, the “East Germans” quite similarly reflect the average office allocation across all members of the Bundestag. The fact that they are slightly overrepresented in some of the party offices, may imply that they are subject to party internal quotas. We expected “Local Heroes” to be especially well represented in their party’s regional subgroups, the “Ländergruppen” which is not confirmed. They do, however, appear to have a high success rate at receiving committee chairs which is in line with our expectation of them receiving positions from which they could serve their constituency’s interests.

Table 6: Over- and Underrepresentation of Career Groups in Higher Offices

	Career Changer	East German	Land Legislator	Party Animal	Local Hero	Parachutist	Overall percent
Party group positions (PG)							
Leadership	0.65	1.17	1.13	1.04	0.70	1.25	27.79
Speaker	0.69	1.12	1.02	1.26	0.73	0.90	32.34
Regional subgroups	0.55	0.86	1.16	1.18	0.96	1.10	11.45
Bundestag positions							
President, Chancellor	1.34	0.88	1.69	0.97	0.17	1.63	2.07
Minister	0.38	1.06	1.11	1.22	0.59	1.40	14.48
Comm. chair	0.60	0.86	0.94	0.94	1.25	1.28	20.76
No positions	1.35	0.88	0.97	0.86	1.23	0.89	38.97
N	401	282	273	143	144	207	1450

PG leadership positions include party group leaders, deputy leaders, as well as whips and deputy whips; PG regional subgroup positions include chairs and vice-chairs; President and Chancellor of the Bundestag include Vice-Presidents and Vice-Chancellors; Ministerial positions include junior ministers; Committee chairs include and vice-chairs.

Overall, the “Local Heroes” are the least likely after the “Career Changers” to achieve any higher office. The “Land Legislators” are slightly overrepresented in all positions and it is likely that their very lengthy career and the experience they gathered at the land-level parliament does indeed promote their career prospects once they reach the Bundestag. Similarly, the “Party Animals” appear to profit from their extensive experience and well-developed network once they enter the Bundestag. They are also slightly overrepresented in all party positions which is what we expected based on their pre-parliamentary career. Lastly, the group of the “Parachutists” presents a very interesting case, quite strongly deviating from all other groups. Despite their very short pre-parliamentary career, they exhibit the highest success rate at achieving higher party and parliamentary offices. It is likely that these MPs, as the example of Frank-Walter Steinmeier showed, bypass the traditional career track by pursuing what Cairney (2007) termed “instrumental occupations”, meaning professions that create a direct link to politics, such as parliamentary staff or trade union officers. Although this career type includes MPs with the most successful track record of achieving higher offices, the previous analysis has showed that this group has been less successful at entering the Bundestag in the current legislative period (see figure 3b).

Summary and Conclusion

Parliamentarians follow different paths to enter the legislature. In this study, we analysed biographical information of 1450 German deputies from the 14th to the 18th legislative period and used sequence and cluster analysis to identify six typical career paths. In this way, we found out that the most common path into parliament, portrayed by the “Party Animal” entails the holding of several party offices but that there are four relevant deviations from this. The type “East Germans” very closely resembles the most common career path, but due to historical circumstances, these parliamentarians undertook the various career steps with a slight delay.

The “Party Animal”, the most common and popularly criticized career type, starts the party career early in life occupying several party offices over a rather lengthy pre-parliamentary path. This party experience and extensive party network pays off in the sense that “Party Animals” are often overrepresented in ministerial positions as well as in leading party group positions. This career path however appears to be less feasible or popular with women, with this group showing the lowest proportion of women elected to parliament.

A much more pronounced bond to his local roots is made by the career type “Local Hero”, whose local standing is reflected in his high probability of receiving a district mandate in his first election to the Bundestag. Within parliament this is also shown by his strong track-record in receiving committee chairs. The “Local Hero’s” focus on local politics does, however, appear to hinder him in achieving higher party or parliamentary offices.

The distribution of higher offices has shown the “Land Legislators” to be rather successful at achieving these, giving credence to the idea that their long career in the subnational legislature equips them with the necessary experience and connections for success at the national level. The small size of this group, however, indicates that successful land-level politicians may choose not to pursue a national level career.

The group of “Career Changers” is as small as that of the “Land Legislators”, each constituting 10 percent of the parliamentarians under investigation and shows that it is possible to assume a mandate without extensive party experience. However, the lack of party experience and a network might be a reason for the “Career Changers” failure to obtain higher offices in parliament and the party group once they are in parliament. A possible alternative explanation could be based on their advanced age and lack of ambition to assume a party political career inside parliament. This possibility was investigated in an affiliated study using qualitative interviews, which we conducted with a majority of “Career Changers” and,

according to their own declaration, they are not as keen as other career types to pursue a long-term career inside parliament (Bailer et al. 2013).

Lastly, the “Parachutists” demonstrate, similarly to the “Career Changers”, that a pre-parliamentary career is not an absolute necessity to win an election into the Bundestag. This career type also proves that success within the Bundestag in achieving higher positions is not solely a function of party networks built over a lengthy political career. The proportion of this career type has, however, declined over the last few legislative periods, reinforcing the “Party Animal” as the most dominant group in Germany’s national politics.

Our analysis suggests that politicians with a strong background in local public and party offices are more likely to enter parliament via a single member district mandate rather than having been elected via the proportional tier on their party’s list. The importance of party and public offices for a political career, as seen by the “Party Animals”, is also a reason why some aspiring politicians start to take up these positions at a very early age and before - or even instead of - entering a “normal” professional career. These “professional politicians” are often elected as deputies at quite a young age and intend to stay parliamentarians for their whole career.

In our study, we could show that sequence analysis is a useful tool to identify career paths more elaborately compared to the methods used in previous parliamentary research. While we have shown this measure to be useful in the explanation of legislators’ parliamentary career success, we believe it to be promising in a wide application of studies, including MPs’ legislative behaviour and representational foci. We have found that there is great public and social interest in this question, since our research sponsor – the BMW Foundation – has used these findings as a starting point for two discussion rounds on the question whether 10 percent of “Career Changers” is enough. We refrain from making a normative judgement on whether a certain career type is more preferable to another as long as we do not have a quality assessment of parliamentarians. However, we believe that a more thorough knowledge on the different career paths, including the frequency, length and timing of party and public offices, allows for a deeper assessment of the influencing variables on the attitudes and behaviour of career politicians.

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Endnotes

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² The hierarchy of posts and positions chosen, follows the simple formula:

- local/regional < land < national < EU
- youth party position < party positions < legislative public positions < executive public positions

It may be criticized that EU legislative positions for example, should be allocated at a lower level than executive public positions at the land-level. While this is a theoretical issue, that is unresolved, empirically, it does not affect our sequences too much. MPs holding EU positions are extremely rare and they do not tend to be sought by politicians who have reached high positions at the land or the national level.

Explaining Voting Behaviour in the German Bundestag
(1961-2013): Candidacy Strategy and Re-election Certainty
in Mixed-Member Systems

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Paper abstract: Mixed-member proportional (MMP) systems, such as the German Bundestag, are designed with the aim of combining the virtues of both local as well as proportional representation. In the literature, behavioural differences according to the type of mandate of an MP (direct or via list) have come to be known as the mandate divide. Using individual-level voting data from the 4th through to the 17th Bundestag (1961-2013), this paper questions the existence of a mandate divide. It investigates an alternative explanation for defection from the party group line in roll-call votes: candidacy strategy (i.e. pure district, pure party list or dual) in combination with the re-election probability.

A shorter version of this paper with a smaller timeframe of investigation has been published in *Representation* 50 (1).

Introduction

Legislative behaviour in mixed electoral systems is often assumed to follow the combined logic of conventional electoral systems such as single-member simple plurality and closed-list proportional representation, creating what has been termed the “mandate divide” (Thames 2005). Members of parliament (MPs) elected via a party list are expected to primarily serve the interests of their parliamentary party group (PPG) while MPs with a mandate from a single member district (SMD) are assumed to turn their focus towards their local party’s and constituency’s interests. Carey’s (2007) theory of competing principals shows comprehensively that there is variation between electoral systems with regard to the influence different principals have on MPs’ re-election prospects, which in turn affects MPs’ legislative behaviour in roll-call votes (RCVs). Translated into the case of mixed systems it has often been assumed that different levels of competing principals’ influence will lead to types of MPs with distinctively different behaviour within a single parliament. Cases such as the German Bundestag, which employs a compensatory mixed-member proportional system (MMP), have been thought to serve as an ideal testing ground for this theory, as the relationship of interest does not need to be disentangled from any country specific effects (for examples of this application, see Lancaster and Patterson 1990; Stratmann and Baur 2002; Zittel and Manow 2008; Sieberer 2010). However, most studies have explored the mandate divide by comparing the MPs elected via party lists with those elected in SMDs, neglecting the fact that the majority of MPs choose a dual strategy of election, using both available modes of candidacy (Klingemann and Wessels 2001; Manow 2013).

This paper argues that with regard to re-election, the strategy chosen, be it pure list, pure district or dual candidacy, as well as the probability of re-election within each strategy, should be considered rather than the type of mandate held during the respective legislative period. This implies that similar to many mixed systems, the German case should not be considered a field for controlled comparisons of different pure electoral systems, as contamination between the two tiers of candidacy may produce new outcomes or may simply disable the causal mechanisms of pure electoral systems (Ferrara et al. 2005, p. 8-12). Research on the German case should therefore consider not two but rather three types (pure list, pure district, and dual candidates) of MPs when conceptualising research questions on the effects of the electoral system. Understanding the incentive structures induced by mixed-member electoral systems is not only relevant for the case of Germany but also for countries that have implemented different versions of complex electoral systems over the past decades, such as the former Soviet countries, Venezuela, Bolivia and New Zealand (for an overview of

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the most comprehensively studied cases, see Shugart and Wattenberg 1999). The increasing number of complex electoral systems implemented around the world has reinforced the need to understand systems beyond those using simply plurality and proportionality (for an overview on electoral systems, see Massicotte and Blais 1999; Bormann and Golder 2013). From a theoretical perspective, existing studies on the presence of a mandate divide in legislative behaviour in Germany have not only had mixed results, but in the case of legislative voting behaviour they have not convincingly been linked to the Competing Principals Theory. If MPs with a district mandate consider voters or the local party organization to be a competing principal to the PPG, we would expect voting against the PPG line more often in decisions concerning issues of interest to the constituency. The secondary intention of this paper is to question the assumption that the motivation behind deviating from the PPG line in RCVs is rooted in serving the respective MP's constituency. In combination, these two questions go to the heart of the founding intentions of implementing the MMP system in Germany, securing both proportional as well as local representation (Roberts 2002).

The institutional determinants of legislative behaviour

The most convincing explanation of MPs' voting behaviour stems from the neo-institutionalist approach which accounts for the widely accepted assumption that MPs primarily seek re-election and higher office within parliament (Downs 1957; Strøm 2000; Kam 2009). The institutional setting in which a parliamentarian is active determines how this goal is best reached (Laver 2002; Hix 2004; Saalfeld 2005; Uslander and Zittel 2006; Sieberer 2010). Regarding legislative voting behaviour, Carey (2007) has shown comprehensively that formal institutions, such as the electoral system, as well as situational settings, such as government status and the relative majority of a PPG have an effect on the overall unity parties display in legislative voting. Focusing on the side of the selectorate, the existing literature has shown that different selection mechanisms of candidates affect their incentives to cultivate a personal vote, which may manifest itself as a greater likelihood to deviate from the PPG's line (Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Carey and Shugart 1995; Lundell 2004; Depauw and Martin 2009).

Both formal institutions, such as the electoral system, as well as less formal institutions, such as selection mechanisms within the PPGs, determine to a great extent the distribution of resources that may influence the incentive structure of a representative in his behaviour (for an overview of the literature, see André et al. 2013). One of the most valuable

resources at the disposal of the PPG leadership is the potential to influence an MP's chance of re-election. Party groups in general and especially party groups with government status are broadly thought to have a wide range of resources at their disposal, such as control over parliamentary information and communication channels, control over the parliamentary agenda, and the capacity to offer selective incentives, such as attractive committee assignments (Damgaard 1995; Sieberer 2006b; Heinz 2009).

In parliamentary systems where the PPGs are the gatekeepers in terms of advancement within parliament (Bowler et al. 1999), the benefits of toeing the PPG line seem quite straightforward (for specific details on the German case see Saalfeld 1995). The question one should really ask is: "Why would anyone ever vote against their PPG?" Theory tells us that the main conflict of representation lies within the discrepancy of local vs. national interests (Pitkin 1967). An MP's local party organization or constituency does not necessarily have the same interest as his PPG at the national level. While an electoral payoff of serving constituency interests is generally assumed in plurality systems with loose party dependency such as the US (for the most comprehensive work, see Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1978; Kingdon 1989), this is much less clear in systems that are skewed toward party loyalty (Cain et al. 1987, p. 206-209). For the MMP system, Bernauer and Munzert (2014) provide some evidence for strategic policy representation, whereby MPs generally position themselves close to their party and position themselves relatively close to their constituency when faced with a close district race.

For the specific case of a mandate divide, Shugart (1992) shows that ensuring local as well as proportional representation was the main motivation for implementing a MMP system in Venezuela, based on the German experience. When we consider the incentives produced by the electoral system, however, the logic of a mandate divide in the presence of dual candidacies is not consistent. If the reason MPs represent the interests of their local constituents is primarily aimed at securing re-election, not their mandate but rather their re-election strategy and their chances of re-election within each tier should be the relevant explanatory factor. Previous work on the mandate divide has therefore understood the different mandates similarly to the adoption of a parliamentary role, as conceptualized in "trustees" and "delegates" (for a explanation if these roles, see Eulau et al. 1959; Andeweg 2014) but neglecting the actual institutional mechanisms that create behavioural incentives for MPs. As Strøm (1997) has argued, legislative roles are best understood in the context of a neo-institutionalist rational choice approach. For the question at hand, this means MPs behaviour should be shaped by their prospects and strategies for re-election rather than the

mandate bestowed upon them. For example, an MP with district mandate and a dual candidacy strategy may have had equal or higher chances of re-election via his party's list. Because he won the district race, even if this was done by a small margin, he would be awarded a district mandate, no matter what his performance on the proportional electoral tier. We should therefore not ascribe to him the role of a district MP but rather that of a dual candidate with high chances of re-election in one tier and mediocre chances of re-election in another.

The theoretical framework of legislative behaviour applied to the German Bundestag

The adoption of the MMP system can be understood as a compromise between the political parties of post-war West Germany to guarantee proportional as well as personalised representation (Roberts 2002). Candidates elected by a single seat district should be particularly dedicated to the concerns of their constituency which will generally be voiced by the local party organization (Roberts 1988; Scarrow 2001). In theory the MMP system was therefore intended to produce two types of representatives, with differing incentive structures according to which principal they are more accountable to. The selection procedure of direct candidates is characterized by a higher degree of decentralization compared to that of the list candidates (Kaack 1969; Poguntke 1994). This highly regulated process allocates the selection competence of direct candidates to the local party organization, while the national level party organization is assumed to have some influence on the composition of the party lists (Klingemann and Wessels 2001). The party authorities at the land-level often use the party lists as an opportunity to include prominent candidates or candidates possessing expertise, that were not considered as direct candidates at the local level. It is also used as a safety net for candidates that are deemed especially valuable to the party or for candidates that are campaigning in districts with a low likelihood of election. Whether the national party organization is able to exert some influence at this stage of the selection process is unclear. Roberts (1988) reports of such an influence, however in a rather informal manner. Interviews with parliamentary party group leaders draw a picture of a rather powerless party group leadership at the national level on questions of candidate selection (Bailer et al. 2012). The existence of such an influence should strengthen the dependency of list candidates toward the national party leadership. However, it is questionable whether an effect of the selection mechanism is still valid, since candidacy for a district seat is often a prerequisite condition to obtain a promising position on a party list (Schüttemeyer and Sturm 2005; Reiser 2014).


The relationship and dependencies between an MP, his party group, and his voters is therefore not straightforward. However, following the previous logic of election and higher office within parliament, it becomes clear that the default for MPs is to support the decisions taken by the PPG, i.e. at the national level. In the rare cases where the PPG's interests conflict with local interests however, MPs with a district mandate may indeed have an incentive to side with their constituency or local party organization. The local party can deny them nomination in the next election and voters can easily cast their personal vote for another candidate while still supporting the same party by giving it the more important list vote, which determines the actual composition of parliament.

Whether the theoretical implications of a mandate divide actually hold in the case of the German Bundestag has proven to be contentious. Some authors emphasise the different commitment structures of district and list candidates. Klingemann and Wessels (2001) speak of "Personalization at the Grassroots" whereby they ascertain that voters evaluate district candidates on the basis of their previous performance thereby securing the personalised element of the MMP system. A survey-based study of MPs by Lancaster and Patterson (1990) also provides evidence of differing accountability structures in the understanding of representation between different types of MPs.

More recently, several studies have shown that no significant differences in legislative behaviour can be observed because the system allows for dual candidacies. Using sequence analysis, Manow (2013) has most recently shown that if one considers all elections an MP has taken part in, barely a quarter of MPs can be considered pure list or pure district candidates. The remaining MPs all used a mix of list, district and dual modes of candidacy. Using our data from 1949 to 2013¹ (see figure 1), we can see that this tendency has strongly increased in the first ten legislative periods and remained rather stable over the past six legislative periods with less than twenty percent of elected MPs having chosen a pure candidacy strategy.

With the vast majority pursuing election in both tiers, it has been posited that not only district but also list MPs must assume constituency responsibilities (Becher and Sieberer 2008; Gschwend and Zittel 2008). This is in line with studies focusing on contamination effects between the electoral tiers, showing that with the majority of MPs pursuing a dual candidacy strategy, the assumption of differing representation logics seems unrealistic or oversimplified (Ferrara et al. 2005; Hainmueller and Kern 2008).

Figure 1: The development of candidacy strategies in the Bundestag (1949 – 2013)



Sieberer's (2010) study of the institutional level effect on individual voting behaviour is of specific interest for the purpose of the following analysis. Analysing the 16th Bundestag (2005 – 2009) Sieberer found that MPs elected to a district mandate are significantly more likely to deviate from the PPG line than MPs elected via a party list. These results remained significant when controlling for government status, executive or parliamentary office, PPG membership and to a limited degree the substance of the vote being held. A more recent analysis by Sieberer (2013) goes beyond the identification of a mandate divide in legislative voting to find that while there is no clear mandate divide in MPs' use of explanation of votes due to contamination effects between the two electoral tiers, the Competing Principals Theory does hold for the content of MPs' explanations.

Although Sieberer has analysed legislative behaviour and the mandate divide in the German context, there are several reasons that justify a re-examination of this research question. Most importantly on a theoretical level, this paper argues that it is not the mode of election (district or list mandate) which determines an MP's legislative voting behaviour, but rather his prospects for re-election under the strategy chosen (pure list, pure district or dual candidacy). Using re-election strategy (pure list, pure district, or dual) rather than mode of election allows for a clearer interpretation of possible contamination effects, especially for

dual candidates. With regard to this point, this paper aims to make a contribution to the current literature on legislative behaviour in mixed electoral systems. Secondly, the voting data for the entire history of the German Bundestag is now available. This not only allows us to investigate the relationship of electoral strategy and legislative behaviour but also how and if this has changed over the course of the last decades. Furthermore, Sieberer's (2010) study analysed the legislative period from 2005-2009 that was governed by a grand coalition of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats with a majority of 140 seats. Within this setting, the German Bundestag which generally has a very low level of defection in RCVs (Sieberer 2006), exhibited a higher rate of defection than usual, especially amongst the Social Democrats. This casts doubt on the generalizability of these results.

Hypotheses

Following the theoretical groundwork presented above, this paper in a first step revisits Sieberer's (2010) key question of whether the MMP system creates a mandate divide according to the mode of election.

H₁: MPs with a district mandate are more likely to defect from the PPG's line than MPs elected via their party's list.

If however distinctive voting behaviour is purely a function of dependency on the party or on the voters for re-election, one should observe deviations from the PPG in accordance to an MP's candidacy strategy and probability of re-election. There are three possible options for a candidacy strategy; pure list, pure district, and dual candidacy. MPs that run only on a party list are most dependent on the party, as their prospects for re-election are determined by the position they are allocated within the party's state list. MPs with a pure district strategy, on the other hand, are expected to be less dependent on their party for re-election.

H_{2a}: MPs with a pure list candidacy are less likely to defect from the PPG's line than MPs with a dual candidacy strategy.

H_{2b}: MPs with a dual candidacy are less likely to defect from the PPG's line than MPs with a pure district candidacy strategy.

As this paper examines MPs and not candidates, all subjects observed have a feasible chance of re-election, however the margin of re-election safety can vary to a high degree. As the probability of re-election declines, MPs with a dual or pure list strategy are expected to

follow the PPG line more consistently, in the hope of retaining their list position or moving up the list (Bawn and Thies 2003).

H₃: MPs with a dual or pure list strategy are less likely to defect from the PPG's line the lower their list re-election probability.

With regard to the re-election probabilities in SMDs, the dependencies are less clear for dual candidates, as the influence of competing principals is mixed (Crisp 2007). MPs with a very high probability of re-election in their district may enjoy some standing in their PPG due to their electoral success and may therefore possess more leeway in voting decisions. For dual candidacy strategies, we can however expect that a low probability of re-election in a district will lead to a stronger dependence on re-election via a party list and vice versa. Therefore, if re-election prospects in both tiers are small, MPs should exhibit rather adapted voting behaviour.

H₄: MPs with a dual candidacy strategy are less likely to defect from the PPG's line when their re-election probability is low in both tiers.

For pure district candidates, one could expect that as the probability of re-election becomes smaller, MPs may defect more from the PPG line so as to serve their local constituency (MacRae 1952). Furthermore, an MP from a very safe district (so-called “Hochburgen” in the German context) may not need to defect from the PPG's line in order to represent the interests of his local constituency, as they may naturally align themselves with that of his PPG (Fiorina 1973). However, from the perspective of the dependency vis-à-vis the party, pure district MPs that enjoy a high level of electoral success may be considered the most independent and therefore the most likely to defect. For this reason, the effect of re-election probability on pure district candidates is not straightforward.

Summarizing the above we can form the following expectation as regards the propensity to defect from the PPG line: MPs with a pure list strategy, as well as MPs with a dual strategy and low chances of re-election in both tiers are expected to deviate very rarely. MPs with a dual strategy and re-election security in both tiers are expected to deviate more often than the previously mentioned groups. And MPs with a pure district strategy are likely to defect more often than MPs with a dual strategy and by extension than those with a pure list strategy.

Finally, the issue on which the vote is being held should be taken into account. While this component is often disregarded, Sieberer's (2010) empirical analysis, as well as

preliminary analysis of the voting data at hand has shown it to have strong explanatory power (Bailer et al. 2015). The intuition behind this assumption is simple: some issues are considered to be more important than others. Issue importance can be the same for all parties, especially where issues are more visible to the electorate (Bailey and Brady 1998). Alternatively, it can vary by party depending on issue ownership (Budge and Farlie 1983; van der Brug 2004). In line with Sieberer's (2010) approach, the analysis controls for the policy areas containing economic and foreign affairs policy. These two categories include macroeconomic policy, labour and employment policy, banking, finance, and domestic commerce policy, foreign trade policy, as well as defence, international affairs and development policy.² With regard to legislative voting behaviour, we would expect MPs to exhibit a distinct voting behaviour according to their candidacy strategy in votes concerning constituency interests, such as transportation, agriculture, community and housing development, as well as public lands and water management (Stoffel 2014; Zittel 2014). Observing higher deviation in votes concerning constituency interests would substantiate the notion that the personalised electoral tier does indeed lead to local representation. This brings us to the final hypothesis, tying the personalized electoral aspect to the idea of representation of MPs' local constituencies:

H₅: MPs with a pure district or dual candidacy strategy are more likely to defect from the PPG's line on votes concerning constituency interests than MPs with a pure list strategy.

The models include control variables for executive and party group positions (Sieberer 2010), government status (Schüttemeyer 1994; Laver and Shepsle 1996; Carey 2007; 2009, p. 146-164) and the seat share of the PPG as a percentage of all seats in parliament (Sieberer 2006). The reason for the inclusion of the seat share is two-fold: first, MPs from the large PPGs (the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats) win a large majority of the district mandates. Second, this allows us to control for party group size effects in a more accurate manner than simply adding indicator variables for parties to the models.

Data and models

This analysis makes use of a novel dataset composed of all roll-call votes from the 4th to the 17th legislative period of the German Bundestag (1961-2013) (see table 1 for an overview of defection rates according to mandate type, government status, PPG and legislative period). This adds up to over 900,000 individual voting decisions of the 3,518 MPs (not including independents) who were Members of the Bundestag during this timeframe. Voting behaviour

was coded as a defection in instances where the MP voted “yes” when the majority of his PPG voted “no” and vice versa. More subtle forms of defection, voting “abstain” when the majority of the PPG takes a clear position or taking a position when the majority abstains are not coded as defections. It should be noted that RCVs are not a random subset of all parliamentary votes with regard to levels of party voting unity (Carrubba et al. 2006; Hug 2010). This bias however should not affect MPs in different ways according to their candidacy strategy (Sieberer 2010). We did, however, remove all votes that were declared so-called “free votes” and votes on “issues of conscience”, which amounted to 99 of the 1,589 roll-call votes held during the timeframe of investigation (for an overview on these kinds of votes, see Richards 1970; Cowley 1998).³ While voting behaviour on these specific votes exhibits the largest amount of deviation from the PPG’s line, it is not expected to follow the same logic of re-election strategy as votes where PPG discipline is upheld.

Table 1: Defection rates by mandate type, government status, party group and legislative period in per cent (1961 – 2013)

	Categories	Defections in %
Mandate type	SMD mandate	1.63
	List mandate	1.92
Election strategy	Pure district strategy	2.30
	Pure list strategy	1.99
	Dual candidacy strategy	1.68
Government status	Government coalition party	1.76
	Opposition party	1.81
PPG	CDU/CSU	1.73
	SPD	1.42
	FDP	2.46
	The Greens	2.09
	The Left	1.35
	Others	8.01
Legislative period	4 (1961 – 1965)	2.69
	5 (1965 – 1969)	3.81
	6 (1969 – 1972)	0.28
	7 (1972 – 1976)	1.87
	8 (1976 – 1980)	1.00
	9 (1980 – 1983)	0.34
	10 (1983- 1987)	0.35
	11 (1987 – 1990)	0.69
	12 (1990 – 1994)	3.22
	13 (1994 – 1998)	1.98
	14 (1998 – 2002)	1.91
	15 (2002 – 2005)	0.57
	16 (2005 – 2009)	2.42
	17 (2009 – 2013)	1.07

For the probability of re-election both in SMDs and party lists, the measures created and described by Stoffel (2014) and recently extended to all legislative periods of the Bundestag by Stoffel and Sieberer (2015) were used.⁴ The individual re-election probabilities for each tier are calculated separately using elections from 1949 to 2013, making these measures much more comprehensive than using thresholds of electoral safety as has been done in previous studies. The district re-election probabilities are calculated in a two-step procedure, first using a probit model to determine the effect of the electoral margin in the previous election on the chances of being re-elected in the next election. From these estimates, the individual probabilities of re-election in a district are drawn. To measure the re-election probability via the party list, Stoffel takes into account that the probability of re-election on a certain list position is conditioned not only by the past electoral performance of an MP's party in his state (Land) but also on the proportion of seats that are taken by MPs from the same party who have won a district mandate. Since the estimates for re-election are based on three preceding elections, no estimates could be generated for the first three legislative periods. Therefore the analysis is restricted to voting behaviour from the fourth to the seventeenth legislative period (1961 – 2013). The re-election strategy is conceptualized as pure district, pure list, or dual. Pure list and pure district candidates have been coded as indicator variables, rendering dual candidates the reference category. For details on the variables used in the analysis see table 2.

Table 2: Overview of variables considered in the regression models

Variables	Description	1961-2013
		Mean (s.d.)
Defection	Indicator variable for individual level vote cast different from that of the majority of own party group. 0 when vote cast the same as that of the majority of own party group or abstention. Votes where MP was not present are not included	0.016 (0.124)
Pure list candidate	Indicator variable for MPs who only run on a party list for each of the respective legislative periods	0.097 (0.296)
Pure district candidate	Indicator variable for members who only run in a single member district for each of the respective legislative periods	0.127 (0.334)
List re-election	Probability of re-election on list	0.584 (0.431)
District re-election	Probability of re-election in district	0.429 (0.414)
Mandate in SMD	Indicator variable for MPs elected with a district mandate	0.445 (0.479)
Executive position	Indicator variable for MPs who have held a position as chancellor, president or vice-president of the Bundestag, cabinet minister, parliamentary state secretary in the legislative period in which the vote was held	0.062 (0.241)
Parliamentary position	Indicator variable for MPs who have held a position in the PPG such as chair or vice-chair as well as chief whip in the legislative period in which the vote was held	0.148 (0.355)
Government MP	Indicator variable for members of government parties during the legislative period of the respective vote	0.546 (0.498)
Economic policy	Indicator variable for votes dealing with macroeconomic policy, labour and employment policy, banking, finance, and domestic commerce policy, foreign trade policy	0.395 (0.489)
Foreign affairs	Indicator variable for votes dealing with defence, and international affairs and development policy	0.153 (0.360)
Constituency issues	Indicator variable for votes dealing with transportation, agriculture, community and housing development, as well as public lands and water management	0.036 (0.188)
Seat share	Percent of seats held by PPG of which MP is a member	34.168 (13.819)

In order to account for the hierarchical structure of the data, two-level logistic regressions are modelled where the upper-level unit is defined as the MP and the lower-level unit is defined as each MP's individual voting decision.

Three models are considered to answer the hypotheses at hand. The first model analyses the mandate divide (H_1) in a very similar manner as was done by Sieberer (2010). The second model considers the candidacy strategy, the probability of re-election as well as the interactions thereof (H_{2a} , H_{2b} , H_3 , and H_4). The third model uses the same candidacy strategy variables as the second model but applies them to the subset of votes on constituency issues as defined above and adopted in H_5 (see table 3 for the results of all models). The mandate divide and candidacy strategy models were also run by legislative period (see tables 4 and 5 in the appendix). This was done to check whether the effects of the electoral system on legislative behaviour have changed over time.

Results

Table 3 summarizes the results of all three models for the whole timeframe under investigation (1961 – 2013). The intra-class correlation Rho, which is listed at the bottom half of table 3, confirms that defining the MP as the upper-level unit is a valid approach. This considers the fact that MP-specific characteristics (e.g. age, ambition, personality, etc.) which could not be included in the model, may also explain legislative behaviour but that these influences are constant within votes cast by the same MP.

It is important to note at this stage that the dependent variable indicates an event that is very rare (as seen in tables 1 and 2) which does not lead to the expectation of very strong effects. The differences in voting behaviour, however, are still considered relevant with the research question at hand since MPs agree with their PPG on most decisions, conflicts between local and national interests within one party are rare, and voting against the PPG is a very strong form of voicing disagreement. Therefore differences of voting patterns will only be observable at a low level.

Table 3: Hierarchical logistic regression models of vote defections in the German Bundestag (1961-2013)

	Mandate Divide	Candidacy Strategy	Subset: Constituency Issues
	LP 4 to 17	LP 4 to 17	LP 4 to 17
District MP	-0.103** (0.039)	- -	- -
Pure district strategy	- -	0.013 (0.072)	0.298 (0.664)
District election probability	- -	-0.005*** (0.001)	0.003 (0.004)
Pure district strategy* election probability	- -	0.004*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.007)
Pure list strategy	- -	-0.167* (0.081)	-1.133 (0.621)
List election probability	- -	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.004)
Pure list strategy* election probability	- -	0.002* (0.001)	0.012 (0.008)
List*district election probability	- -	0.0001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Government MP	0.048 (0.029)	-0.018 (0.030)	-0.475* (0.199)
Executive office	-1.181*** (0.086)	-1.006*** (0.087)	- -
Parliamentary office	-0.201*** (0.038)	-0.154*** (0.038)	0.078 (0.198)
Economy	-0.229*** (0.022)	-0.159*** (0.023)	- -
Foreign affairs	0.309*** (0.025)	0.415*** (0.026)	- -
Constituency Issue	-0.341*** (0.061)	-0.285*** (0.061)	- -
Seat share of PPG	-0.018*** (0.001)	-0.017*** (0.002)	0.017* (0.008)
Legislative period dummies	Omitted from table		
Constant	-4.168*** (0.053)	-3.357*** (0.071)	-6.855*** (0.847)
Rho	0.331	0.249	0.317
Chi^2 of LR-test: rho=0	10000***	7178***	35***
AIC	116946.773	114512.473	2834.277
N	915757	915757	29303
N MPs	3518	3518	2154

Reporting: Beta coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

In the first column of the table one can see that the hypothesis on the mandate divide (H_1) is not supported in the analysis of the pooled data. Rather surprisingly, MPs who have won a district mandate are less likely to defect from the PPG's line, which runs in the opposite direction of the effect assumed under the idea of a mandate divide. A look at the effects within each legislative period (see table 4 in the appendix), show that none of the negative effects are significant at conventional levels when the data are not pooled across legislative periods. However, for two of the more recent legislative periods, the fifteenth and the sixteenth, MPs with a district mandate are more likely to deviate from the PPG's line than those with a list mandate. At first sight, the mandate divide hypothesis (H_1) appears to be confirmed for only those two legislative periods.

This paper, however, has argued that MPs' voting behaviour should be explained by his individual re-election strategy and prospects, rather than the mandate he has obtained. Of course, MPs with a district mandate overlap with those who have a pure district strategy or a dual district strategy with relatively high chances of re-election in the district. By looking specifically at the candidacy strategy, we can hope to disentangle the source of the effects on legislative behaviour, namely the mandate or the candidacy strategy. The model with the pooled data in the second column of table 3 considers the district strategy using indicator variables for pure district and pure list candidacy strategies with dual candidacy as the reference category, as well as the re-election probability in each tier. This allows for an analysis of contamination effects, especially of those MPs who choose a dual candidacy strategy to secure re-election.

The strongest effect with regard to candidacy strategy when looking at all voting decisions from 1961 – 2013, stems from MPs who have chosen a pure list candidacy strategy. They are significantly and substantially less likely to defect from the PPG's line than their colleagues with a dual or a pure district candidacy strategy. While the null-hypothesis regarding higher PPG voting for pure list candidates (H_{2a}) can be rejected for the pooled model, the analysis by legislative periods (see table 5 in the appendix) does not support this finding. For most legislative periods the effect is as expected, negative, however not at conventional levels of significance. The same analysis of each legislative period also shows us that during the eleventh, the fifteenth, and the sixteenth legislative period, MPs with a pure district strategy were much more likely to defect from the PPG than MPs with a dual and a pure list strategy. Reflecting on the findings from the first model (as shown in table 4 in the appendix), which suggested a positive effect of having a district mandate on defections for specifically those legislative periods, we can now see that this effect was not driven by the

mandate divide but much more by the pure district election strategy. MPs with a pure district election strategy of course, when successful, always receive a district mandate which explains the correlation of these two findings. Overall, the effects of the pure list candidacy strategy is therefore only substantiated in the pooled model (column 2 of table 3) and effects of the pure district candidacy strategy (H_{2b}) are only substantiated for some of the more recent legislative periods (table 5 in the appendix).

Regarding MPs' behaviour dependent on their prospects in each electoral tier, the pooled model (see column 2 in table 3) exhibits a negative effect in both electoral tiers for dual candidates (rows 3 and 6 in table 3). As the electoral prospects for MPs with a dual strategy improves, the tendency to breach discipline declines. For MPs with a dual or pure list candidacy strategy, we expected the opposite effect, namely, that as their chances of re-election declined, the more likely they would be to toe the PPG's line (H_3). For MPs with a pure list strategy, the interaction effect (row 7 in table 3) nullifies the negative effect of the election probability, rendering MPs with a pure list strategy simply less likely to defect than other MPs, no matter what their probability of re-election.

Regarding the effect of the probability of re-election in the personalised district tier, no concrete hypotheses were formulated, as the effects in both directions could be expected. From the point of view of independency vis-à-vis the PPG, very high re-election chances could grant MPs enough freedom to deviate more often. At the same time, MPs from very safe districts may simply not have to defect from the PPG's line in order to represent their local voters, because the interests of voters and party are naturally aligned. The pooled model as well as the models for each legislative period, suggest that as the probability of re-election increases, the propensity to defect from the PPG's line decreases. For MPs with a pure candidacy strategy, similar as seen before, this effect is nullified by the interaction of the two variables (row 4 in table 3).

In the last hypothesis (H_5) this paper questions whether personalized representation is translated into representation on issues the local constituency is generally thought to care about. Therefore the model on candidacy strategy was employed on the subset of votes dealing with constituency issues, such as transportation, agriculture, community and housing development, as well as public lands and water management. As only this subset is analysed, the issue dummies are not used in these models. As seen in the last model of the analysis (column 3 in table 3) MPs running in the plurality tier of the electoral system, be it as a pure district strategy or as a dual strategy, are no more likely to defect from the PPG's line than

MP's pursuing a pure list candidacy strategy. Therefore the link between having a personalised electoral tier and individualised legislative behaviour in service of constituency interests, needs to be thoroughly questioned in the case of roll-call voting.

The control variables in the models analysed generally exhibit the effects that were expected beforehand. MPs holding executive or parliamentary office were significantly less likely to defect from the PPG's line (for the model restricted to constituency issues, the effect of executive office could not be estimated because MPs holding executive offices never defected on these issues). For the model on constituency issues this also applies to MPs from government parties. Over the whole time period under investigation, defections on issues dealing with the economy and constituency issues are rare, while they are more common for issues dealing with foreign affairs. This finding is similarly an indication that defections in roll-call votes are, if at all, only loosely linked to representing constituency interests. Individualised voting behaviour is therefore probably best understood as the leeway an MP has vis-à-vis his party in voting decisions.

Government MPs appear to toe the party line more consistently than MPs from opposition parties but only on votes dealing with constituency issues. Only during the first few legislative periods are government MPs more rebellious (as seen in table 5 in the appendix). This could be the result of more formalised coalition agreements during the more recent legislative periods. Except for votes on constituency issues, smaller party groups appear to exhibit higher levels of defection.

Conclusions

This paper questions the existence of a mandate divide with regard to legislative voting behaviour in mixed-member electoral systems such as the German MMP system. The question is in itself relevant because the MMP system was introduced in post-war West Germany and beyond it in other countries, based on the assumption that it would secure the representation of local interests. The theoretical argument in this paper argues that in a neo-institutionalist understanding of an MP's legislative behaviour, not the mandate won by the MP but rather his strategy for re-election needs to be taken into consideration. This is especially relevant where the majority of MPs pursue a dual candidacy strategy, such as in the German case.

Using roll-call data from the German Bundestag (1961 - 2013), the paper shows that the mandate divide hypothesis cannot be confirmed. The pooled model indicates the opposite of a mandate divide effect, where MPs with a district mandate are less likely to defect from the PPG's line than those with a list mandate. Further inspection on the data according to each legislative period does suggest higher levels of deviation in the more recent legislative periods by MPs with a district mandate; this however, appears to be driven by MPs who have chosen a pure district re-election strategy. The pooled regression models indicate that MPs with a pure list candidacy strategy are less likely to defect from the PPG's line than those with a pure district or dual strategy. These findings indicate the presence of contamination effects between the electoral tiers for MPs with dual strategies, and rather undiluted effects for those with pure candidacy strategies. MPs' behaviour should therefore not be investigated using the dichotomous mandate divide categorisation but rather the tripartite candidacy strategy differentiation. This is even more relevant for analysis of more recent and the current legislative periods where most MPs follow a dual candidacy strategy.

While the findings are weak, they do suggest that MPs' individualised voting behaviour should be understood with respect to the freedom they have vis-à-vis their party rather than the representation of local interests and that specifically in this matter conceptualising their re-election strategy may be a useful tool to furthering understanding of legislative behaviour. This notion is reinforced in the finding that when MPs deviate from the PPG's line, it is not on issues that are of specific concern to the local constituency but rather on votes dealing with foreign affairs.

Future work should identify the motivation of MPs for choosing a pure district or pure list strategy, as these MPs appear to differ somewhat from the majority of the candidates with a dual candidacy strategy. Were they simply not considered for a position on a party list or in a district race? Possibly MPs with a pure district strategy are less reliant on the party's label for re-election due to strong local ties and support, such as those recently termed "local heroes" by Bailer et al. (2013). Special attention should be given to changes in electoral strategies of the same MP over time.

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Appendix 1:

Table 4: Hierarchical logistic regression models of vote defections according to the mandate divide in the German Bundestag (1961-2013)⁵

Legislative period	4	5	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
District MP	-0.136 (0.157)	0.111 (0.114)	0.130 (0.129)	0.091 (0.345)	-0.051 (0.429)	0.243 (0.216)	0.039 (0.176)	-0.016 (0.104)	0.136 (0.087)	0.130 (0.090)	0.628* (0.308)	0.433** (0.167)	-0.452 (0.355)
Government MP	2.016*** (0.198)	0.460 (0.440)	-3.126*** (0.284)	1.047** (0.394)	0.102 (0.394)	-2.039*** (0.253)	-0.592*** (0.158)	0.360*** (0.092)	-1.073*** (0.087)	-0.232** (0.084)	-1.981*** (0.301)	-3.005 (4.009)	-0.808** (0.308)
Executive office	-0.276 (0.460)	-0.596 (0.419)	-0.947 (1.034)	-0.558 (0.643)	.	.	-0.465 (0.323)	-1.403*** (0.238)	-0.695** (0.223)	-0.500* (0.220)	.	-3.837*** (0.775)	-3.193*** (0.914)
Parliamentary office	-0.433* (0.201)	-0.440* (0.187)	0.121 (0.168)	-0.004 (0.471)	0.004 (0.536)	-0.386 (0.227)	-0.464* (0.202)	-0.309* (0.122)	-0.145 (0.112)	-0.394*** (0.117)	-0.127 (0.342)	-0.596*** (0.175)	-1.393*** (0.361)
Economy	0.706*** (0.154)	.	-0.656* (0.270)	-1.961*** (0.381)	-0.797* (0.342)	0.149 (0.164)	-0.563*** (0.113)	-1.677*** (0.112)	-1.796*** (0.096)	-0.950*** (0.074)	-1.308*** (0.266)	-0.621*** (0.082)	0.755*** (0.102)
Foreign affairs	1.960*** (0.233)	.	2.370*** (0.180)	0.125 (0.353)	-0.166 (0.463)	-0.242 (0.239)	0.431** (0.154)	-0.879*** (0.115)	0.396*** (0.074)	-0.076 (0.090)	1.406*** (0.178)	0.452*** (0.064)	1.637*** (0.100)
Constituency ⁶ issue	0.443 (0.313)	-2.519* (1.004)	-1.986*** (0.233)	-0.184 (0.109)	-2.260*** (0.581)	-1.651 (1.016)	0.630** (0.207)	0.035 (0.268)
Seat share of PPG	-0.014** (0.006)	0.051*** (0.012)	-0.026 (0.014)	-0.007 (0.016)	-0.036* (0.017)	-0.050*** (0.006)	-0.023*** (0.006)	-0.034*** (0.003)	0.008* (0.003)	-0.009** (0.003)	-0.064*** (0.011)	0.100 (0.146)	-0.018 (0.019)
Constant	-5.400*** (0.299)	-5.933*** (0.503)	-3.333*** (0.656)	-6.900*** (0.849)	-4.912*** (0.834)	-3.610*** (0.204)	-4.550*** (0.211)	-2.677*** (0.122)	-3.929*** (0.114)	-3.686*** (0.114)	-4.654*** (0.364)	-5.773*** (1.339)	-6.559*** (0.343)
Rho	0.139	0.001	0.001	0.413	0.429	0.112	0.273	0.130	0.102	0.071	0.446	0.340	0.331
Chi ² LR-test: rho=0	36	0.029	0.032	59***	18***	8**	458***	145***	149***	59***	261***	1175***	2083***
AIC	3005	2811	2145	890	551	2234	5792	10649	13788	10139	2288	11981	9933
N	14110	8856	19165	25097	11434	50904	91431	61926	98936	88148	54453	88101	142201
N MPs	566	539	545	549	526	536	672	697	692	698	588	637	651

Reporting: Beta coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 5: Hierarchical logistic regression models of vote defections according to the candidacy strategy in the German Bundestag (1961-2013)

Legislative period	4	5	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
Pure district strategy	0.303 (0.728)	-0.307 (0.800)	0.379 (0.704)	-313.547 (272.778)	-5.605 (6.264)	0.277 (1.976)	9.828* (3.839)	0.261 (0.624)	0.684 (1.259)	-0.359 (0.406)	3.320* (1.529)	4.318** (1.446)	0.587 (3.402)
District election probability	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.000 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.014)	-0.008 (0.013)	0.010 (0.005)	0.008 (0.006)	-0.005* (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.006** (0.002)	0.004 (0.010)	0.007 (0.005)	0.008 (0.007)
Pure district strategy* election probability	-0.007 (0.010)	0.004 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.013)	3.141 (2.731)	0.060 (0.065)	0.001 (0.022)	-0.100* (0.040)	-0.012 (0.007)	-0.007 (0.013)	0.009 (0.005)	-0.028 (0.019)	-0.049** (0.016)	-0.002 (0.036)
Pure list strategy	-0.455 (0.461)	-0.315 (0.402)	0.173 (0.583)	-10.409 (20.024)	-6.481 (9.699)	-0.549 (0.403)	0.623 (0.500)	-0.374 (0.253)	0.145 (0.465)	-0.394 (0.390)	-0.011 (1.258)	-0.720 (0.709)	1.100 (1.320)
List election probability	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.000 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.011)	-0.006 (0.010)	0.007 (0.004)	0.007 (0.005)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.002)	0.004 (0.007)	0.000 (0.004)	0.009 (0.005)
Pure list strategy* election probability	0.004 (0.005)	0.006 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.007)	0.111 (0.202)	0.060 (0.099)	0.015* (0.007)	-0.009 (0.008)	0.002 (0.004)	0.001 (0.006)	0.005 (0.005)	0.002 (0.019)	0.011 (0.012)	-0.021 (0.023)
List*district election probability	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)
Government MP	2.034*** (0.211)	0.480 (0.447)	-3.199*** (0.319)	1.094* (0.439)	0.125 (0.407)	-2.315*** (0.282)	-0.565*** (0.160)	0.313*** (0.093)	-1.076*** (0.093)	-0.160 (0.092)	-1.844*** (0.320)	-3.533 (4.118)	-0.788* (0.315)
Executive office	-0.221 (0.466)	-0.668 (0.424)	-1.003 (1.037)	-0.501 (0.646)	.	.	-0.514 (0.327)	-1.267*** (0.235)	-0.652** (0.225)	-0.473* (0.219)	.	-3.646*** (0.773)	-3.088** (0.953)
Parliamentary office	-0.407* (0.206)	-0.461* (0.190)	0.090 (0.174)	-0.043 (0.479)	0.070 (0.543)	-0.459* (0.226)	-0.469* (0.201)	-0.208 (0.118)	-0.121 (0.113)	-0.360** (0.118)	-0.114 (0.346)	-0.500** (0.176)	-1.406*** (0.367)
Economy	0.704*** (0.154)	.	-0.658* (0.270)	-1.962*** (0.381)	-0.796* (0.342)	0.137 (0.164)	-0.564*** (0.113)	-1.673*** (0.112)	-1.796*** (0.096)	-0.950*** (0.074)	-1.308*** (0.266)	-0.621*** (0.082)	0.754*** (0.102)
Foreign affairs	1.957*** (0.233)	.	2.369*** (0.180)	0.122 (0.354)	-0.166 (0.463)	-0.242 (0.239)	0.432** (0.154)	-0.877*** (0.115)	0.395*** (0.074)	-0.076 (0.090)	1.407*** (0.178)	0.451*** (0.064)	1.637*** (0.100)
Constituency Issue	0.458 (0.313)	-2.523* (1.004)	-1.985*** (0.233)	-0.184 (0.109)	-2.259*** (0.581)	-1.650 (1.016)	0.632** (0.207)	0.036 (0.268)
Seat share of PPG	-0.010 (0.007)	0.047*** (0.013)	-0.029* (0.015)	-0.002 (0.017)	-0.028 (0.020)	-0.066*** (0.009)	-0.028*** (0.007)	-0.028*** (0.003)	0.009** (0.003)	-0.010** (0.003)	-0.062*** (0.011)	0.123 (0.150)	-0.034 (0.020)
Constant	-5.319*** (0.395)	-5.601*** (0.594)	-3.187*** (0.803)	-6.368*** (1.210)	-4.503*** (1.011)	-3.570*** (0.243)	-4.991*** (0.368)	-2.334*** (0.186)	-3.815*** (0.174)	-3.203*** (0.171)	-5.041*** (0.708)	-5.918*** (1.420)	-6.923*** (0.473)
Rho	0.135	0.001	0.001	0.003	0.391	0.419	0.097	0.257	0.108	0.101	0.064	0.440	0.329
Chi^2 of LR-test: rho=0	34***	0.029	0.003	0.744*	52***	17***	6**	308***	109***	148***	50***	240***	1109***
AIC	3014	2820	2154	885	558	2232	5795	10596	13798	10126	2295	11975	9934
N	14110	8856	19165	25097	11434	50904	91431	61926	98936	88148	54453	88101	142201
N MPs	566	539	545	549	526	536	672	697	692	698	588	637	651

Reporting: Beta coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Endnotes

¹ Data for the 1st to the 15th legislative period were collected in cooperation with Henning Bergman (University of Bamberg) from the Project “Parliamentary Voting Behaviour in the German Bundestag” conducted by Thomas Saalfeld (University of Bamberg), Stefanie Bailer (ETH Zurich) and Ulrich Sieberer (University of Konstanz). The data for the 16th legislative period were collected by Ulrich Sieberer (University of Konstanz) and the data for the 17th legislative period have been collected by the author.

² All votes are coded according to the classification of the Comparative Agendas Project. The codebook for the German project was provided by Christian Breunig of the University of Konstanz.

³ Votes where party group discipline was waived were identified by using print media, mainly newspapers. To qualify as a “free vote” two sources needed to confirm that party groups had not given a voting recommendation to their MPs. I thank Max Würfel for his support in identifying these votes.

⁴ I thank Michael Stoffel and Ulrich Sieberer (both from the University of Konstanz) for providing this measure. See Stoffel (2014) for the details on the operationalization of the measurement.

⁵ The models could not be run for the sixth legislative period, since the few deviating votes it contained were cast on free votes that have been excluded from the analysis.

⁶ The effects of indicator variables on policy areas (economy, foreign affairs and constituency issues) could not be measured for all legislative periods because several of these did not hold any roll-call votes in the specified policy areas.

Exploring, Maintaining, and Disengaging:
On the three phases in a legislator's life

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Abstract

Building on the understanding that a career is a dynamic concept, this paper illustrates that the career stage and age of an MP serve as useful variables for predicting legislative activity. Our findings show that at the beginning of their career, parliamentarians focus on low-cost activities such as attending votes. As experience increases, MPs undertake more demanding legislative tasks, such as questioning and rapporteurships. Most importantly for our understanding of accountability, we establish the existence of a last-period problem, as MPs significantly reduce their activity levels as the end of their parliamentary career approaches.

Introduction

In professional life, people start careers, learn their trade and develop into more or less active and efficient workers over the course of their career. Similarly, parliamentarians are inexperienced in parliamentary work at the beginning of their mandate. Considering their willingness to submit themselves to a long and labour-intensive campaign, one can assume that they are all highly motivated once they reach their elected office. Over the course of their parliamentary career however, their motivation might sink with seniority - both in terms of tenure and age - and this may be even more likely as they anticipate the end of their parliamentary career. In this study, the effect of time in parliament as well as age will serve as predictors for the ambition of legislators in order to predict their parliamentary activity. While we already have a good understanding of the institutional and ideological influences, e.g. how election systems, nomination rules or preferences affect parliamentarians' behaviour, much less is known about the impact of their individual ambition on legislative activity during the various career stages (and for preferences, see Krehbiel 1993; for the effects of electoral systems on voting, see Carey and Shugart 1995; for nomination rules, see Hazan and Voerman 2006; on bill initiation, see Bräuninger et al. 2012; for electoral security, see Eggers and Spirling 2014).

Ambition, conceptualised as a personal characteristic, has been used to explain legislative performance, starting with Schlesinger's (1966) influential study which differentiates between more and less ambitious parliamentarians. We contend that the career stage, meaning the different phases which a parliamentarian passes through during legislative service is a concept that helps to explain parliamentarians' performance by measuring changing ambition and growing experience over time. While clearly relevant, age and career stage are often overlooked variables in the explanation of legislative performance. When ambition wanes, the so-called last period problem may arise (Zupan 1990). When legislators no longer care about re-election, the ability of voters to hold them accountable disappears. We expect parliamentarians to reduce their activities dependent on whether they anticipate the end of their parliamentary career and whether leaving parliament was a voluntary action or not. Setting itself apart from previous studies, this paper investigates in detail whether disappointed last-termers or deliberate last-termers (who expect to move on to higher office or want to retire) differ in performance. Unlike most studies on legislative behaviour, this analysis takes the effect of post-parliamentary prospects into account in explaining an MP's current behaviour (for an exception, see Parker and Dabros 2012).

At the other end of the career spectrum, novice MPs, are restrained by their inexperience. Lacking key parliamentary skills, novices are forced to engage in activities that require no individual expertise, such as participation in legislative votes. Activities that require a minimum level of experience, such as parliamentary questions and rapporteurships, are pursued at a lower level initially. The activities of parliamentarians in the middle stage of their career will change in both number and nature since the legislator has by then gathered the informational means and experience to conduct activities which have a larger legislative impact.

This article argues that legislative activity and thereby accountability are subject to temporally varying levels of ambition. The effects of the career stage in interaction with the age of parliamentarians are investigated with an analysis of vote attendance and parliamentary activities, such as parliamentary questions and rapporteurships. After introducing previous literature on the topic, we develop our model of career stages using a novel data set of legislative activities and biographical information of MPs in the German Bundestag from the 15th through to the 17th legislative period (2002 – 2013).

Which factors impact legislative activity?

While the study of the various aspects of legislative voting is very widespread, studies on the legislative activity levels of parliamentarians are surprisingly scarce (for in-depth studies of legislative voting behaviour, see Hix 2002; Carey 2009; Kam 2009). The question of which parliamentarians are more industrious and active and for what reasons, remains understudied. Generally speaking, MPs are expected to display different levels of activity according to their different levels of ambition. In his influential study, Schlesinger (1966) categorized parliamentarians according to their type of ambition: *progressive ambition* (meaning aspiring, higher position-seeking), *static ambition* (meaning desiring to merely maintain their position) and *discrete ambition* (meaning not seeking another term in office). The different degrees of ambition have been used to explain why parliamentarians show inconsistent voting behaviour or varying levels of legislative activity. For example, progressively ambitious legislators are more active in sponsoring bills and participate more actively on the floor by making speeches and offering amendments (Herrick and Moore 1993), while at the same time voting more often with the party group line in order not to endanger their career prospects (Van Der Slik and Pernacciaro 1979). Maestas (2003) provides an overview of the various effects the

different ambition levels have on roll-call voting behaviour, time allocated to floor work, district travel, and time spent monitoring constituent opinions in US state legislatures.

Rohde (1979), however, assumed that all parliamentarians are similarly progressively ambitious and that the willingness to take on the risks of a particular opportunity structure determines whether a parliamentarian runs for higher office or not. In accordance with this, we assume that the ambition level of parliamentarians is uniformly high, since they have all gone through lengthy, tiring, expensive, and competitive candidacy and campaigning processes to achieve their mandate (for a detailed account of this process, see Reiser 2014).

Time in parliament as an influencing factor on legislative behaviour is mostly found in studies of parliamentary or party socialization which assume that parliamentarians adapt their attitudes, and thus behaviour, due to the new situations they encounter once they take on their mandate. In these studies, time in parliament has simply been conceptualized as a measure for the different experiences and influences to which parliamentarians are exposed over time. So far, these studies have come to quite varied conclusions. While socialization effects such as a change in attitudes (Badura and Reese 1976; Wüst 2009) or more loyal voting behaviour (Stratmann 2000) were found by some in the case of the German Bundestag and the House of Commons (Mughan et al. 1997), other studies strongly reject this finding (Scully 2005). We argue that time in parliament is a useful proxy for growing expertise and experience; however, we do not necessarily think that the change caused by the passing of time occurs in legislators' preferences but rather in their legislative capabilities and career ambitions, which are reflected in their varying levels of activity.

The age and profession of parliamentarians has often been the object of investigation in light of the representativeness of parliaments with regards to society as a whole. This has been studied by comparing legislatures by average age, occupational groups or levels of educational attainment (Best and Cotta 2000). Also, the increasing professionalization in terms of a lower average age of MPs at parliamentary entry or lower turnover of European parliamentary systems has been discussed at a macro level, but rarely at the individual level (Saalfeld 1997). As such, these studies are based on only a snapshot of an MP's background, and the high aggregation level has ignored the individual career orientations of parliamentarians.

In our approach, the ambition of parliamentarians – the desire to stay in office and to perform well in it – is influenced by their career stage and the age at which they enter parliament. Inspired by marketing research based on sociological and psychological

approaches, we suggest dividing the legislative career path into three phases; *exploration*, *establishment-maintenance* and *disengagement* (Cron and Slocum Jr. 1986). This tripartite concept assumes a changing relationship between performance and age according to career stage.

In the **exploration phase of a career**, a person only has a vague idea about the profession, and explores several activities in order to establish a professional profile by the end of this stage (Cron and Slocum Jr. 1986). As for the work of a parliamentarian, the exploration phase consists of learning the rules of the game, processing experiences, and building a network, as this quote from a parliamentarian illustrates: ‘I was overwhelmed by all the new impressions in Berlin. Hundreds of new faces which I could not allocate, thousands of new information bits which I had to sort and process.’ (Bülow 2010, 40-41). Several studies have shown that freshmen in parliament experience ‘learning by doing’ and thus perform worse at the beginning, meaning that they are less effective (Padró i Miquel and Snyder 2006) and sponsor fewer bills (Schiller 1995).

In the exploration phase, we expect a strong readiness to engage in so-called low-cost activities, such as attending recorded votes, for which no expertise and experience is required, but which allow the parliamentarians to demonstrate their concern for constituency interests, and appear motivated to the party group leader. For the case of a candidate centred electoral system, Ashworth (2005) has found that new members of Congress tend to over-invest in constituency work, as an attempt to maximise their incumbency advantage. For the case of more party-centred electoral systems, as those of Western Europe, re-election seeking behaviour should be focused toward the party group leadership rather than the voter. In line with the finding that very ambitious parliamentarians demonstrate more loyal voting behaviour (Van Der Slik and Pernacciaro 1979), these parliamentarians are expected to attend votes more often than their more established colleagues. Furthermore, they are expected to pick up low-cost activities, such as asking parliamentary questions rather quickly, since these require less expertise than more demanding legislative tasks. Thus it has been shown in the case of the Swiss parliament that newcomers tend to engage in parliamentary questions time more often than their colleagues, since other activities are usually less easily available to them (Bailer 2011). Correspondingly, we expect a below-average level of activity in tasks which require more expertise, such as serving as the rapporteur on a committee recommendation.

The effect of being in the exploration phase is expected to be modified by the age of the parliamentarian. We assume that young parliamentarians are more ambitious than their

older colleagues since they may plan for a long-term professional political career whereas MPs who have held a profession before their mandate might not (Borchert and Zeiss 2003). Young career-oriented parliamentarians vote more in line with the party group than their older colleagues (Kam 2009) and defect less (Meserve et al. 2009), which is a confirmation of their higher ambition. We expect younger parliamentarians to work more actively in their early career stage, since they may hope to build their whole career on their legislative mandate.

In the **establishment phase of a career**, efforts are made to stabilize one's career and to establish a secure place within the organization (Super 1980). The skills acquired during the exploration phase are used to produce superior results and to achieve successful outcomes (Cron and Slocum Jr. 1986). Parliamentarians in this stage are expected to make the best use of their potential, and to engage in activities which require more expertise and more support from their colleagues, such as legislative amendments or rapporteurships. The effectiveness of parliamentarians is shown to increase strongly with tenure due to learning-by-doing (Padró i Miquel and Snyder 2006). More experienced parliamentarians are shown to sponsor more bills (Schiller 1995) and have more bill success (Hamm et al. 1983). Also Volden and Wiseman (2009) demonstrated how cultivating a skill set over time leads to more legislative effectiveness. Hibbing (1991) emphasized the relevance of seniority in the execution of important legislative work but also demonstrated that it comes in a form of a trade-off, entailing a reduction of constituency-oriented work. The establishment stage is closely followed by the **maintenance phase**, in which one reassesses choices and accomplishments. This can coincide with an organizational plateauing (Slocum Jr. et al. 1985). Here, competition from younger colleagues, technological innovation and new job assignments are starting to be felt and may be considered as threats. Hain (1974) investigated how politicians realize in the middle stage of their career whether they have a chance of advancing further or not. In the latter case they may chose to leave service voluntarily to find employment in the private sector. Empirically however, it is very challenging to distinguish between the establishment and maintenance stage, in view of which we treat them as one, namely the establishment-maintenance phase.

A professional career ends with the **disengagement phase** in which the transition from working life to retirement motivates a person to reduce the pace of work, either due to physical limitations or lacking ambition. In this stage, we expect a decrease in activities: parliamentarians reduce their engagement because they do not plan to return to office. Thus Herrick and Moore (1993) show that MPs reduce the numbers of trips they make to their

district the longer they are in office. In legislative studies, such change in behaviour has been investigated as a 'last-period problem' in which MPs cease to be accountable to voters and party leaders (Zupan 1990; Parker and Dabros 2012). We expect parliamentarians to reduce their legislative activities in this last phase since they might already be repositioning themselves towards a new phase in their lives, or they might simply be no longer motivated (Lott 1990). The older parliamentarians are, the less likely it is that they will seek higher offices in parliament (Prewitt and Nowlin 1969), and the more likely it is that they display low or discrete ambition levels (Frantzich 1978).

In this disengagement phase, we claim that it is useful to distinguish between the reasons for the departure from parliament, specifically whether MPs decided to leave voluntarily or involuntarily as proposed in Theakston (2012). MPs who choose to vacate their office voluntarily, either to retire or to pursue other career options outside of parliament, are expected to be least accountable to their voters and their party because they are able to predict the end of their parliamentary career most clearly. Therefore, they will reduce their level of activity. MPs who left parliament in a conflictual manner, either because they had a falling out with their party or because they were the focus of a public scandal, are also expected to reduce their activity but are probably less able to anticipate the actual end of their parliamentary career. Finally, we expect that MPs, who intended to pursue another term in parliament but were not chosen as a candidate by their party to run for re-election, will also reduce the amount of work they put into legislative activity. Since these MPs exhibited an interest in remaining in parliament and are possibly still hopeful of occupying office at a later point in time, this effect may be less pronounced than for the other departing MPs. The three defined reasons for leaving their mandate do not include MPs who ran for re-election but failed. This common reason for departure does not fulfil the necessary criterion for a loss of accountability as it cannot be anticipated.

So far the disengagement stage has been described as a rather short term reaction to a future event, the departure from parliamentary office. Disengagement can however also occur as a result of dissatisfaction with one's past career achievements and a resulting lack of ambition. Some MPs are re-elected to parliament for several terms but are repeatedly overlooked when filling higher party or parliamentary positions. In a study on the British House of Commons Benedetto and Hix (2007) found that frustrated parliamentarians who have not obtained an office in the party or in parliament during their career vote against the party line more often than their colleagues. Similarly we expect these MPs to exhibit some

form of disengagement when they realize that they cannot hope for further advancement in their parliamentary career. Unlike the disengagement phase induced by the future departure of office, this may affect activity levels of MPs over the course of several years. The actual form that disengaged behaviour takes, however, is not clear cut. The study on British MPs voting behaviour implies for our case that disengagement may lead to lower attendance rates, while the denial of higher office and thus legislative power, may lead to higher rates of activity that are available to individual MPs, such as asking parliamentary questions or rapporteurships.

Using career stage and age as variables accounting for ambition and experience has the advantage of using easily available and ex-ante measures of ambition (Matthews 1984) which are available for the whole population of MPs. Schlesinger (1966) used an alternative method to identify progressively ambitious politicians by looking ex-post at who achieved a higher position in parliament. This approach, however, ignores the progressively ambitious parliamentarians who failed to achieve higher offices. The most appropriate measure for different ambition levels appears to be measuring the desire of parliamentarians to stay in office, which is best measured with a direct survey question about their future career prospects (for examples, see Herrick and Moore 1993; Maestas 2003; Høyland et al. 2013; Sieberer and Müller 2013). However, this approach suffers from the same problem as most surveys: low response rates and most likely, selection bias. By using career stage – in this case interacted with age – we use variables available for all parliamentarians at all points in time of their career.

Defining legislative activity

While most studies of parliamentary activity have focused on only one measure of activity such as votes (Carey 2009), submitted bills (Van Der Slik and Pernacciaro 1979), or parliamentary questions (Martin 2011), this study encompasses three types of parliamentary activities: vote attendance, questions and rapporteurships (for an overview of the literature on different measures of activity, see Micozzi 2013). These were chosen because they require different levels of expertise on the part of the individual. While attending voting does not require any expertise, questions and even more so, rapporteurships demand actual policy knowledge, preparation, and background knowledge. We also chose these activities because they are conducted by an individual legislator and not by a group of people or a party group, and thus allow us to study individual legislative behaviour. After parliamentary reforms in 1969 and 1980, individual legislative rights were reduced in the Bundestag in order to

strengthen the party groups in opposition and to make parliamentary work more efficient (Ismayr 2000). Hence voting, questioning, and rapporteurships, are the only remaining activities which allow for the study of individual legislative behaviour. The use of more than one legislative activity is also recommended in order to avoid investigating an activity which is influenced by parliamentarians' staffers (as suggested by Arnold et al. 2014).

Vote attendance

Assuming that ambition with regard to the goals of re-election and seeking higher office in parliament will vary according to an MP's current career stage see (Downs 1957; Manin et al. 1999; Müller 2000; Strøm 2000), we expect vote attendance to vary correspondingly. In this paper the attendance at roll-call votes is considered the lowest level activity both with regards to effort and expertise. It is nonetheless clearly a very important activity, due to its high relevance for the party group as a whole. Demonstrating a party group's unity and public image towards the voter who wants to have his electoral promises and party platforms represented, legislative votes and vote attendance are under the constant scrutiny of the party group leadership. The influence of re-election concerns are exhibited in the fact that MPs attend votes more diligently when they are elected with a small majority (Bernecker 2014). Long-serving MPs contemplating retirement will probably disregard the wishes of the party group leader and attend votes less frequently, as the so-called last period problem suggests. Arnold, Kauder and Potrafke (2014) show that parliamentarians who have attractive outside earnings, and are thus less dependent on party group leaders in their life after their legislative mandate, attend votes less diligently. We have decided to use the attendance of votes instead of the actual roll-call voting behaviour since the latter follows a more complex logic depending on the principals most relevant to MPs for re-election or career advancement (Hix 2002; Carey 2009).

Parliamentary questions

Members of parliament use parliamentary question time to hold the government accountable to parliament, to demand information and to represent electoral interests (Martin and Rozenberg 2012). Written and oral questions are an opportunity for legislators to generate personal publicity, to express concern for the interests of constituents and interest groups, and to develop a reputation in relation to specific subject matters (Wiberg and Koura 1994). In

comparison to legislative work in committees, such as legislative amendments and rapporteurships, parliamentary questions demand less time and expertise. We thus consider them as an appropriate measure for activities requiring more commitment than simple vote attendance but less expertise than rapporteurships.²

Rapporteurships

By investigating rapporteurships³ of a committee's formal vote and explanation of its decision, we cover a more profound legislative activity. In the German Bundestag a vast amount of the legislative workload is referred to its standing committees (Miller and Stecker 2008). Formally, rapporteurs are appointed by the committee chair for each item of deliberation, routinely they are however suggested by the party groups for this role (von Oertzen 2005). These reports are generally delivered to parliament in written form and need to explain the committee's recommendation on a bill as well as present the views of the committee's minority and the statements of co-advising committees. Although the role is a rather formal one at the end of a decision-making process in the committee, a certain level of expertise is required for this activity. Based on these considerations we suggest the following hypotheses about the influence of career stage and age on legislative activity:

*1a) Parliamentarians in the **exploration stage** of their career display a high degree of low level activities (such as attending votes) and a low degree of high level activities (such as parliamentary questions and rapporteurships)*

*1b) The effect of the **exploration stage** is mediated by age: the younger parliamentarians are, the harder they will try to compensate their inexperience with activity.*

*2a) Parliamentarians in the **disengagement stage** of their career reduce their activities as there is no future election in which they will be held accountable. This effect should be most pronounced in cases where MPs can anticipate the end of their parliamentary career in advance, specifically when they choose to retire or seek employment outside of parliament.*

2b) *Parliamentarians in the **disengagement phase** who are not standing for another election (due to a conflict with their party, to a scandal, or because they were not confirmed by their party as a candidate), are also expected to reduce their activity. This is expected to be to a lesser extent however, as the end of their parliamentary career is less predictable.*

3) ***Disenchanted** parliamentarians that have not been considered for higher office over the course of a long career are expected to reduce their activity.*

Data

This paper makes use of three datasets to analyse the effects of career stage on parliamentary activity over three legislative periods from the 15th to the 17th Bundestag (2002-2013). Choosing the Bundestag to study has several advantages, primarily regarding the significance of the political parties both with regard to an MP's career as well as the division of labour within parliament. In nearly all national European parliaments party groups act as gatekeepers to MPs' career advancement; this analysis is therefore representative of the individual legislative behaviour of many parliamentary regimes. As regards the division of labour in the Bundestag, most legislative activities are either tied to the party group or a minimum number of participants, leaving very few activities to pursue as an individual. By investigating attendance at votes, parliamentary questions and rapporteurships we therefore cover the full range of activities available to individual MPs. The time span of this study was chosen out of both theoretically relevant and practical considerations. First, parliamentary activity is not divided equally between government and opposition parties. Parliamentary questions in particular are considered a tool for opposition parties to control the government. All party groups in the German Bundestag are represented in both government and opposition in the three legislative periods covered in this analysis, except 'The Left' (a far-left party), which has never been a member of the federal government.⁴ In the following paragraphs both the data sources and the operationalization of the variables are introduced.

Activity data

First we analyse attendance at all 535 roll-call votes (RCVs)⁵ from the 15th to the 17th (2002-2013) legislative period of the German Bundestag (102 RCVs from the 15th legislative period, 177 votes from the 16th legislative period, and 256 from the 17th legislative period). The unit

of analysis for participation at votes is each vote that took place during each MP's service. The dependent variable is the attendance at a recorded vote (coded 1 when present). Generally speaking, the attendance rate of German MPs at roll-call votes is rather high. Over the past three legislative periods, MPs have on average missed one in thirteen roll-call votes. Of the 325,789 individual opportunities to participate in voting contained in our dataset, MPs did so in 92.4 per cent of all cases. Attendance rates between party groups vary from 86.5 to 94 per cent, with The Left appearing least and the Christian Democrats appearing most frequently.

This paper uses the official records as well as plenary protocols from the German Bundestag to create measures of parliamentary activity in the form of questions and rapporteurships.⁶ Oral and written questions posed during plenary sessions, which are used as a measure of activity, are aggregated to numbers of questions asked for each year of an MP's parliamentary career. This constitutes our measure of performance in low-cost activities. With regards to asking questions, there is of course a strong bias toward opposition parties, as this represents a basic tool for controlling government. In the period under review, opposition MPs asked on average ten questions per year, while government MPs asked one. However, as we are analysing observations from three legislative periods, including three different government coalitions, the overrepresentation of opposition MPs' activities can be controlled for.

Similarly, reports of committee recommendations for a decision are counted and aggregated by year. In the context of our analysis, rapporteurships are considered to be a measure of performance of a high-cost activity. Opposition MPs presented on average three reports, while government MPs presented slightly less than two per year. On the individual level, there is a very large range of variation in both kinds of activities. The minimum number for both questions and presentations of reports is zero, while the maximum number per year is 107 and 64 respectively. On average MPs asked 6.9 questions in the plenary and held 2.6 rapporteurships per year. These averages are rather high however, due to a few very assiduous MPs. Members of small party groups generally show a higher level of activity as they have to compete with fewer colleagues for these activities.

To make full use of the availability of the voting and activity data, the level of observation differs in the explanation of attendance from that of questions and rapporteurships. Attendance at votes is measured at the individual vote level for each MP, which represents the lowest possible level of observation. The activity levels in questioning and rapporteurships on the other hand are observed at the level of each MP for each year he or


she spends in parliament during the investigation timeframe. The reason for the differing levels of observation lies in the differing nature of the activities. The opportunity to participate in a vote is given exogenously. Several times a year all MPs are summoned to participate in the exact same kind of activity, without necessarily having contributed anything to the occurrence of said activity. Posing questions during plenary sessions and reporting on committee recommendations, on the other hand, represent activities in their own right.

Career stage data

Before the explanatory variables are discussed in detail, a few words regarding the structure and scope of the data are necessary (see figure 1). As mentioned previously, the data cover three full legislative periods that span 11 years (t_1 to t_{11}). For each time point t_1 to t_{11} we can assess the activity and participation level of each MP. The main indicator of interest, MPs' careers, however, will often cover more or less than the time span of our data. Some MPs started their career earlier than 2002 (the starting point of our data), are continuing their parliamentary career in the current legislative period, and will do so far into the future (see MP_2 in figure 1). For other MPs the data covers the beginning (MP_1) or end (MP_4 and MP_5) of their parliamentary career, or in some cases both (MP_3 , MP_6 , and MP_7). Some MPs' careers end during this time due to a failed re-election (MP_5 and MP_6) which is why we observe an end of their parliamentary career but no disengagement phase.

For the data at hand, 55 per cent of MPs began their parliamentary career at the federal level during the timeframe of investigation. 38 per cent of the MPs ended their parliamentary career due to reasons other than not being re-elected. This analysis focuses on the beginning and the ending of MPs' careers, which is reflected in the coding and modelling of their career stages and their respective activities. Given the data structure, we therefore investigate MPs' activity and participation levels during their exploration and disengagement phase relative to their establishment-maintenance phase.

Figure 1: Career Data Structure



In order to measure the career stage, basic biographical data on 1008 members of parliament from 2002-2013 have been coded.⁷ These data include their date of birth, the date of entry into the Bundestag, position inside the Bundestag or party group, committee chairs, party group membership, and pre-legislative experience based on their official biographies as listed in the Kürschner Volkshandbuch.⁸ From this data we can determine the career stage of an MP according to the number of years she has served in parliament as well as their age for every data year. Due to the nature of the data, the distribution of the number of years is skewed to the right, showing the largest number of MPs at the beginning of their parliamentary career and a declining number of observations the longer the career. The German Bundestag has renewed itself at rates between 23 per cent and 33 per cent in the last three legislative periods. The average age at which MPs begin their legislative career is very constant at 43 years over the three observed periods.

However, the age at which they enter parliament varies greatly from 19 for the youngest to 70 for the oldest. To account for the career stage, indicator variables for the first 9 years in parliament were created. We chose 9 as it represents the median number of years in parliament over all observations. This should somewhat balance the impact of the fact that MPs with long careers, extending through all 11 data years of our analysis are overrepresented compared to MPs whose careers only cover a part of our investigated timeframe. This implies that no single number of years is chosen to depict the exploration phase, but instead that we explore the development of legislative activity during the first years. We can assume that it will take a novice at least a few years' time to learn all the necessary skills in committees and on the floor to become fully functioning as a parliamentarian. This is confirmed by a statement of a parliamentarian during one of our interviews who explained: "It took me two years catch up with the established parliamentarians when it came to learning the rules of the game."⁹ Furthermore, the advancement from the exploration to the establishment-maintenance stage is likely to reflect an incremental process, rather than an abrupt switch from one year to the next. Following our understanding of the exploration stage, this paper analyses the interaction of age and each of the first three years of an MP's parliamentary career.

This analysis focuses on the effects of the beginning and the end of MPs' careers. We therefore try to define the exploration and the disengagement phase, whilst allowing the length of the establishment-maintenance stage to vary from MP to MP, reflecting the fact that parliamentary careers do not have fixed lengths. Activity levels at the beginning and end of a

career can then be compared to activity levels between those two defined phases. To assess the end of a career (the disengagement phase), three mutually exclusive last-term variables are created to describe the motivation for leaving.¹⁰ The first identifies MPs who ‘chose to leave’ because they wanted to retire or decided to follow other career options, such as an attractive executive position at the state-level or a job in the private sector. These MPs did not seek to be re-confirmed as candidates for the following election. Specifically in these cases, we expect re-election as a mechanism for accountability to fail most obviously. MPs that plan to retire are no longer seeking advancement in their careers, while MPs that are pursuing a career outside of the federal parliament are likely to be distracted by their future career change during the end of their last term. The second variable also identifies MPs that chose not to run for re-election, but did not do so willingly. Either they had a falling out with their party, were not re-confirmed in a leadership position, or were forced to resign due to a scandal. The third variable ‘failed candidate nomination’ identifies those MPs who wanted to run in the following election but were not nominated as candidates in the single member district or on the party list. The baseline category is MPs who are either running for re-election or not in the last year of a parliamentary term.

During the timeframe of investigation, 356 MPs left parliament due to one of the three reasons we have defined above. 272 chose to leave for retirement or other career aspirations outside parliament, 44 had to leave due to a conflictual relationship with their party or a scandal, and 40 MPs were not confirmed as candidates for the next election. For all three departure variables, the focus of our investigation regarding the disengagement stage lies in their activity levels during the last year of their parliamentary career. Since the accountability mechanism should not break down when MPs seek re-election, we do not study the disengagement stage for MPs whose careers ended due to failed re-election. The criterion for loss of accountability during the disengagement stage is the anticipation of the nearing end of one’s career. For the various departure reasons that we have defined, we assume this anticipation to start one year before the actual departure from parliament. By the same logic, we do not study the end phase of parliamentary careers that were cut short due to illness or death.

Also assessing the motivation behind legislative performance, MPs who have not been considered for any of the most attractive positions within parliament or the party groups are identified. On average these positions are reached after 8 to 10 years of service in parliament. Those who have not reached an executive position such as minister, junior minister, president,

or vice president of the Bundestag, a party group leadership position, a committee chair, or vice-chair after 15 or more years in parliament are identified as disenchanted MPs. 15 years of experience in parliament corresponds to the average time it takes to reach such a position for the first time plus one standard deviation. In the data at hand, on average 2.7 per cent of MPs are categorized as disenchanted during the 15th legislative period, 5.5 in the 16th legislative period and 8.8 per cent in the 17th legislative period.

Controls and models

Legislative experience at the state level previous to entry into the Bundestag should clearly influence an MP's capabilities in legislative activities. Regarding activities such as questioning and rapporteurships, previous legislative experience should aid MPs in engaging in these activities. We therefore expect these MPs to show higher levels of activity. There is no theoretical reason why attendance rates at votes should be influenced by previous legislative experience. Over all three legislative periods under investigation, quite consistently 20 per cent of MPs had previous legislative experience at the state level.

Other control variables introduced to the analysis include indicator variables for MPs who hold an executive position, as defined above, a party group leadership position or a committee chairmanship. MPs in higher positions are expected to be more active in areas other than the standard workings of parliamentary life. We therefore expect them to be less active in our measures of legislative work and to exhibit lower attendance rates at votes. During the three legislative periods between 14.2 and 16.4 per cent of MPs held executive positions, between 20.1 and 25.7 per cent held party group positions, and between 14.1 and 17.2 per cent held a committee position. To account for the effect of government status we include a government dummy variable. We also include party dummies to control for party specific effects such as size (Sieberer 2006). Since larger party groups have more instruments for rewarding and punishing attendance or absenteeism at votes, we would expect a positive effect on attendance rates. However, larger party groups are also more difficult to control simply due to the greater numbers of their members. When it comes to parliamentary questions, we expect more questions from small party groups since questions might be one of the 'weapons of the weak', not taking government status into account. Concerning rapporteurship allocation, larger party groups receive more reports in absolute terms but also have greater internal competition amongst MPs for these opportunities to distinguish themselves. Lastly, the structure of our data requires a further control variable to take into

account the fact that MPs do not enter parliament at random times but that they cluster after an election. For the data at hand this means that novices cluster after data year t_1 , t_4 and t_8 .¹¹ This clustering of the data coincides with the legislative cycles that we would expect with regard to activities such as questioning and rapporteurships. The data however do not suggest any legislative cycles with regard to roll-call votes. For this reason the control variable depicting the year of the legislative cycle is only included in the analysis of questions and rapporteurships.

Finally, the data are constructed in such a way that the characteristics of MPs which are described in the independent variables can vary over time within one upper level observation (the MP). For example, an MP_1 may be a member of a government party during the data years t_1 to t_3 but not during the data years t_4 to t_{11} . Likewise, he may become disenchanted during our timeframe of observation at t_8 . Analysing the data at a level lower than the MP observation level, such as at the vote or at the MP-year observation level, requires two-level models; for the counts of questions and rapporteurships per year a poisson model and a logit model for the binary outcome of attendance.

Results

The results for all activities are discussed by career stage, starting with vote attendance, followed by questions and rapporteurships. First, we consider voting as the basic activity in which every parliamentarian has to engage. While voting as such is not a costly exercise since it requires little expertise in professional party groups with systems of vote recommendations, not attending can be a potentially high cost activity because MPs must provide a credible explanation as to why they did not show up.¹² The level of analysis is the individual vote level, where every MP had the chance to participate, which renders 325'789 observations for this analysis of 1008 MPs. Next the analysis deals with the number of questions and rapporteurships during a legislative year, rendering 6'795 observations for the same 1008 MPs. For the explorations stage, the marginal effect of age on each activity is then shown graphically for the first, second and third year of tenure according to Berry, Golder, and Milton (2012)

Table 1: Analysis of Parliamentary Performance (Attendance, Parliamentary Questions and Rapporteurships)

		Multilevel logistic model	Multilevel poisson models (no. of activities)	
		Attendance	Questions	Rapporteurships
Age at activity/vote		-0.024*** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.003)	-0.041*** (0.004)
Exploration stage	Age * first year	-0.023** (0.007)	0.004 (0.002)	0.016*** (0.004)
	First year	1.719*** (0.357)	-1.030*** (0.111)	-1.341*** (0.208)
	Second year	0.660*** (0.047)	-0.506*** (0.041)	-0.243*** (0.054)
	Third year	0.470*** (0.047)	-0.292*** (0.039)	-0.313*** (0.049)
	Fourth year	0.203*** (0.047)	-0.364*** (0.038)	-0.168*** (0.046)
Fifth year		0.052 (0.040)	-0.141*** (0.038)	-0.265*** (0.058)
Sixth year		0.497*** (0.042)	0.014 (0.033)	0.038 (0.044)
Seventh year		0.259*** (0.041)	0.081** (0.031)	-0.084* (0.040)
Eighth year		0.225*** (0.040)	-0.008 (0.031)	0.007 (0.037)
Ninth year		0.179*** (0.035)	0.006 (0.032)	-0.091 (0.055)
Disengagement stage	Chose to leave (e.g. retirement)	-0.323*** (0.032)	-0.153*** (0.032)	-0.351*** (0.043)
	Conflictual departure	-0.416*** (0.105)	0.231* (0.098)	-0.125 (0.122)
	Failed candidate nomination	0.246 (0.130)	-0.437*** (0.124)	-0.029 (0.141)
	Disenchanted	-0.439*** (0.083)	0.895*** (0.064)	0.007 (0.089)
Legislative cycle (year of the legislative period)		-- --	-0.040*** (0.007)	0.292*** (0.011)
Executive position		-0.684*** (0.114)	-0.437*** (0.127)	-0.707*** (0.135)
Committee chair		-0.1 (0.110)	-0.266* (0.120)	0.039 (0.124)
Parliamentary position		-0.09 (0.094)	0.005 (0.102)	-0.282** (0.107)
Pre Bundestag legislative experience		-0.223* (0.088)	-0.259** (0.098)	-0.192 (0.101)
Government MP		0.351*** (0.020)	-2.376*** (0.020)	-0.245*** (0.021)
Social Democrats		-0.175* (0.086)	-0.161 (0.096)	0.092 (0.097)
Free Democrats		-0.678*** (0.118)	0.476*** (0.128)	0.873*** (0.129)
The Left		-0.271* (0.129)	0.784*** (0.138)	0.594*** (0.145)
Greens		-1.258*** (0.130)	1.008*** (0.135)	1.022*** (0.138)
Constant		4.345*** (0.165)	1.494*** (0.190)	1.757*** (0.211)
Standard deviation at MP level		1.051	1.141	1.152
N observations		325789	6795	6795
N MPs		1008	1008	1008
chi2 of LR-test		1592.676	15062.55	2115.482


* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, reporting: beta-coefficients, (s.e.)

Exploration phase effects

The first item of interest is the likelihood of attending a vote during the exploration stage, i.e. during the first years of a parliamentary career (see the second column of table 1). Novice MPs are expected to show high rates of attendance, since it is an activity that requires no expertise. Amongst these, in particular, young MPs are expected to aspire to a long career in parliament and are likely to want to please their party group leadership, meaning that they will attend as many votes as possible. The effect of the interactions of age and the first, the second, and the third year of parliamentary service are estimated and plotted in figure 2.¹³

As can be seen, MPs in their first, second, and third year are more likely to participate in a vote than those who have had a longer career in parliament. It also shows that this effect is strongest for young MPs during their first year in the legislature. The marginal effect of age decreases in the second year and disappears in the third year, where behaviour seems to be determined solely by seniority rather than age. On average, the odds of a 25 year-old MP in his first year in parliament of attending a vote are 1.25 times that of a 50 year-old MP in his first year. The odds that the same young, novice MP attends a vote are 4.3 times than those of a 50 year-old MP in his seventh year in parliament.


Figure 2: Marginal Effect of Age on Propensity to Attend Votes during the Exploration Phase



As mentioned previously, it does not seem appropriate to define the exploration stage as a specific number of years. The analysis instead observes the development of attendance over the first 9 years. This exploratory method shows us that an MP's behaviour does change significantly and substantially during the first 3 years of his tenure. After 3 years the marginal effect of age dissipates. This reinforces the intuition that the exploration stage lasts around 3 years. After 3 years we witness a slow but steady decline of attendance at votes.


The next part of the analysis looks at the number of activities pursued as a measure of legislative performance. Figure 3 displays the average number of questions asked and reports made during the corresponding career year. Focusing on the development during the first 10 years in parliament, which cover more than 50 per cent of all observations, parliamentary questions start at a rather low level which increases steeply during the exploration phase. At the end of the exploration phase they are on average more active in questioning compared to any other time in their career. This suggests that asking parliamentary questions is indeed a rather low-cost activity which can be learned quite quickly. The activity requiring more expertise, the rapporteurship of committee decisions, also shows an increase during the exploration phase. MPs adopt both the low and the high cost activities very quickly and peak in both around the end of their first term. In our interviews, several parliamentarians pointed out to us how they had to learn the tricks of the trade at the beginning of their mandate: "You have to learn fast, you are not allowed to ask too much and you have to learn how the opinion formation process in the party group and plenary functions". In their exploration period most parliamentarians suffer from an intense information overload which they learn to deal with over time: 'Information management is the biggest challenge at the beginning.' MPs with very long parliamentary careers show decreased levels of performance in both activities. This is very likely due to the fact that senior MPs move on to activities with a stronger legislative impact or higher offices. What is most visible in these graphs, is that both types of activities, but especially so for rapporteurships, are subject to the effects of the legislative cycle. Activity rates peak every four years, shortly before an election. For this reason a variable catching the legislative cycle is included in the following models.

Figure 3: Average Activity Levels of MPs 2002 - 2013




For the regression analysis of parliamentary questions and rapporteurships (see columns 3 and 4 of table 1), two-level poisson models are employed since the dependent variable, the number of oral and written parliamentary questions or rapporteurships which a parliamentarian asks during a data year (t_i), is a count variable. The effects of the exploration phase, age and the interaction thereof are illustrated in figures 4 and 5. Both activities are pursued at a rather low level during the exploration phase compared to the establishment-maintenance phase. This is in line with our expectations (H1a), since new MPs lack the expertise to pursue these activities vigorously. In particular, young MPs show a very low level of activity in their first year of service, most pronounced in the small number of rapporteurships. Of the new MPs, it appears to be the older ones that engage in this high cost activity. It is possible that the party group leadership and committee heads who distribute the rapporteurships consider that these new MPs can compensate for their lack of parliamentary experience with their professional experience.

Figure 4: Marginal Effects of Age on Questions during the Exploration Phase



Generally performance is low in both kinds of activities for all new MPs. However, specifically in the first year, older MPs seem to perform better than their young colleagues in areas where high levels of expertise are required, such as with rapporteurships. Similar to the marginal effect of age with regard to voting attendance, the marginal effect of age for activity levels in questions and rapporteurships disappears by the second or third year, indicating that activity levels of young MPs rise faster during the exploration stage than those of their older colleagues. This is in line with the notion that younger MPs will work harder to compensate for lack of experience and to ensure a successful and hopefully long career in parliament. In the case of questioning, the marginal effect actually changes direction, with young MPs in their third year of service being more active than their equally tenured older colleagues. Again we observe that new MPs slowly adapt their activity levels to their more senior colleagues. By the 7th or 8th year of service, they tend to pursue the overall average amount of activities.

Figure 5: Marginal Effects of Age on Rapporteurships during the Exploration Phase



Disengagement stage effects

Moving on to the hypothesis regarding the disengagement phase, the three reasons for disengagement are defined as: ‘chose to leave’ for the sake of retirement or the pursuit other career opportunities outside of parliament, ‘conflictual departure’ due to a falling out with one’s party or a public scandal and ‘failed candidate nomination’. The expectation was that MPs who anticipate the end of their parliamentary career are more difficult to hold accountable, as they do not face the constraint of an approaching election race. Similarly with regard to an MP’s relationship with his party group, disciplining and rewarding mechanisms affecting future career prospects that are generally available to the party group leadership lose their effectiveness, thereby weakening MPs’ accountability.

We hypothesized that this effect would be most pronounced for MPs who chose to leave, as they can best predict the end of their parliamentary career. This ‘last period problem’ is exhibited in all three types of activities under investigation. These MP’s odds of attending votes are 0.72 times those of MPs who expect to remain in parliament, their odds of questioning government are 0.86 times those of their counterparts, and their odds of reporting on committee recommendations are 0.71 times those of their colleagues. With regard to the

involuntary forms of departure from parliament the picture is less pronounced. MPs who leave parliament as a result of a conflict attend votes less frequently, but they are more likely to formulate questions for plenary sessions maybe in an attempt to use their remaining time for last chances to serve their constituency or interest groups. MPs who were not confirmed as candidates for an upcoming election do not differ in their presence at votes, they are however likely to reduce questioning. With regard to rapporteurships they do not behave differently than their colleagues who hope and expect to remain in parliament. We assume that the differences between the types of departure can be explained by the timeframe available to adapt one's behaviour. MPs who leave parliament to retire or to pursue other career options, are most likely to have taken this decision quite some time in advance, leaving enough time for a different behaviour to unfold.

For those MPs who have not received a higher position after at least 15 years' service, the odds of attending a vote are *ceteris paribus* 0.65 times those of MPs who have achieved a higher position during their parliamentary career. These disenchanted MPs, however, have rather high levels of performance in the low-cost activity of asking a question in the plenary. Having been deprived of executive or leadership positions to engage in, this low-cost activity may be one of the few opportunities to have legislative impact.

As expected, MPs occupying an executive position in their party group or government are much less likely to attend a vote or pursue other individual activities than the other members of parliament. This can be explained by the simple fact that these MPs often have more pressing or important business to attend to. MPs holding committee positions or higher positions within parliament are just as likely to attend votes as all their colleagues. They are less likely to pursue the other activities frequently, which is probably explained by the presence of other time-consuming obligations and the access to activities that have a higher impact on legislation. This is confirmed by a quote from a committee chair who recently replied when confronted with his low level of plenary activities in a newspaper interview: "As committee chair I have many channels to make my voice heard, in contrast to my colleagues."¹⁴ Also a parliamentary expert pointed out that after the learning period is over, relatively many freshmen MPs take on rapporteurships since more experienced MPs assume higher positions and do not need to conduct these jobs anymore (von Oertzen 2005).

Contrary to our expectation, instead of exhibiting higher levels of legislative activity, MPs with pre-Bundestag legislative experience actually exhibit lower levels than their colleagues in all three types of activity. Having gathered legislative experience at the state

level, therefore, does not guarantee that an MP will be more active during his mandate at the federal level. A possible explanation may be that they apply their previous experience to more challenging legislative activities than questioning and reporting on committee recommendations.¹⁵

The odds of an MP from a governing party attending a vote are 1.4 times those of an opposition MP, even while controlling for the different party groups. Opposition parties are more active regarding reporting, while small party groups apparently offer more than twice as many opportunities to be engaged in this activity. This is an effect due to size since legislators from small party groups have to assume more tasks in committees than their colleagues from larger groups. As one MP pointed out in our interviews: “In a small party group like the Liberals you have to deal with the full programme of the committees in contrast to larger party groups which have several specialists for each topic.” Clearly, The Left Party and Green Party MPs are the most active when it comes to asking parliamentary questions.¹⁶ This is very much in line with The Left Party as the perpetual opposition party and the strategy of the Greens flooding the plenary with parliamentary questions since first entering the Bundestag in 1982 (Ismayr 2000).

Conclusion

This study has shown that variations in legislative activity levels - the attendance of votes, the asking of parliamentary questions and the reporting of committee recommendations - can be explained by the career stage and age of an MP. In contrast to previous studies, rather than specifying ambition levels as a characteristic of individual MPs, we illustrated that ambition translated into different activity levels is a function of an MP's past and prospective parliamentary career. With regard to the exploration phase most of our expectations were confirmed: Junior MPs perform at a high level in activities that require no expertise, such as attending votes. This also represents an activity expected by the party group which will strongly determine their future career in parliament. They perform at a low level in more challenging activities, such as questioning and rapporteurships, where older novice MPs are on average more active than their younger but equally tenured colleagues. However, by the end of their first term in parliament, the young MPs are on average outperforming their older colleagues in these tasks, indicating the former group's high level of ambition. This is in line with our expectation that both experience and ambition affect MPs' legislative behaviour at the beginning of a parliamentary career.

Most importantly for our understanding of accountability in parliamentary regimes, we established the presence of a significant last-period problem in all three types of legislative activities studied. Clearly, the absence of ambition for an additional term in parliament affects the accountability of MPs toward both their party group and their voters. As expected this effect is most pronounced for MPs who leave parliament voluntarily, to retire or seek a new career opportunity elsewhere, as they are best able to anticipate the end of their parliamentary career.

Behaviour in parliamentary questions and rapporteurships also indicate that MPs adapt their focus of activities to those that are available to them. As MPs gain experience and find other channels for influencing legislation, they pursue parliamentary questions and rapporteurships less actively. This is also displayed in the results for all holders of higher offices, who are less engaged in individual activities since they can exercise influence through institutionalized channels. Disenchanted MPs, on the other hand, while exhibiting low attendance rates at votes, are rather active in asking parliamentary questions. We argue that this represents a form of activity that allows MPs who have been denied other opportunities to influence legislation.

In conclusion, we have shown that the measures of career stage and age are key concepts for our understanding of legislative behaviour and democratic accountability. These variables have the advantage that they are rather easily measured and are available for all parliamentarians at all points of their career, thus avoiding selection bias. This parsimonious theoretical framework, which assumes only that legislators are ambitious and motivated by their career advancement, should be widely applicable to other parliamentary regimes.

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Endnotes

¹ Both authors contributed to this work equally.

² In the German parliament, each parliamentarian is allowed to ask the government at most two oral questions per parliamentary session (of which there are at least 20 per year) and at most four written questions per month

³ “Berichterstattung zur Beschlussempfehlung”.

⁴ In our period of investigation, the following parties were in government: 2002-2005: Social-Democrat/Green coalition, 2005-2009: “Grand coalition” between Christian Democrats and Social-Democrats, 2009-2013: Christian-Democrat/Liberal coalition government.

⁵ These data were collected in collaboration with Henning Bergmann and Thomas Saalfeld (University of Bamberg), Ulrich Sieberer (University of Konstanz), and Stefanie Bailer (ETH Zurich) in the project “Parliamentary Voting Behaviour in the German Bundestag” (<http://www.german-roll-calls.info/>) funded by the Thyssen Foundation.

⁶ These data were provided by the Bundestag services.

⁷ MPs with a career length of two years or less have been removed from the analysis, since the exploration and disengagement stage of these MPs coincide. There is therefore no logical manner in which to compare the activities of these MPs in their respective career stages.

⁸ The data are based on the biographies as listed in Holzapfel, K.-J. and Holzapfel, A. (2007) and were coded in the framework of the research project on career changers in the Bundestag (Bailer et al. 2013). We are grateful for the provision of data by Prof Philip Manow (University of Bremen) and the “Neuen Darmstädter Verlagsanstalt”.

⁹ Interview conducted within the research project described in the previous endnote Bailer et al. 2013.

¹⁰ The specific reasons for leaving parliament or not running in another election were coded using internet sources, such as MPs’ personal websites, online newspapers, Wikipedia, and

party websites. For every observation, the departure reason had to be consistent in two online sources.

¹¹ The 15th legislative period of the Bundestag consisted of only 3 years due to a lost confidence vote of Chancellor Schröder.

¹² Additionally, MPs' salaries may be reduced by up to €200 per day of absence, according to §14 of the Code of Conduct for Members of the German Bundestag (https://www.bundestag.de/blob/194694/d80fcbce66d0e367a80d7e18608db822/abggges_2013-data.pdf) accessed 20 March 2015.

¹³ Table 1 only depicts the model for the interaction of age with the first year in parliament. The two other models with interactions of the second and third year show practically identical results in all other variables.

¹⁴ Online article from "Die Zeit" (<http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2013-07/abgeordnetenbilanz-mdb-datenprojekt-bundestag>), accessed 8 August 2013.

¹⁵ We cannot carry out an investigation of these more demanding tasks, e.g. a bill proposal, since these activities can officially only be conducted by groups of MPs or party groups.

¹⁶ In the last legislative period of the German Bundestag the SPD as largest opposition party asked 2220 oral questions, the Greens asked 2208 and the Left 1331.

Do Women Matter? Female Representation in the German Bundestag

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Abstract:

Whether women in parliament represent the interests of women in society is considered of high importance in the justification of promoting higher levels of female representation in legislative bodies. On issues specifically concerning women, this has shown to be true in several legislatures, however, usually in a context of rather high levels of female representation in a personalized electoral system or in the context of a two-party system. The German Bundestag can be considered a hard case for this question, when the party groups' gate-keeping role regarding access to elected office and its dominance in the legislative process, as well as the low levels of female representation are taken into account. Analysing legislative debates and votes on the legislation most crucial to the promotion of women's position in society over the course of the German Bundestag (1949 – 2015) this paper shows that gendered behaviour does indeed occur, even when women are represented at very low rates in parliament.

Introduction

Since the establishment of the German Bundestag in 1949, the legal situation for women in German society has improved in many areas, starting with the amendment of the Basic Law (the Federal German Constitution) codifying that men and women are equal before the law. Since then many laws and reforms have translated into equal rights for women within marriage and divorce, the implementation of maternity protection, a liberalization of requirements for abortions, a more comprehensive protection of women against sexual assault and harassment, as well as equal opportunity laws in the workplace, just to name a few. Previous research by Meyer (2003) has described the role of parliamentary party groups in some of the most relevant reforms concerning women's rights and identified its most influential proponents. If and how a stronger numerical presence of female MPs has promoted this development, however, is not clear. During this time-period (1949 – 2015) but not necessarily synchronously to these developments, the number of women in the Bundestag has increased from under 7 percent to over 36 percent most recently (Hoecker 2008; Holzapfel and Holzapfel 2013). Several reforms improving women's position in society, however, were passed at times when the representation of women was very low. Whether women in parliament represent the interests of women in society is considered of high importance in the justification of promoting higher levels of female representation in legislative bodies (Lovenduski 1993; Thomas 1994). This raises two questions in the context of the German Bundestag: Are female MPs more likely to represent women's interest than their male party colleagues in a party dominated system? And, are they more likely to do so as their numerical strength grows?

This paper analyses the representation of women by women in a setting that can be considered a hard case, namely the German Bundestag. Not only is access to elected office (Norris 1993) and nearly all legislative behaviour determined by its party groups (Beyme 1982; Ismayr 1992), allowing for very little individualistic behaviour, but also the representation rates of women in parliament did not exceed 10 percent until the late 1980s (Kolinsky 1991; Hoecker 1998). Both these factors, namely a certain discretionary power of individual representatives as well as a critical amount of women in parliament or parties are considered strong determinants of the representation of women's interest (Dahlerup 1988; Phillips 1995; 1998). However, it is not clear whether female MPs in a party dominated legislature attempt to and/or succeed in the representation of women's interests.

Given the context of this multi-party system, one would expect observable legislative behaviour to occur along party lines. For the specific question at hand, however, the difference in behaviour of women and men within the same party group is of special interest. To study the representation of women by women, several legislative activities are investigated: Parliamentary debates on so-called “women’s issues” are analysed in terms of participation and positioning of MPs. In this activity, female MPs can signal that they have recognised the demands of female voters and the need to speak out for policies that are of special interest to them. In a second step, which focuses rather on passing legislation on women’s issues, roll-call votes are used to investigate whether there is a gender voting pattern beyond party line voting behaviour. Differences in voting attendance as well as actual voting behaviour are analysed within and across parties. In this activity, MPs can actually attempt to bring about policy change. Due to the role of parties in forming policies, these activities are analysed at the individual as well as at the party level. The initiation of bills by parties, the individual participation in debates, as well as attendance at votes, gives an indication of whether MPs and parties prioritize legislation dealing with women’s interest. The positions taken in debates and the voting behaviour exhibited indicate whether female MPs speak for and act for women. The policies analysed cover four broader categories of issues: equality issues, abortion, maternity related labour issues, as well as the penalization of spousal rape.

Taking the whole history of the German Bundestag to the present (1949 – 2015) and several legislative activities into account, this paper shows that even in the context of strong party groups, women are more active in plenary debates on women’s issues and in some cases female MPs from the Christian Democrats are more likely to vote for bills that promote women’s interest than their male colleagues. This, however, does not appear to be a function of growing numerical representation of women in parliament. Rather this tendency has declined as women have grown from a small to a large minority within their parties.

Theoretical framework

Studies on the representation of women have a natural starting point with Hanna Pitkin’s (1967) typology of representation. Specifically two of the forms of representation described in her typology have drawn much academic attention due to their implications for all forms of representative democracy, namely descriptive and substantive representation. By distinguishing descriptive representation, which means representation by someone who shares specific characteristics such as gender, race, or profession with those she represents, from

substantive representation, which refers to representation by acting on behalf of someone, Pitkin's concept of representation forms the foundation of any debate on the composition of elected bodies, such as parliaments. The notion that these two views of representation are not necessarily fully congruent has elicited much discussion on the importance of having women physically represented in legislative bodies. Most prominently Phillips (1995; 1998) and Mansbridge (1999) have convincingly argued that substantive representation is facilitated by descriptive representation, in that women do not just act *as* but rather *for* women. This is based on the understanding that women as a group share a common set of experiences and interests within society.

Subsequent research has focused on identifying substantive representation as a result of the rise of descriptive representation levels of women throughout Western democracies, but has often fallen short of providing the clear-cut evidence of such a relationship (for an overview of the current state of research, see Taylor-Robinson 2014). This in turn clashes with a feminist world perception, that women in politics matter and bring about positive change not just for female voters but for society as a whole (Tamerius 2012). One attempt to explain this was found in the idea of critical mass theory, which posits that women will be able to effect change once they have reached a critical mass within the legislature (Dahlerup 1988). Often however, the timeframe of the investigations is too short to justify a critical mass argument, as they analyse only one or two legislative periods with different levels of representation and while studies of several legislatures, such as the US Congress (Norton 1999; Swers 2005), the UK House of Commons (Childs and Withey 2004; Catalano 2009), and the House of Representatives in New Zealand (Grey 2002) have shown an effect of descriptive representation on substantive representation, these often limit themselves to female members of conservative parties and tend to be conditioned by several context factors (for an overview, see Wängnerud 2009). In their theoretical model, Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers (2007) outline these context factors that should prove conducive to substantive representation, namely a strong left-wing government or coalition, as well as an engaged civil society with an active feminist movement.

Critical mass theory broadly assumes that women will form strategic coalitions so that increasing numbers of women support the women's cause. Childs and Krook (2006; 2009) modify the expectations of critical mass theory in terms of substantive representation and argue for a focus on critical actors rather than critical mass. They show that it is actually not clear what the effects of an increasing proportion of women will be. But other explanations

such as an increased interest of men with regard to women's issues, and a diversification within the group of female legislators are not merely conceivable but rather likely. In the German context these alternative explanations can be considered especially relevant with regards to parties positioning themselves as representing women's interests. Amongst the established parties, none have reached levels of critical mass of female representatives until the early 1990s. The electoral support of women was primarily based on generational factors, next to socio-economic and religious cleavages, with women born before WWII preferring the Christian Democrats and younger women supporting the Social Democrats (Kolinsky 1993). While the Social Democrats were traditionally considered the party of women's interest representation on matters such as equal opportunities in education and employment, as well as financial security, the Christian Democrats supported women's interests as a function of their biological predisposition and their societal status, namely as mothers and wives (Meyer 1998). As the post-war generation grew over time, both large parties had to compete more actively for women's votes, and even more so since the rise of the Green Party during the 1980s and the entry of The Left Party after German reunification (Decker and Neu 2013). The new left-wing parties supported more feminist ideas such as emancipation, liberal abortion regulations, and quotas to secure women's representation in executive jobs (Lenz 2010, p. 234). In the parties of the new left, one would therefore expect both its female as well as its male MPs to fully support and represent women's interests, while one could expect gender differences within the established parties, especially for the Christian Democrats and possibly the Free Democrats. This expectation is in line with previous findings where mainly women from conservative parties and sometimes only under certain conditions, significantly differed from their male colleagues on issues concerning women (Swers 1998; Frederick 2009; Lloren 2014).

This connects to a gap in the current literature which does not neglect but understates the importance of political parties in the formation of policy (Osborn 2012). Beyond the US literature which deals with a personalised political system, several authors have expressed the importance of left-wing parties in the formulation and implementation of women-friendly policies (Caul 1999; Lovenduski and Norris 2003). Phillips' (1998) theoretical argument tying descriptive to substantive representation, however, hinges on the scope of discretion she accredits to individual representatives. In the face of a party-dominated environment such as the German Bundestag this assumption may not be reflective of the reality in which policy is formed. This conclusion is also voiced in Studlar and McAllister's (2002) cross-national analysis of critical mass as an accelerant of women's descriptive representation in

parliaments. Since they find no evidence of this most likely effect of critical mass theory, namely that reaching critical mass will accelerate the growth of higher proportions of female MPs, they doubt the extensions it makes with regard to substantive representation in a political system with strong parties.

Given the contrasting results of the existing literature, the short timeframes on which most studies are based, and the failure to account for the dominance of parties, this paper aims to extend the previous research on the representation of women's interests by women by analysing parliamentary behaviour on legislation most relevant to women for the entire history of the German Bundestag. In doing so, it builds on the research recommendations that recent studies have formulated as a consequence of the dissonant findings on representation. Celis et al. (2008) argue for a more holistic approach of analysing policy by looking at representation at different stages and spaces of policy formation. This is in line with Osborn's (2012) recommendation not to exclude the analysis of roll-call votes but to look at representation beyond these. Furthermore, the importance of parties next to individual behaviour of MPs in the formation of women-friendly policies is accounted for, which reflects the functioning of the German Bundestag more correctly.

Institutional context of speeches and votes

The German Bundestag is generally described as a "Fraktionenparlament" which means party groups are the main actors in all legislative processes (Ismayr 1992; 2002). Where party groups are dominant, one can expect little individualistic behaviour by MPs, as all informational and distributive resources are held by the party group leadership (Bowler et al. 1999).

Regarding legislative speeches, much like in other parliamentary regimes, this expectation applies to the German Bundestag, where party group leaders distribute the right to give a speech in parliament amongst their members, and where those selected are expected to present the position as decided by the majority of the party group (Schüttemeyer 1994; 1998; Saalfeld 2000; Schüttemeyer 2001). Proksch and Slapin (2012) show that for the German Bundestag, the party group leadership has the incentive to present a unified front in legislative debates and also has the tools to control who speaks. Their analysis of speeches indicates that MPs with positions that deviate from that of the party group leadership are less likely to be allocated any speaking time. The same effect has been shown in other contexts where institutional factors grant the party group leadership gate-keeping powers to the plenary floor

(Giannetti et al. 2014). We can therefore assume for cases where speaking time is allocated to MPs taking a position different from that of their party group, that this is a strategic decision taken by the leadership.

Analysing the effect of gender on plenary speeches Bäck et al. (2014) show that women speak the same amount as men in so-called soft policy areas, while in all other policy areas women speak less. This again suggests that the party group leadership plays a role in producing the result of who has access to the plenary debate. For debates on women's issues, female MPs may be more desirable speakers, because voters ascribe a certain competence and credibility to them on these matters. This implies that in instances where we observe women representing a different position than that of their parties, they are probably doing so with the blessing of the party group leadership.

While having female MPs represent women's interests in a plenary debate can send a signal to voters, a rather different logic applies to MPs' voting behaviour where the main goal is to pass legislation. Also as a result of having most resources allocated to the party group, the Bundestag is characterised as a parliament with high party group voting discipline (Saalfeld 1995; Sieberer 2006). In this context, a higher participation rate of women at votes as well as promoting legislation to improve women's position in society by voting distinctively differently than their male party colleagues can be considered substantive representation as a result of descriptive representation.

Coding of legislation and data

Building on the recent literature, this paper focuses on women's issues to investigate the presence of substantive representation. What comprises women's issues, however, is not clearly defined and therefore varies within the research. Some authors distinguish between feminist interest and women's preferences (Lloren 2014), others exclude the notion of feminist interest and focus on a single policy area, such as family issues (Brunsbach 2011), again others only consider emotionally loaded topics such as abortion (Norton 1999). In this paper I focus on legislation that affects women disproportionately. This qualifier does not imply that women are more engaged in different policy areas than men based on different interests, as studied by Bäck et al. (2014) or on different priority or opportunity structures as indicated by Thomas (1994), rather it requires women to be impacted by the law differently than men. This does not exclude the possibility that changes in the law may impact men as well. Surely the reform of the marriage law that rescinded a husband's right to dispose of his

wife's wealth affected men, but it did so in a different way from how it affected women. Due to this selection criterion, laws were selected based on legislative content that impacted women's position in society most significantly as depicted in the literature on the women's movement and women's rights in Germany (Wiggershaus 1979; Meyer 1998; 2003; Lenz 2010).

This paper makes use of two different sources of data to provide some insight into the representation of women's issues, namely plenary debates and roll-call votes. For both data sources legislation on four main issues was coded: equality issues, abortion, maternity protection, and spousal rape. In order to assess the promotion of women's rights the contributions in plenary debates have been hand-coded for laws that have been most relevant for women.¹ To qualify as one of these laws, there needed to be a direct link to one of the selected women's issue. Bills are deemed to be women-friendly when they propose an improvement for women, such as an equal right or the removal of a restriction relative to the status quo. They are coded as not women-friendly when they introduce legislation that reproduces the status quo or imposes a restriction on women. For the selected issues this specifically means that legislation extending or promoting equal rights to women in the workplace and their marriage, proposing a liberal solution on abortion, introducing or extending maternity protection, or recognizing spousal rape as a criminal offence are coded as being women-friendly. Legislation that maintains or reinforces unequal treatment of women in the workplace or their marriage, that proposes restrictive conditions to qualify for an abortion, that does not extend maternity protection rights, and that defines rape as an extramarital phenomenon are coded as not being women-friendly. Due to the historical development of women's rights in Germany, starting with the unequal treatment of women in several laws in the mid-twentieth century, not women-friendly policy often simply meant maintaining the status quo. For this reason more women-friendly bills have been introduced over the past six decades than non-women-friendly bills. Of the 77 bills that could be coded as promoting or hindering women's rights and legal protection, 52 were coded as being women-friendly as opposed to 25 that were coded as not women-friendly. Some bills were debated simultaneously for which it could not be determined whether their content was women-friendly or not. For example, during the debate on abortion laws several bills proposing different approaches to sexual education were discussed. Cases as these, where it could not be determined whether the bill promoted women's rights or not, were not included in the following analysis.

Legislative debates are coded from the first to the current eighteenth legislative periods (1949 – 2015)², whereby the debates from the first, second and third reading, in cases where the bill reached these stages, are included. In order to assess the representation of women, debate contributions were coded as 1 if they supported a women-friendly policy and 0 otherwise. During the process of passing a single law, several different drafts and amendments were introduced. Therefore, the position of the speaker is always coded with respect to the bill or amendment that is being debated. Each bill in turn is coded as to whether it is women-friendly or not. Only speeches of MPs were considered and only one position per MP, bill, and reading was included. Interposed oral questions and speech interpellations were not included because policy positions could not be derived from them. In the 613 coded speech contributions MPs stated their support or rejection of a bill in 786 instances. Sometimes they referenced more than one bill that was dealt with during the same debate, which is why more positions on bills could be coded than general positions in speech contributions. For each speech contribution, the general position of an MP was coded as women-friendly when she spoke in favour of improving a right granted to women or in favour of abolishing a legal restriction for women. For the selected bills only the positions on the specific issue of the bill is reflected in the coding of the debates. This is a necessary requirement because some issues are mentioned extensively in speeches that do not actually constitute part of the legislation being debated. For example, the issue of abortion was often discussed and used as a reason for declining to extend rape laws to cover spousal rape. Several MPs feared that women could use the pretence of having being raped by their husband as a justification for an abortion which was only legal under specific circumstances, one of which included being pregnant as a result of rape. These speeches were only coded on their position regarding the bill at hand, in this case the criminal law on rape, and not on their positions regarding abortion.

The roll-call data cover the same four women's issues. However, there is not always a roll-call vote held on each bill debated. While the existence of selection effects on roll-call votes as shown by Carrubba et al. (2006) as well as Hug (2010) surely also applies to the German case, it is not evident how it should influence the voting behaviour of men and women in different ways. Overall 52 votes have been identified from the population of all 1,938 roll-call votes³ held in the Bundestag from 1949 to 2013 as dealing with the four selected women's issues. Similar to the bills debated in the plenary, these bills were coded as proposing women-friendly policy or not. The voting data was then extended to include

whether an MP had cast a women-friendly vote. A women-friendly vote is coded as 1 if an MP votes for a women-friendly bill or against a non-women-friendly bill and 0 otherwise.

Content of the legislation

The plenary debates for legislation on gender equality issues include 222 speeches in debates during the first, second, seventh, twelfth, seventeenth, and eighteenth legislative periods of the Bundestag. These encompass legislation on equal rights with regard to salary and access to public office and employment, equal rights and duties of spouses in family matters, equal rights and duties in the case of divorce, as well as for women on executive and managing boards of firms. The commonality of these laws lies in what prompted them; as the result of the almost singlehanded effort of Elisabeth Selbert, one of the four “Mothers of the Constitution”, article 3 of the 1949 Federal German Constitution stated that men and women are equal (Wiggershaus 1979). This meant several pieces of existing legislation needed to be reformed in order to conform to the constitutional requirements. Before that the sexes were considered “generally” equal which allowed for many exemptions simply by referencing the biological differences between men and women. This was used to justify unequal rights for female employees on the labour market as well as unequal rights of spouses. In the following legislative periods, four major debates to rectify this situation were held: the first demanding that the government become active in the formulation of legislation ensuring basic equal rights as required by the Constitution, the second and third on the reform of marriage and family laws, where the main contention was based on whether men would keep the right of final judgement on decisions affecting the family, and lastly on the removal of structural disadvantages for women, especially in their careers, where quotas for managing and executive boards of firms were debated.

On the next issue, abortion laws, two large rounds of debates were held, dealing with basically the same question, whether abortion should be legal within the first trimester (trimester model) or whether it should only be legal in the case of an indication that the child will have a high chance of premature mortality or disability, or for medical reasons when pregnancy is a threat to the mother’s life, her physical, or her mental health (indication model). The reforms of the law are highly comparable both in content and the context in which they were discussed, although the first reform took place during the 7th legislative period (1972 – 1976) and the second during the 12th legislative period (1990 – 1994). The legislature had initially passed a law liberalizing abortion according to the trimester model,

which was later struck down by the Federal Constitutional Court. The legal situation at the time of both debates was therefore very similar. The urgent need for a reform was also comparable in both situations. In the first case, the law was problematically divorced from reality, where women who had an abortion were de facto breaking the law. This clash of law and reality culminated in the 1971 publication of an issue of the magazine “Stern” which listed 374 women openly declaring to have had an abortion. In the second reform, the need to change the legislation equally did not come from parliament, but rather as a consequence of German reunification. The GDR had adopted a trimester model to regulate abortion, which led to the necessity to harmonize the law between the new and the old German states. Both the bills introduced and the debates held in these instances were therefore very similar in content. In the more recent past, several debates were held on laws dealing with the specifics of late-term abortion as well as pre-implantation diagnostics. These observations were not included in the analysis because they cannot be understood as pure women’s issues but rather as issues affecting both parents. Overall 309 positions on bills regarding their women-friendliness or lack thereof were coded from the 229 speeches that were coded on the issue of abortion.

Debates on maternity protection laws were held in the first, the fourth, and the eighth legislative period. The introduction of the law defined the basic rights and duties for employees and employers, as well as a suspension time from working and compensation payments for this period. The main change in the reform during the fourth legislative period was an extension of the suspension period from work. The reform during the eighth legislative period complemented the suspension period with a four month paid maternity leave. During the course of these debates, 86 speech contributions, taking 107 positions on the debated pieces of legislation were made.

The last issue deals with legislation on spousal rape from the tenth to the thirteenth legislative period. The request of social democrats in 1972 to remove the term “extramarital” from the definition of rape was declined in the committee on legal affairs. As a result rape within a marriage was not possible under the German Criminal Code. During this reform of the Criminal Code, spousal rape laws were debated in the plenary always in combination with children’s protection laws against sexual abuse and pornography but no bills dealing exclusively with the definition of rape were introduced. Therefore, the following analyses include bills on spousal rape laws only from 1983 onward, as these specifically and exclusively deal with sexual assault of women. The law that eventually penalized rape within

a marriage was passed in 1996 and was amended to improve legal protection of victims in 1997 (Müting 2010). The legislative process was delayed over many legislative periods, in each of which the governing parties (the conservative-liberal coalition) promised to propose a bill but consistently failed to do so by the end of each legislative term. While all parties claimed to agree that spousal rape should be recognized as a reality and that the current law needed to be altered to reflect this, disagreements arose over details in the implementation.

Amongst what can be judged as smoke-screen tactics by the Christian Democrats, some implausible arguments were made, such as the concern that the average person was not aware that rape was possible in a marriage because a women's consent was given indefinitely at the moment of matrimony or that women would accuse their husbands of rape in order to have access to a legal abortion. More credible points of disagreement were the inclusion of a reconciliation clause ("Versöhnungsklausel"), which would allow for a milder sentence in case of reconciliation between the spouses, or the provision that spousal rape should be a criminal offence prosecuted only upon request by the victim ("Antragsdelikt"), or that the victim should have the right to stop the criminal investigation ("Widerspruchsklausel"). On this issue MPs took 90 positions on the proposed bills in 84 debate contributions.

Hypotheses

For the four presented women's issues, a first indication of representation is active participation of women in parliamentary debates as well as on votes dealing with the respective legislation. From both these activities it can be determined whether women prioritize and ascribe a higher importance to these issues than their male party colleagues. Therefore the first two hypotheses are defined as follows:

H₁: Women participate more actively in parliamentary debates on legislation on women's issues than their male party colleagues.

H₂: Women are more likely to attend roll-call votes on women's issues than their male party colleagues.

The following two hypotheses regard the position female MPs take relative to their male colleagues both in plenary speeches as well as in roll-call votes on bills concerning women's issues. Here women move from simply being active on issues concerning women to potentially influencing policy.

H₃: Women are more likely to speak in support of a women-friendly bill or to oppose a bill preserving the status quo in plenary debates than their male party colleagues.

H₄: Women are more likely to vote for women-friendly bill or to vote against a bill preserving the status quo than their male party colleagues.

Based on previous research and taking the German party system into account, these effects from the preceding hypotheses are expected to hold especially for women from conservative parties. Within left-wing parties, representation of women's interests is expected both from male and female MPs. With regard to Germany's liberal party, the Free Democrats, no expectations can be formed based on the existing literature.

H₅: Women from conservative parties are more likely to differ from their male colleagues than women from left-wing parties in parliamentary debates as well as in roll-call votes.

In plenary debates, most MPs will represent their party's position, support legislation that their own party introduced, or speak against another party's proposal. In more rare instances, an MP will also speak in support of another party's bill proposal. By lending support across party lines, they are effectively placing the importance of passing legislation on women's issues over party identification.

H₆: In legislative speeches, women are more likely to support bills on women's issues from other parties than their male party colleagues.

Lastly, some of the existing literature indicates that women are more likely to substantively represent women's interests as they gain a critical mass within parliament or their party. In this party dominated context, the proportion they constitute within their party should be the relevant measure for this question.

H₇: As the proportion of women within their own party group rises, they are more likely to speak in favour of or to vote for women-friendly bills.

In the German context, the alternative to these hypotheses is simply that representation of women through legislative behaviour is solely a function of the parties rather than of individual actions.

Plenary debates on women's issues bills

The majority of bills introduced to the German Bundestag are from opposition parties, followed by parties of the governing coalition and the Bundesrat (the German Federal Council). Although groups of individual MPs comprising at least 5 percent of the chamber may introduce legislation, this happens only in rare cases in which cooperation is often formed by members across the government-opposition line (Busch et al. 1988). Proposing a bill on a women's issue can be considered the first substantive step in representation. Therefore, before the individual level behaviour for men and women in debates are presented, a brief look at the bill initiation is required for each of the issues at hand (see table 1). On all issues considered in this paper, the Social Democrats appear to be the most active and the most successful in passing women-friendly bills. As we would expect from left-wing parties, the Greens and The Left Party also consistently propose women-friendly legislation, they however are not successful in having any of it passed. This is more surprising for the Greens, since The Left Party has never been a member of the government coalition. Bills introduced by the Christian Democrats on the other hand usually favour preserving the status quo, especially with regards to gender equality, abortion, and spousal rape issues. This applies less to maternity protection, which is in line with the Christian Democrat's identity of being the "family party".

The Free Democrats regularly introduced legislation that favoured the status quo rather than extending the rights of women, this however was usually the case when they introduced bills as a part of the coalition government with the Christian Democrats. On the issue of abortion, however, they consistently initiated legislation to liberalize the law and did so successfully in cooperation with the Social Democrats even while being partnered in a coalition government with the Christian Democrats (the bills introduced by MPs across the government-opposition line are listed in the last column of table 1). In a similar course of action, during the same legislative period in which they passed a law on spousal rape with the Christian Democrats as their coalition partners, which did little to protect the victims of rape, the Free Democrats also partnered with MPs from opposition parties to pass a law improving the legal situation of the victims. Three of the bills that favoured women-friendly legislation were introduced by the Bundesrat. None of them were passed by the members of the Bundestag, but they successfully reinitiated debates on spousal rape and gender quotas for executive boards after governing parties had failed to propose any legislation on these matters.

Table 1: Initiation of bills on women's issues (1949 – 2015)

Initiating parties	SPD	CDU/CSU	FDP	Green	The Left	Bundes-rat	Gov- Opp- Coop.
Equality							
w-f bill	11 (3)	4 (2)	2 (1)	5 (0)	1 (0)	1 (0)	1 (0)
not w-f bill	0	14 (3)	4 (3)	0	0	0	0
Abortion							
w-f bill	5 (2)	0	5 (1)	1 (0)	1 (0)	0	1 (1)
not w-f bill	1 (0)	6 (0)	0	0	0	0	0
Maternity protection							
w-f bill	8 (5)	3 (2)	3 (3)	-	-	0	0
not w-f bill	0	1 (0)	1 (0)	-	-	0	0
Spousal rape							
w-f bill	5 (0)	0	0	5 (0)	1 (0)	2 (0)	1 (1)
not w-f bill	0	1 (1)	1 (1)	0	0	0	0

Number of bills that parties introduced and number of bills passed in parentheses. Several bills were initiated by more than one party. In this case, they are counted for each initiating party which is why the total exceeds the 77 bills introduced into parliament.


If and how an MP chooses to actively participate in the plenary debate gives a further indication of representation. As speaking time is allocated to party groups as a function of their size, variation in the amount of speeches between party groups is not of interest for the defined hypotheses (Schreiner 2005). We can, however, and more importantly for the question at hand, observe differences in participation rates between men and women within party groups. Since the opportunity for individual MPs to speak in parliament is determined by the party group leadership, this also gives an indication of what the party group is trying to signal to the voters. During several debates on women's issues, male MPs stated that due to the nature of the legislation, female MPs should take a leading role in the legislative process.

On the issue of gender equality, the number of debate contributions is nearly the same for men and women. When we factor in that women only constituted between 5.8 and 8.8 percent of parliament for the first twenty years of these debates, it becomes clear how much more actively they participated than men. This can be seen in figure 1 where the ratio of participation rates of women and their descriptive representation within their party is given for each debate by the over-/underrepresentation index.

$$\text{Over-/underrepresentation-Index} = \frac{\frac{n \text{ debate contributions by } \text{♀}_p}{n \text{ debate contributions}_p}}{\frac{n \text{ ♀ members}_p}{n \text{ members}_p}}$$


The index is calculated by party p and allows a comparison of female participation and male participation in debates relative to the proportions they account for in their party. A value of 1, shown by the horizontal line in figures 1 – 4, indicates that women were equally active as men. This would be the case if women had given 20 percent of their party's speeches in a debate while constituting 20 percent of their party group's members. Values over 1 indicate that they are on average more active than men, while values under 1 mean that men participated more actively.

Figure 1: Relative participation rate of women in debates on gender equality (1949 – 2015)



In the case of gender equality (figure 1), women were especially active relative to their presence in parties in the early days of the Bundestag. The issues debated at this stage dealt with reforming laws that no longer complied with the equality paragraph in the Federal Constitution. During the first debates on the family and marriage reforms in the early seventies, however, Christian Democrat and Free Democrat women were underrepresented during the debates. During the later stages of the reform process they pick up on activity and remained overrepresented in the amount of speeches they held. As the proportion of women in all parties grew to averages over 20 percent, men and women participated in speeches on gender quotas about at the same proportion as they were represented in their parties.


Figure 2: Relative participation rate of women in debates on abortion (1972 – 1993)



A similar picture of convergence on participation relative to descriptive representation within parties can be observed for debates on abortion (see figure 2). When women were scarcely represented in all parties, they exhibit higher participation rates than the proportions they occupied in their parties. As the number of women grew, their activity levels approached those of their male colleagues.

More interestingly, figure 3 indicates that the participation rates of women fell, as time progressed, with their numerical representation in their parties remaining nearly the same. This suggests that while maternity protection was an issue in which almost exclusively women were engaged during the fifties, it became an issue of interest to men during the following three decades.


Figure 3: Relative participation rate of women in debates on maternity protection (1949 – 1980)



The patterns of the previous three graphs on the issues of gender equality, abortion, and maternity protection all suggest that rather than requiring a critical mass for female MPs to represent the concerns of women, men begin to take interest in legislation on women's issues, which is in line with one of the alternative predictions of critical mass as discussed by Childs and Krook (2008). In contrast, for the issue of spousal rape, the picture presented is very different. In the first debates in 1983 women were absolutely silent, with the exception of female MPs from the Green Party. As the discussion progressed and no legislation was passed during a period of over ten years recognizing rape as a phenomenon that could occur in a marriage, women became more active. This is especially interesting in the case of the women from the Free Democratic Party, which was the coalition partner of the Christian Democrats

for the entire time period in which this legislation was debated. As discussed previously, the governing parties failed to introduce any legislation on the matter until 1995. The government bill that was eventually passed into law did little to actually protect the victims of rape. It was only at this stage that women from the Free Democrats became vocal in the defence of women's interests (Emma 1997). This took the form of the 1997 amendment introduced by MPs from all parties and across the government-opposition line, which altered the law in order to grant victims better protection against abusive spouses. This is one example of how representation of women by women is possible across party lines even in the presence of strong party groups.

Figure 4: Relative participation rate of women in debates on spousal rape (1983 – 1997)



For the first three issues, it can be confirmed that women are generally more active in debates than their male party colleagues, lending support to the first hypothesis. This effect seems to be stronger in the earlier days of the Bundestag when women were only scarcely represented. In the case of spousal rape, however, women only became more active than their male colleagues in the later stages of the debate, which was at a time when women's representation in parliament was on the rise. This could be a possible observation of the critical mass phenomena.

Focusing on whether MPs take a women-friendly position with regards to the bills introduced in their speeches, we can observe large differences between parties, as one would expect, but also some differences within parties. In the 613 individual speeches, 414 (68 percent) were in favour of a women-friendly policy, while 199 (32 percent) did not speak out in favour of a women-friendly policy, preferring the status quo. Of the 792 positions regarding the individual bills, on the other hand, 482 (61 percent) supported legislation that promoted a women-friendly policy while 310 (39 percent) did not. Figures 5a and 5b depict the difference between stating a position that supports women's rights and backing that position up by specifically supporting or rejecting a bill. This differentiation needs to be made with regard to plenary debates, because quite often an MP will speak out in support of women's rights but reject the bill that would realize those rights. In the debate on equal treatment of spouses in marriage and family issues, for example, several MPs stated that women should naturally be understood as equal partners but that it was not the function of the state to regulate these relationships, which is why they did not support legislation that actually allocated equal rights to husbands and wives.

Figure 5a shows that with the exception of abortion, MPs from left-wing parties very consistently take a women-friendly position in their speeches. The articulated support on the actual bills is less consistent (see figure 5b); however, a large majority does support women-friendly bills on all of the issues debated. For the Christian and the Free Democrats the picture is a little more diverse. On the issue of gender equality women in these parties speak out in support of women's interests at a very high rate and more often than their male colleagues (figure 5a). But the willingness to support legislation that would represent these interests is often declared in less than half of their speeches (figure 5b).

Figure 5a: Percentage of speeches per party on a certain proposal that speak in favour of a women-friendly policy





Figure 5b: Percentage of speeches per party on a certain women's issue that explicitly support women-friendly bills or reject non-women-friendly bills



On the issue of abortion, the patterns vary which is to be expected on this topic, due to its strong link to religious beliefs. While the Social Democrats predominantly choose women-friendly positions, this tendency is more pronounced for its female members. Different from the rather strong divide along gender lines within the CDU/CSU party group on the issue of gender equality, on the topic of abortion men and women voiced an equal share of positions against a the women-friendly option. Within the party of the Free Democrats, nearly 20 percent of the male speakers choose a conservative position on abortion while women were unanimously in favour of the women-friendly position.

The issue of maternity protection laws again causes a split between men and women within the Christian Democrats, the majority of women favouring the women-friendly policy and the majority of men rejecting it. Even more surprisingly, within the Free Democrats the majority of female speakers did not choose a women-friendly position while the majority of their male colleagues did. In their speeches, these women voiced a strong concern for the burden which the law imposed on employers.

Overall, debate contributions from left-wing parties predominantly support bills that are aimed at improving women's position in society and reject those that aim to maintain the status quo (figure 5 b). On all issues except abortion, nearly half of the speeches from female Christian Democrats support women-friendly legislation while only a minority of their male colleagues do so. These findings are in line with what the defined hypotheses suggest. And while a similar pattern can be observed for the Free Democrats, this does not apply to the issue of maternity protection, where women are less likely to support bills extending the protection coverage than their male party colleagues.

In the German context the support of bills is strongly driven by party group dynamics. Very often one debate will deal with multiple bills simultaneously, since each party will introduce their own bill proposal. As seen in table 1, bills from the Greens and The Left Party barely ever have any chance of passing. Observing whether MPs support bills from other parties in their speeches gives an indication of more substantive representation of women's interests beyond party identity. Table 2 lists positions in support of bills that were introduced by a party of which the speaker in the debate was not a member. This does not include support of co-sponsored bills if the speaker was a member of one of the co-sponsoring parties. With the exception of the FDP, women from all parties voiced their support for other parties' women-friendly bills more often than men. Especially bills introduced by the SPD and the FDP managed to gain cross-party support. Interestingly, men from The Left party never spoke

in support of another party's bill, which indicates that they are less willing to reach across party lines to ensure women-friendly legislation is passed, while the female MPs from The Left appear to be more pragmatic in securing women-friendly legislation.

The last row in table 2 deals with the positions on the three bills that were introduced by groups of MPs from both governing and opposition parties. The pattern of higher rates of support by women is also captured on these bills. Generally speaking and in line with the sixth hypothesis, women appear to be more willing to cross party lines, in favour of passing women-friendly legislation. Interestingly enough this appears to apply especially to left-wing parties.

Table 2: Speaking in support of women-friendly bills introduced by other parties

Speaker	SPD		CDU/CSU		FDP		Greens		The Left		Total
	♂	♀	♂	♀	♂	♀	♂	♀	♂	♀	
Bill initiator											
SPD	-	-	13	16	25	16	2	11	0	7	90
CDU/CSU	6	8	-	-	0	5	0	1	0	0	20
FDP	34	42	4	6	-	-	2	0	0	2	90
Greens	4	7	0	1	0	0	-	-	0	6	18
The Left	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	-	-	1
Gov-Opp	13	27	5	8	2	2	0	4	0	1	62
Total	57	84	22	31	27	23	4	17	0	16	281

This first descriptive analysis of debate participation, position-taking, and bill support speaks to the notion that women do advocate on behalf of women's interest. For left-wing parties this, however, applies to both sexes equally. Amongst the Christian Democrats on the other hand, female MPs take women-friendly positions and support women-friendly bills more often than their male colleagues on issues of equality and maternity protection. This is in line with what has been observed in more personalized political systems, such as the U.S. Congress. It is also in line with what has been formulated in the hypotheses one, three, and five. Evidently, this can also apply to settings where parties dominate the political space and the party group leadership functions as a gate-keeper to the parliamentary floor. This strongly suggests that parties aim to send the signal to voters that their female MPs represent the interests of women in a substantive manner.

Voting on women's issues

Since the roll-call voting on the selected women's issues represents an activity which includes all MPs and not just those selected to speak in the plenary, the percentage of women in an MP's party can be meaningfully included in the analysis. This allows us to draw some conclusion as to whether a critical mass effect translates into substantive representation. Firstly, it needs to be noted that voting in the German Bundestag is generally characterised by very high levels of party voting unity, as one would expect in a parliament where party groups are the most important actors (Schüttemeyer 1994; Saalfeld 1995; Schüttemeyer 1998; Sieberer 2006). Nearly all votes are cast along party lines. This can therefore be considered as a hard case for the testing of gendered representation. Secondly, while roll-calls were held on all issues at some point in time, they were not held on all bills debated. A brief overview of the occurrence of roll-call votes on the selected issues is given in table 3. Equality issues span nearly the whole timeframe under investigation. Laws on maternity protection, however, are only covered for the 4th and 8th legislative period. Several reforms on this issue were actually passed since then, but not by a roll-call vote. The bulk of all votes are on abortion. As mentioned earlier, these votes are very similar in content across the different points in time, which renders them very comparable. Although laws on spousal rape were debated for 15 years in the Bundestag, the only votes held by roll-call were during the 13th legislative period.

Table 3: Occurrence of RCVs on women's issues

Legislative period	Gender equality	Abortion	Maternity protection	Spousal rape	Total
2 nd LP (1953 – 1957)	2	0	0	0	2
4 th LP (1961 – 1965)	0	0	4	0	4
7 th LP (1972 – 1976)	4	9	0	0	13
8 th LP (1976 – 1980)	0	0	3	0	3
12 th LP (1990 – 1994)	1	10	0	0	11
13 th LP (1994 – 1998)	0	7	0	3	10
16 th LP (2005 – 2009)	0	6	0	0	6
17 th LP (2009 – 2013)	3	0	0	0	3
Total	10	32	7	3	52

Similarly to different levels of participation in debates on women's issues, representation of women by women would imply that they should be especially interested in passing legislation that will further women's interest. Assuming that presence is required for representation, the following analysis compares participation rates within parties but between

the sexes in the roll-call votes. The fixed-effects logistic models in table 4 present the effects of party and gender on the likelihood of participating in a vote (meaning attendance at a vote but including abstentions).

Table 4: Logistic regression of legislative voting participation on women's issues (1954 – 2013) with male SPD as the baseline category

Participation	Gender equality	Abortion	Maternity protection	Spousal rape
SPD, female	0.782*** (0.212)	0.503*** (0.125)	0.185 (0.244)	0.466 (0.320)
CDU/CSU, female	-0.701*** (0.185)	0.425* (0.178)	0.231 (0.252)	0.42 (0.424)
FDP, female	-0.255 (0.302)	-0.262 (0.200)	-0.634 (0.402)	0.068 (0.761)
Greens, female	0.517 (0.372)	-1.252*** (0.270)	- -	0.200 (0.454)
The Left, female	0.246 (0.358)	-1.016*** (0.209)	- -	-0.487 (0.507)
CDU/CSU, male	-0.358** (0.110)	0.599*** (0.139)	-0.302** (0.103)	0.182 (0.218)
FDP, male	-0.797*** (0.138)	-0.354** (0.127)	-0.373* (0.152)	-0.955*** (0.288)
Greens, male	1.007* (0.415)	-1.105*** (0.272)	- -	-0.38 (0.434)
The Left, male	0.298 (0.375)	-1.287*** (0.196)	- -	- -
% Women in party	-0.052*** (0.011)	0.022* (0.009)	-0.014 (0.034)	- -
Minister	-1.212*** (0.163)	-0.517*** (0.138)	-0.977*** (0.160)	-0.493 (0.405)
Constant	1.575*** (0.183)	3.319*** (0.298)	1.518*** (0.328)	2.520*** (0.206)
Vote dummies (not presented)	- -	- -	- -	- -
N	5521	19613	3631	1964
aic	4877.85	9025.596	3717.86	1105.217
chi2	212.68	885.215	28.007	28.578

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, reporting: beta-coefficients, (s.e.)

For all the models presented, the male MPs from the SPD function as the reference category. While this allows a straightforward interpretation of female participation relative to male participation for the Social Democrats, comparing participation rates between men and

women of the other parties is rather challenging. For this purpose table 5 presents the coefficients from the same models as table 4 but rotating the reference category to give us the effect of female MPs relative to their male colleagues for the SPD, the CDU/CSU, as well as the FDP (as there was neither substantive nor significant differences within the Greens and The Left, the estimates for these parties are not listed). Fixed effects for the bills voted on are also included in the models to control for bill specific characteristics, such as the salience of the issue, the party which introduced the bill, and the date or weekday of the vote, as these factors may all influence the attendance at votes. Both in analysing participation rates and voting behaviour, left-wing parties often show no variation, as they consistently and at equally high levels across the sexes, vote for women-friendly bills. On the issue of maternity protection, these parties are also not included, as they were not represented in parliament at the time of the votes.

Tables 4 and 5 indicate that female MPs from the Social Democrats are more than twice as likely to participate in votes on equality issues, while female MPs from the Christian Democrats are less likely to participate than their respective male colleagues. This raises the question whether they strategically chose to stay away from these votes. In the case of the FDP there is no significant difference between male and female MPs across all issues. For votes on maternity protection, however, female Christian Democrats are more likely to attend the vote. On the issue of spousal rape there appears to be no difference between male and female MPs' likelihood of participation across all parties. The second hypothesis therefore is therefore only confirmed for the Social Democrats and only on two of the four issues.

Table 5: Excerpt of coefficients from table 4 with changing baseline categories, showing differences between women and men within the same party

Female participation relative to male participation	Gender equality	Abortion	Maternity protection	Spousal rape
SPD	0.782*** (0.212)	0.503*** (0.125)	0.185 (0.244)	0.466 (0.320)
CDU/CSU	-0.343* (0.164)	-0.174 (0.128)	0.533* (0.244)	0.237 (0.414)
FDP	0.542 (0.307)	0.092 (0.194)	-0.261 (0.413)	1.023 (0.777)

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, reporting: beta-coefficients, (s.e.)

Turning to the question of whether female MPs were more likely to vote for a women-friendly bill or to vote against a bill that maintained the status quo than their male party colleagues, the analysis leads to a more complex picture (see tables 6 and 7). On the issues of maternity protection and spousal rape, some parties show no variation, which is why they were omitted. As expected, MPs will differ strongly across party groups. The regression models confirm these expectations, in that relative to the Social Democrats, the Christian Democrats and the Free Democrats exhibit less women-friendly tendencies, while the members of Green Party and The Left Party show a very high tendency to cast a women-friendly vote.

Table 6: Logistic regression of legislative voting behaviour on women's issues (1954 – 2013) with male SPD as the baseline category

Women-friendly vote	Gender equality	Abortion	Maternity protection	Spousal rape
SPD, female	-0.074 (0.172)	0.120 (0.087)	- -	- -
CDU/CSU, female	-5.416*** (0.243)	-4.351*** (0.152)	-0.176 (0.267)	1.427*** (0.398)
FDP, female	-3.456*** (0.255)	-1.828*** (0.173)	-0.465 (0.598)	3.324** (1.064)
Greens, female	5.084*** (0.335)	3.469*** (0.273)	- -	- -
The Left, female	5.676*** (0.346)	4.618*** (0.278)	- -	- -
CDU/CSU, male	-5.885*** (0.200)	-4.704*** (0.115)	-7.769 (228.732)	-1.201** (0.464)
FDP, male	-3.484*** (0.186)	-1.706*** (0.108)	- -	- -
Greens, male	4.879*** (0.335)	2.448*** (0.271)	- -	- -
The Left, male	5.798*** (0.363)	4.487*** (0.277)	- -	- -
% Women in party	-0.294*** (0.013)	-0.055*** (0.008)	5.357 (190.610)	- -
Constant	6.234*** (0.287)	3.061*** (0.188)	-31.909 (1143.659)	-5.730*** (1.185)
Vote dummies (not presented)	- -	- -	- -	- -
N	4559	18227	1653	936
aic	4148.59	11280.811	1415.484	426.005
chi2	1012.344	5132.972	190.334	80.073

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, reporting: beta-coefficients, (s.e.)

Looking specifically at differences between male and female MPs of the same party, table 7 clearly indicates that in all issues, except maternity protection, women from the Christian Democrats are significantly more likely to cast a women-friendly vote than the men from the same party. On the issue of spousal rape, women from the Free Democrats were also much more likely to vote for the women-friendly position. This effect can be attributed to the vote on the third cross-party bill on this issue. In the first two votes high party discipline was enforced by the centre-right governing coalition, which their female MPs openly regretted during the respective debates (Gerste 1997). There is no difference in voting behaviour between men and women from the Social Democrats, which can be explained by the overall high rates of women-friendly votes from both male and female MPs, similar as to the other left-wing parties.

Table 7: Excerpt of coefficients from table 6 with changing baseline categories, showing differences between women and men within the same party

Female voting behaviour relative to male participation	Gender equality	Abortion	Maternity protection	Spousal rape
SPD	-0.074 (0.172)	0.120 (0.087)	- -	- -
CDU/CSU	0.468** (0.157)	0.352** (0.113)	-0.176 (0.267)	1.427*** (0.398)
FDP	0.028 (0.235)	-0.122 (0.170)	-0.465 (0.598)	3.324** (1.064)

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, reporting: beta-coefficients, (s.e.)

The effect of a growing number of female representatives in parties is negative and highly significant on votes of gender equality and abortion. Since these models span a time frame in which women were represented at levels lower than 5 percent to when women reached over 50 percent descriptive representation within some parties, this effect can be considered robust. The rather large effect of descriptive representation in the model on maternity protection does not lend itself to any interpretation, since women were represented at very low levels during all votes on this issue.

Overall, the null hypothesis for hypothesis 4 cannot be rejected, since women from all left-wing parties and the Free Democrats do not appear to behave differently from their male colleagues, with the exception of the issue of spousal rape. Hypothesis 5, on the other hand, is

confirmed for the issues of gender equality, abortion and spousal rape; women from the Christian Democrats differ significantly from their male colleagues in their voting behaviour. Hypothesis 7 on the other hand is not confirmed, but rather the opposite is established. As the descriptive representation of women within parties rises, the less likely MPs are to cast a women-friendly vote.

Conclusion

This paper sought to investigate whether representation of women by women occurs in the context of strong party groups in a multi-party setting. To this end, the participation in debates and votes on women's issues as well as the positions taken in these debates and votes, were compared between parties and within parties between female and male MPs from 1949 – 2015 in the Bundestag.

With regard to participation in debates, women consistently appeared to be more active than their male colleagues when accounting for their numerical strength within their party group. This effect, however, appears to decline over time, with the exception of the issue on spousal rape, where women only became vocal as the legislative process progressed.

As would be expected in the German context, the new parties of the left consistently showed high levels of support for women-friendly policies across all their MPs and activities. With regard to the more established parties the patterns however vary according to activity. Women from the Social Democrats did not differ much from their male colleagues in the parliamentary debates, where both sexes supported women-friendly bills with an overwhelming majority. They did show themselves to be more active in participating in votes, which implies that they ascribe a higher importance to these issues than their male colleagues. In the actual voting behaviour, women from the Social Democrats again did not set themselves apart from the rest of their party group. Female Christian Democrats on the other hand, did show a higher propensity to support women-friendly policies both in debates and in the legislative votes than their male colleagues who represent the least likely group to support women-friendly policies in either activity. These results are in line with the literature focusing on more personalised political systems, the extension of which has not been confirmed for multi-party, party dominated systems. Female MPs from the Free Democrats only differed from their male colleagues in the votes on the issue of spousal rape. Regarding this party group however, the differences between gender in debates appears to be starker than in votes, with women often voicing support in speeches but not lending it in the actual vote. Taking the

party group leadership's role in granting access to debates into account, this finding strongly suggests that parties aim to send the signal to voters that their female MPs actively represent the interests of women by having them speak to their concerns, but without actually supporting women's interests.

Considering the fact that most positions by both women and men are taken along party lines, this leads to the question of why small differences in behaviour in speeches or in votes may be of interest to female voters. This is particularly relevant since the emergence of the Green Party and The Left Party who both consistently support policies that further women's position in society. If women seek substantive representation in parliament they could simply support left-wing parties. The preceding analysis, however, has shown that the new parties of the left have been both unsuccessful at passing any of their own legislation promoting women's interests and were not likely to support legislation introduced by other parties. Any women-friendly legislation that did pass was introduced by one of the established parties and in the case of abortion and spousal rape by groups of MPs across government-opposition lines. Specifically in these instances, female MPs could alter an outcome. While the new parties of the left were not responsible for passing any women-friendly bills of their own, they were crucial in keeping several of the issues on the agenda, by introducing similar bills on the same topics over and over again. Furthermore, their mere presence forced the established parties to adjust their policies on gender quotas for female candidates and to compete for women's votes (Kolinsky 1993). These effects could be observed in the so-called feminisation of the Christian Democratic Party which has taken place over the course of the last decade and has led it to promote more women-friendly policies (Hien 2014).

Lastly, the notion of a critical mass effect on the representation of women's interests could not be confirmed for the timeframe under investigation. Rather the presence of some individualistic representation of women's interest at times when women were vastly underrepresented in parliament lends itself to a rejection of critical mass effects. Based on this finding, some light should be shed on the presence and effect of so-called "critical actors" for representation. In the German context this would specifically apply to MPs holding higher party positions.

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Appendix 1: Legislation on women's issues included in debates(1949 – 2015)

Debate date	LP	Bill content	Act	Parl. Doc.	Passed	WF-bill	Initiator Party
Abortion							
5/17/1973	7	Abortion, supplementary law for trimester model	Bill	376		1	SPD and FDP
5/17/1973	7	Abortion, punishable except in the case of medical indication	Bill	561	0		CDU
5/17/1973	7	Abortion, trimester model	Bill	375	1	1	SPD and FDP
5/17/1973	7	Abortion, indication model	Bill	554	0	0	CDU/CSU
5/17/1973	7	Abortion, extended indication model	Bill	443	0	0	SPD
5/17/1973	7	Abortion, supplementary measures for family planning and counselling	Motion	374		1	SPD and FDP
5/17/1973	7	Abortion, establish committee of inquiry	Bill	548		0	CDU/CSU
4/26/1974	7	Abortion, including indication model	Amendment	2041	0	0	CDU/CSU
9/26/1991	12	Abortion, liberalizing with trimester model	Bill	841	0	1	SPD
9/26/1991	12	Abortion, liberalizing, to 12 week period abortion period	Bill	898	0	1	PDS
9/26/1991	12	Abortion, indication model	Bill	1179	0	0	CDU/CSU
9/26/1991	12	Abortion, liberalizing, without defined period	Bill	696	0	1	GR
9/26/1991	12	Abortion, liberalizing with trimester model	Bill	551	0	1	FDP
9/26/1991	12	Abortion, status quo	Bill	1178	0	0	CDU/CSU
6/25/1992	12	Abortion, liberalizing compromise, trimester model	Bill	2605	1	1	Across gov-opp parties, mainly SPD and FDP
Spousal rape							
12/01/1983	10	Extending area of application criminalizing rape to include marriage	Bill	562	0	1	Green
12/01/1983	10	Extending area of application criminalizing rape to include marriage	Bill	585	0	1	SPD
11/06/1983	11	Extending area of application criminalizing rape	Bill	474	0	1	SPD

		to include marriage					
2/8/1990	11	Extending area of application criminalizing rape to include marriage and right of self-determination in sexual activities	Bill	5153	0	1	Green
1/15/1993	12	Extending area of application criminalizing rape to include marriage, criminal prosecution without right of withdrawal for victim	Bill	1818	0	1	SDP
1/15/1993	12	Extending area of application criminalizing rape to include marriage, extending definition of what constitutes rape	Bill	2167	0	1	Federal Council
1/15/1993	12	Extending area of application criminalizing rape to include marriage, right of self-determination in sexual activities, and Extending the definition of force in rape	Bill	3303	0	1	Green
2/17/1995	13	Extending area of application criminalizing rape to include marriage, right of self-determination in sexual activities, and Extending the definition of force in rape, adapting the procedural law to improve victim's burden of proof	Bill	536	0	1	PDS
2/17/1995	13	Extending area of application criminalizing rape to include marriage, extending the definition of what constitutes rape, inclusion of men as possible victims	Bill	199	0	1	Federal Council
2/17/1995	13	Extending area of application criminalizing rape to include marriage, extending the definition of what constitutes rape, inclusion of men as possible victims	Bill	323	0	1	SPD
10/13/1995	13	Extending area of application criminalizing sexual coercion include marriage, which allowed for milder sanctions than rape, criminal prosecution with right of withdrawal for victim	Bill	2463	1	0	CDU/CSU and FDP

5/9/1996	13	Amendment on bill proposed by CDU/CSU and FDP to remove the victim's right of withdrawal of prosecution	Amendment	4562	0	1	SPD and Green
4/24/1997	13	Amendment on bill proposed by CDU/CSU and FDP to remove the victim's right of withdrawal of prosecution	Bill	7324	1	1	Across gov-opp parties
Gender equality							
12/1/1949	1	Gender equality with regard to salary	Motion	206	0	1	KPD
12/1/1949	1	Gender equality with regard to public office (ministerial positions)	Motion	177	0	1	SPD
12/1/1949	1	Gender equality bill, according to Art3/2 of GG	Motion	176	1	1	SPD
11/27/1952	1	Family and marriage law, according to Art3/2 of GG but including ultimate decision right of husband	Bill	3802	1	0	CDU/CSU and FDP and DP
2/12/1954	2	Family and marriage law, according to Art3/2 of GG excluding ultimate decision right of husband in marriage and family	Bill	112	0	0	FDP
2/12/1954	2	Family and marriage law, according to Art3/2 of GG but including ultimate decision right of husband for in marriage and family	Bill	224	1	0	CDU/CSU and FDP and DP
2/12/1954	2	Family and marriage law, according to Art3/2 of GG excluding ultimate decision right of husband in marriage and family	Bill	178	0	1	SPD
5/3/1957	2	Family and marriage law, according to Art3/2 of GG equal parenting rights, including ultimate decision right of husband. Three separate amendments (one from each party) but after some changes, they were identical (1031, 1032, 1037).	Amendment	1032	0	1	SPD/CDU/FDP
5/3/1957	2	Family and marriage law, according to Art3/2 of GG reinstating ultimate decision right of	Amendment	1035	0	0	CDU

		husband in marriage					
6/8/1973	7	Family and marriage, equal rights and duties, divorce	Bill	650	1	1	SPD and FDP
12/11/1975	7	Family and marriage, equal rights and duties, divorce	Amendment	4459	0	0	CDU/CSU
12/11/1975	7	Family and marriage, equal rights and duties, divorce	Amendment	4447	0	0	CDU/CSU
12/11/1975	7	Family and marriage, equal rights and duties, divorce	Amendment	4456	0	0	CDU/CSU
12/11/1975	7	Family and marriage, equal rights and duties, divorce	Motion for resolution	4458		1	CDU/CSU
12/11/1975	7	Family and marriage, equal rights and duties, divorce	Amendment	4448	0	0	CDU/CSU
12/11/1975	7	Family and marriage, equal rights and duties, divorce	Amendment	4445	0	0	CDU/CSU
12/11/1975	7	Family and marriage, equal rights and duties, divorce	Amendment	4457	0	0	CDU/CSU
12/11/1975	7	Family and marriage, equal rights and duties, divorce	Amendment	4453	0	0	CDU/CSU
12/11/1975	7	Family and marriage, equal rights and duties, divorce	Amendment	4449	0	0	CDU/CSU
12/11/1975	7	Family and marriage, equal rights and duties, divorce	Amendment	4446	0	0	CDU/CSU
12/11/1975	7	Family and marriage, equal rights and duties, divorce	Amendment	4463	0	1	SPD
12/11/1975	7	Family and marriage, equal rights and duties, divorce	Amendment	4454	0	0	CDU/CSU
9/30/1993	12	Gender equality reform, women's advancement laws in the federal administration, state mandate to enforce gender equality, sexual harassment laws	Bill	5468	1	1	CDU/CSU

9/30/1993	12	Gender equality reform, women's advancement laws in the public and private sector, anti-discrimination laws in the workplace, proportional representation of women in executive positions, women's quotas for apprenticeship training positions	Bill	5717	0	1	SPD
4/10/2010	17	Quotas, 40% women on executive and managing boards by 2017	Bill	797	0	1	Green
12/3/2011	17	Quotas, 30% women on executive boards by 2015, 40% by 2017	Bill	3296	0	1	Green
2/25/2011	17	Quotas, 30% women on executive and managing boards after 5 years, 50% after 10 years	Motion	4842	0	1	The Left
2/25/2011	17	Quotas, 40% women on executive and managing boards	Motion	4683	0	1	SPD
3/6/2012	17	equal pay for women	Motion	8897	0	1	Green
3/6/2012	17	gender equality in all aspects of life	Motion	8879	1	0	CDU/CSU and FDP
3/6/2012	17	Quotas, 30% women on executive and managing boards by 2013, 40% by 2015	Bill	8878	0	1	SPD
10/26/2012	17	Quotas, initially 20% women in executive positions, then 40%	Bill	11139	0	1	SPD and Green
4/18/2013	17	Quotas, initially 20% women in boards of directors, then 40%	Bill	11270	0	1	Federal Council
7/3/2014	18	Quotas, 40% for all executive positions by 2016 and for boards of directors by 2018	Bill	1878	0	1	Green
1/30/2015	18	Quotas, 30 % women on boards of directors, commitment of firms on self-imposed quota goals	Bill	3784	1	1	CDU/CSU and SPD
Maternity protection							
10/20/1949	1	Maternity protection, first implementation	Motion	79	1	1	SPD
7/27/1950	1	Maternity protection, first implementation	Bill	1182	1	1	SPD

12/12/1951	1	Maternity protection	Bill	2876	1	1	SPD
12/12/1951	1	Maternity protection incl. house staff	Amendment	395	0	1	KPD
12/12/1951	1	Maternity protection incl. civil servants	Amendment	394	0	1	SPD
10/24/1962	4	Maternity protection, extension of protection period	Bill	562	0	1	SPD
03/25/1965	4	Maternity protection, extension of protection period	Bill	3125	1	1	CDU/CSU/FDP
03/25/1965	4	Maternity protection, extension of protection period	Bill	3170	1	1	CDU/CSU/FDP
7/1/1965	4	Maternity protection, extension of protection period	Amendment	722	1	1	SDP
7/2/1965	4	Maternity protection, no extension	Amendment	725	0	0	FDP
7/6/1965	4	Maternity protection, extension of protection period	Bill	730	0	1	SPD
7/6/1965	4	Maternity protection, no extension	Bill	731	0	0	CDU/CSU
3/15/1979	8	Maternity leave of 4 months, full health insurance and social security coverage and job protection for 6 months	Bill	2613	1	1	SPD and FDP
3/15/1979	8	extension of salary compensation for maternity leave to women outside the labour force	Amendment	2828	0	1	CDU/CSU

Endnotes

¹ All debates were hand coded from the plenary protocols provided online by the German Bundestag.

² See the appendix 1 for a list of motions, bills and amendments debated.

³ The data on roll-call votes was collected in the course of the project “Voting Behaviour in the German Bundestag” which was funded by the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung. The bulk of the data collection efforts were conducted by Henning Bergmann (University of Bamberg) and the author under the guidance of Thomas Saalfeld (University of Bamberg), Stefanie Bailer (ETH Zurich) and Ulrich Sieberer (University of Konstanz).

Conclusion

The aim of my thesis was to explain the drivers of legislative behaviour in the German Bundestag in a comprehensive manner. The existing literature, while providing a number of insights into the behaviour of German MPs when it comes to voting (Saalfeld 1995; Sieberer 2010), electoral incentives (Lancaster and Patterson 1990; Stratmann 2006), and career backgrounds (Saalfeld 1997; Best and Cotta 2000), suffered from a number of weaknesses that I sought to improve on. In terms of parliamentary voting, most work had taken as its unit of analysis the parliamentary party group, neglecting the role of individual MPs, as well as problematically assigning agency to a collection of individuals. Second, work on the electoral incentives of MPs had tended to focus on the mode of election, rather than the candidacy strategy, a significant weakness in the study of a two-tiered electoral system allowing dual candidacies. Thirdly, studies of the backgrounds of MPs had previously focussed on describing MPs' occupational backgrounds, ignoring the effect of MPs' career patterns before parliament on their career within it. By extending the analysis of voting in the Bundestag to cover the period 1961 – 2013, and doing this at the level of the voting records of the individual MPs, employing individual level data on MPs' career paths and the institutional setting in which they go about achieving their career ambitions, as well as MPs' re-election strategies, the four papers in this thesis significantly advance our understanding of legislative behaviour in the German Bundestag. Further, this thesis provides the first in-depth quantitative analysis of the role of women in the Bundestag in furthering legislation of particular interests to women.

The composition of parliament according to career paths

The paper "Pathways into Parliament: Party Animals, Parachutists, and other Patterns" identified six career paths that can lead to a mandate in the Bundestag. The analysis has shown that next to the traditional career paths, which are characterised by the pursuit of many party and local level political positions, two career paths exist which clearly do not follow this established route. Both "Career Changers" and "Parachutists" are present in the legislature, albeit at lower levels than the traditional career types, such as "Party Animals" and "Local Heroes". The path into parliament is therefore not closed to those pursuing a political career later in life or outside the structures of the party organisation; although those assets do appear to facilitate access to parliament.

Comparing the success rate of obtaining higher positions in the legislature of MPs with a lateral entry into parliament with those who have pursued a long pre-parliamentary career, we find that the absence of a long service record to the party does not impede the attainment of attractive positions for the select group of “Parachutists”. Strong networks and local support does, in turn, appear to help all other career types. Taking the development over the five studied legislative periods into account, the paper reveals that the career politician “Party Animal” has increased his presence in the Bundestag, reaching levels between 30 and 50 percent depending on the party. During the same timeframe, the presence of “Parachutists” has declined within all parties as well as in the Bundestag as a whole, in particular due to the failure of the Free Democrats to re-enter parliament in the most recent election.

This may be an indication that the future of national politics in Germany belongs to those who have dedicated their entire career to the pursuit of a life in politics. From a methodological point of view this paper has shown that using sequence analysis to study MPs’ career paths is a promising strategy for understanding the composition of legislatures. The method sets itself apart from existing research strategies, as it allows us to include the timing, length, order, and type of positions held over the course of a prospective MP’s adulthood. The typology generated by the analysis should prove useful in analysing MPs’ behaviour as well as their career development within parliament.

Voting in the mixed member proportional system

The second paper, “Explaining Voting Behaviour in the German Bundestag (1961-2013): Candidacy Strategy and Re-election Certainty in Mixed-Member Systems”, argued that the idea of a mandate divide as a result of the German mixed member proportional system does not have much theoretical merit. Furthermore, its existence could not be substantiated empirically. This finding in itself draws into question the purpose of the mixed member proportional system in the German case and beyond. Clearly, it does not create the personalised electoral element as was intended.

I proposed using the MP’s candidacy strategy (pure list, pure district, or dual) in combination with his re-election probability in each tier instead of the type of mandate obtained to study the propensity to defect from the party group line. This suggests that it is rational for only a small part of the elected MPs to defect from the party line, specifically those who pursue a pure district candidacy. The empirical findings are weak for the case of legislative roll-call voting, which suggests that voting should be thought of as a function of

the independence an MP has vis-à-vis his party rather than as one of representing his local constituency in the pursuit of re-election.

The theoretical concept of candidacy strategy should, nonetheless, be applicable to all kinds of legislative behaviour that seeks to understand the connection of MPs to their local constituency. This could be especially interesting in the study of less constrained constituency work that is more focused on local interests. Future work should focus on access to the different candidacy strategies and how this may change over the course of an MP's career.

Legislative activity according to career stage

The third paper, "Exploring, Maintaining, and Disengaging: on the three phases in a legislator's life", argued that an MP's parliamentary career ambition can be measured using his career stage and age. This is reflected in the kind and amount of activities he pursues over the course of his parliamentary career, measured in the attendance of votes, in the asking of parliamentary questions, and the undertaking of rapporteurships. We have shown that both a learning as well as a disengaging phase exists which affects his legislative work. Most consequential for our understanding of accountability in parliamentary regimes, we established the presence of a significant last-period problem in MPs' activity levels. The absence of ambition for an additional term and future career in parliament appears to affect the accountability of MPs toward both their party group and their voters. This effect is strongest for MPs who leave parliament voluntarily, to retire or seek a new career opportunity elsewhere.

Regarding the measures and the applicability of the study, two aspects of our study should be highlighted: First, the career stage and age are ex-ante measures and available for all MPs. The research design, unlike many works studying career ambition, does not require survey data, which is riddled with problems of low response rates and selection bias. Second, our conceptualisation of ambition may vary across a legislator's career, which is in line with the theoretical concepts of careers (Cron and Slocum Jr. 1986) and also appears to be confirmed in our analysis. The simple theoretical framework which assumes an MP's behaviour is influenced by his ambition to seek re-election, to further his career within parliament or to disengage from it, should be broadly applicable to the study of legislative bodies beyond the German context.

Women representing women's interests

The last paper of the thesis, “Do Women Matter? Female Representation in the German Bundestag”, sought to assess the importance of having women's interests represented in parliament by women. During the last 65 years many laws were passed or reformed that substantively improved the position of women in society. Many of these laws were initiated, debated, and sometimes passed at a time when women very massively underrepresented in parliament, at levels as low as six percent of the Bundestag. The analysis has shown that women mostly took a more active part in debating the bills dealing with women's issues and to some extent were more likely to vote for a women-friendly bill than their male colleagues. The study has illustrated that even in the context of strong party groups; the substantive representation of women by women does exist. While this would be expected from newer left-wing parties, this is especially important in the case of the more established and conservative parties, since they have proven to be more likely to reach across party lines and have been more successful at passing their bills into law.

Successfully representing women's interests and passing laws to improve their standing in society, however, has not proven to be dependent on the number of women represented in the respective party groups. Rather, as women reach higher levels of representation, the tendency for women to disproportionately speak out for women-friendly laws and for the legislature to vote favourably for these laws has decreased. Future research should therefore focus on clarifying whether female MPs have used the different channels which they have started to have more access to in the recent legislative periods, such as party group leadership positions, committee chairs, or ministerial positions, to influence the legislative process and substantively represent the interests of women.

Outlook

In conclusion, the thesis has illustrated the insights that are to be gained by studying MPs at the individual level, even when they are active in a highly regulated institutional and restrictive party setting such as the German Bundestag. In this effect, it has aimed to explain legislative behaviour from an institutional, a career driven, and personal identity perspective.

This thesis has also illustrated that as parliaments evolve, for example by opening or closing access for certain career types or to include more women, they remain an intriguing topic well worth studying. In particular, as the composition of parliaments change and the

ambitions of their members to pursue a life-long career within the legislature increase, we should see the electoral and career strategies of politicians adapt to achieve these goals. This development does raise new questions about representation by career politicians.

The thesis has also dealt with the representation of women, which is often allocated within the literature of minority group representation. While the representation of women remains of high societal relevance, increased cross-national migration, in particular in the context of the European Union, means that future work on representation should focus its attention on groups lacking representation due to their country of origin.

Much emphasis has been put on collecting rich and detailed data that can be used beyond the realm of this thesis, such as the roll-call, biographical and plenary debate data. This seems especially relevant in a time when parliamentarians are overburdened with frequent survey requests and these in turn suffer from low response rates and by extension from severe selection bias. Considering the access to publicly available information on MPs, their biographies, and many kinds of legislative activities they pursue in parliament, the research field of legislative studies should focus on measures that do not need to be extracted from survey data. That studying individual behaviour of legislators without the dependence on survey data is a feasible strategy, has been shown in the multitude of data sources used in the four papers of this thesis.

Future research includes ongoing work on the roll-call voting behaviour of German MPs in collaboration with Stefanie Bailer (ETH Zurich), Henning Bergmann (University of Bamberg), Thomas Saalfeld (University of Bamberg) and Ulrich Sieberer (University of Konstanz) in an effort to promote the study of the German Bundestag and make it more accessible to comparative studies on legislative behaviour. It furthermore includes ongoing collaboration with Ulrich Sieberer to analyse the roll-call data in a fuller context of the history of the Bundestag, specifically its institutional and party organisational development. In a personal pursuit to understand the mechanisms of voting behaviour on so-called “free votes” and votes on “issues of conscience” more fully, the population of the roll-call data has been used to identify the subset of these specific votes. Identifying and explaining voting behaviour in the absence of party group discipline should add to our overall understanding of representation. Moreover, identifying these votes, controlling for them, or removing them from basic roll-call vote analysis will allow us estimate the effects on parliamentary voting more accurately. Finally, the pre-parliamentary career data is the first cornerstone of a prospective comparative careers project led by Stefanie Bailer. This will surely add much

insight to our knowledge of the composition of and the access to parliaments across several European political systems. On this note, I am hopeful that this thesis has not only added to the existing literature on legislative studies but will also stimulate further research at the individual level of parliamentarians by providing a rich and diverse collection of data.

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