Open access
Datum
2020-01Typ
- Journal Article
Abstract
We obtain experimental evidence that suggests that promisors are more likely to keep promises the more they were relied on by a promisee; that this effect is anticipated by promisees, who accordingly strategically overinvest to lock promisors into keeping their promises (psychological lock-in); and therefore that legal enforcement can reduce overinvestment as promisees do not need to make use of the extralegal mechanism of psychological lock-in when the legal regime induces promisors to perform instead. These results contrast with the central prediction of the holdup literature that underinvestment results in the absence of legal enforcement. Mehr anzeigen
Persistenter Link
https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-b-000421995Publikationsstatus
publishedExterne Links
Zeitschrift / Serie
The Journal of Legal StudiesBand
Seiten / Artikelnummer
Verlag
University of Chicago PressOrganisationseinheit
09629 - Stremitzer, Alexander / Stremitzer, Alexander