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Nachhaltigkeit in der sozialen Sicherung über 2030 hinaus
(2016)ÖkonomenstimmeDie soziale Sicherung in Deutschland ist nicht nachhaltig finanziert. Dieser Beitrag schlägt deshalb ein Paket von Reformvorschlägen vor, das die soziale Sicherung wieder zukunftsfähig macht.Other Publication -
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Raising the Bar for Incumbents
(2012)VOX CEPR's Policy PortalIncumbent politicians have a host of advantages in US elections; members of the US Congress are typically re-elected about 90% of the time. This column argues that such a head start can often be bad for the country, with leaders focusing on short-term populist policies rather than the greater good. It suggests raising the bar for incumbent candidates.Other Publication -
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Money and Banking - Realigned Efficiently
(2011)Current macroeconomic policymaking suffers from an inadequate range of instruments and the absence of a comprehensive assignment of responsibilities. This column introduces a new CEPR Policy Insight designed to remedy these shortcomings. It proposes a framework for monetary, macroprudential, and microprudential policies.Other Publication -
“Triple-knot” fiscal safety for the Eurozone
(2011)VOX CEPR's Policy PortalMany economists are calling for new rules in European governance to put a stop to the Eurozone crisis, with some going so far as to suggest steps towards political union. This column outlines an institutional framework – a proposal the author calls “Reciprocal Parliamentary Approval” – that may help to restore the fiscal stability many see as vital to the survival of Europe’s single currency without states surrendering their sovereignty.Other Publication -
Banking on the Average
(2011)VOX CEPR's Policy PortalCurrent regulation imposes fixed capital requirements on banks. However, this makes it impossible to use regulatory capital as a buffer against negative macroeconomic shocks. This column explains how this paradox could be resolved by basing capital requirements each year on average bank equity capital in the industry.Other Publication -
Crisis Contracts
(2011)VOX CEPR's Policy PortalWhen banks failed, the government paid up. But the bankers responsible kept their bonuses from the years of excess. This column argues for “crisis contracts”. Such contracts require that, in the event of a crisis, bank managers forfeit a portion of their past earnings to rescue the banking system.Other Publication