Agency Theory: Methodology, Analysis
Open access
Autor(in)
Datum
2005Typ
- Monograph
ETH Bibliographie
no
Altmetrics
Abstract
Designing a contract is often more of an economic than a legal problem. A good contract protects parties against opportunistic behavior while providing motivation to cooperate. This is where economics and, especially contract theory, may prove helpful by enhancing our understanding of incentive issues. The purpose of this book is to provide specific tools which will help to write better contracts in real world environments. Concentrating on moral hazard literature, this book derives a tentative checklist for drafting contracts. As an economic contribution to a field traditionally considered an art rather than a science, this treatment also gives much attention to methodological issues. Mehr anzeigen
Persistenter Link
https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000300217Publikationsstatus
publishedBand
Verlag
Peter Lang VerlagOrganisationseinheit
09629 - Stremitzer, Alexander / Stremitzer, Alexander
ETH Bibliographie
no
Altmetrics