Experts or Authorities? The Strange Case of the Presumed Epistemic Superiority of Artificial Intelligence Systems
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Date
2023-09-04Type
- Working Paper
ETH Bibliography
yes
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Abstract
The high predictive accuracy of contemporary machine learning-based AI systems has led some scholars to argue that, in certain cases, we should grant them epistemic expertise and authority over humans. This approach suggests that humans would have the epistemic obligation of relying on the predictions of a highly accurate AI system. Contrary to this view, in this work we claim that it is not possible to endow AI systems with a genuine account of epistemic expertise. In fact, relying on accounts of expertise and authority from virtue epistemology, we show that epistemic expertise requires a relation with understanding that AI systems do not satisfy and intellectual abilities that these systems do not manifest. However, recent developments of large language models make us argue that in the future AI systems may endowed with a form of epistemic authority. Further, following the Distributed Cognition theory and adapting an account by Croce on the virtues of collective epistemic agents to the case of human-AI interactions we show that, if an AI system is successfully appropriated by a human agent, a hybrid epistemic agent emerges, which can become both an epistemic expert and an authority. Consequently, we claim that the aforementioned hybrid agent is the appropriate object of a discourse around trust in AI and the epistemic obligations that stem from its epistemic superiority. Show more
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publishedExternal links
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SSRNPublisher
Social Science Research NetworkSubject
Epistemic expertise; Authority; Epistemology; Artificial intelligence; Distributed cognitionOrganisational unit
03995 - von Wangenheim, Florian / von Wangenheim, Florian
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ETH Bibliography
yes
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