Vertical syndication-proof competitive prices in multilateral assignment markets
Open access
Datum
2016-12Typ
- Journal Article
Abstract
We consider a market comprising a number of perfectly complementary and homogeneous commodities. We concentrate on the incentives for firms producing these commodities to merge and form a vertical syndicate. The main result establishes that the nucleolus of the associated market game corresponds to the unique vector of prices with the following properties: (i) they are vertical syndication-proof, (ii) they are competitive, (iii) they yield the average of the buyers- and the sellers-optimal allocations in bilateral markets, and (iv) they depend on the traders’ bargaining power but not on their identity. The proof uses an isomorphism between our class of market games and the entire class of bankruptcy games. Mehr anzeigen
Persistenter Link
https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000121032Publikationsstatus
publishedExterne Links
Zeitschrift / Serie
Review of Economic DesignBand
Seiten / Artikelnummer
Verlag
SpringerThema
Multilateral market; Syndicate; Cooperative game; Assignment market; Bankruptcy problem; NucleolusAnmerkungen
It was possible to publish this article open access thanks to a Swiss National Licence with the publisher.