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dc.contributor.author
Patranabis, Sikhar
dc.contributor.author
Mukhopadhyay, Debdeep
dc.date.accessioned
2022-10-13T13:09:35Z
dc.date.available
2020-10-26T13:50:40Z
dc.date.available
2020-10-27T07:19:08Z
dc.date.available
2020-11-07T04:58:54Z
dc.date.available
2020-11-09T06:19:25Z
dc.date.available
2021-08-11T13:20:09Z
dc.date.available
2022-10-13T13:09:35Z
dc.date.issued
2021
dc.identifier.isbn
1-891562-66-5
en_US
dc.identifier.other
10.14722/ndss.2021.23116
en_US
dc.identifier.uri
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11850/447960
dc.identifier.doi
10.3929/ethz-b-000447960
dc.description.abstract
Dynamic searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) supports updates and keyword searches in tandem on outsourced symmetrically encrypted data, while aiming to minimize the information revealed to the (untrusted) host server. The literature on dynamic SSE has identified two crucial security properties in this regard - forward and backward privacy. Forward privacy makes it hard for the server to correlate an update operation with previously executed search operations. Backward privacy limits the amount of information learnt by the server about documents that have already been deleted from the database. To date, work on forward and backward private SSE has focused mainly on single keyword search. However, for any SSE scheme to be truly practical, it should at least support conjunctive keyword search. In this setting, most prior SSE constructions with sub-linear search complexity do not support dynamic databases. The only exception is the scheme of Kamara and Moataz (EUROCRYPT’17); however it only achieves forward privacy. Achieving both forward and backward privacy, which is the most desirable security notion for any dynamic SSE scheme, has remained open in the setting of conjunctive keyword search. In this work, we develop the first forward and backward private SSE scheme for conjunctive keyword searches. Our proposed scheme, called Oblivious Dynamic Cross Tags (or ODXT in short) scales to very large arbitrarily-structured databases (including both attribute-value and free-text databases). ODXT provides a realistic trade-off between performance and security by efficiently supporting fast updates and conjunctive keyword searches over very large databases, while incurring only moderate access pattern leakages to the server that conform to existing notions of forward and backward privacy. We precisely define the leakage profile of ODXT, and present a detailed formal analysis of its security. We then demonstrate the practicality of ODXT by developing a prototype implementation and evaluating its performance on real world databases containing millions of documents.
en_US
dc.format
application/pdf
en_US
dc.language.iso
en
en_US
dc.publisher
The Internet Society
en_US
dc.rights.uri
http://rightsstatements.org/page/InC-NC/1.0/
dc.title
Forward and Backward Private Conjunctive Searchable Symmetric Encryption
en_US
dc.type
Conference Paper
dc.rights.license
In Copyright - Non-Commercial Use Permitted
ethz.book.title
28th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS 2021)
en_US
ethz.size
18 p.
en_US
ethz.version.deposit
acceptedVersion
en_US
ethz.event
28th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS 2021)
en_US
ethz.event.location
Online
en_US
ethz.event.date
February 21-24, 2021
en_US
ethz.notes
Conference lecture held on February 22, 2021.
en_US
ethz.identifier.wos
ethz.publication.place
Reston, VA
en_US
ethz.publication.status
published
en_US
ethz.leitzahl
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02150 - Dep. Informatik / Dep. of Computer Science::02660 - Institut für Informationssicherheit / Institute of Information Security::09653 - Paterson, Kenneth / Paterson, Kenneth
en_US
ethz.leitzahl.certified
ETH Zürich::00002 - ETH Zürich::00012 - Lehre und Forschung::00007 - Departemente::02150 - Dep. Informatik / Dep. of Computer Science::02660 - Institut für Informationssicherheit / Institute of Information Security::09653 - Paterson, Kenneth / Paterson, Kenneth
en_US
ethz.date.deposited
2020-10-26T13:50:51Z
ethz.source
FORM
ethz.eth
yes
en_US
ethz.availability
Open access
en_US
ethz.rosetta.installDate
2020-11-09T06:19:36Z
ethz.rosetta.lastUpdated
2023-02-07T07:07:09Z
ethz.rosetta.versionExported
true
ethz.COinS
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